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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Chapter Introduction
This dissertation explores the possibilities presented by online platforms for scenario planning in
urban public policy. Specifically, it examines various methodological and practical issues raised by
the design and use of such systems in long term policy formulation, with a focus on
their potential as data collection instruments and analysis platforms in qualitative scenario planning.
This chapter provides an overview of the research and articulates the questions that inspired
and guided the research process. I set this inquiry in the context of three distinct bodies of
professional literature, including public participation in urban planning research, qualitative scenario
research for urban planning, and participatory collective intelligence systems as data generation and
analysis instruments. I then describe the dissertation's method and core case studies, and conclude
with a discussion of the contribution this research might make to the field.
1.2 Problem Statement
Urban planning research has a long-standing interest in the future. Davidoff and Reiner (1973, p.
11) write that, "we define planning as a process for determining appropriate future action through a
sequence of choices". Myers and Kitsuse (2000, p. 225) observe that, "the future orientation of
planning is unique to the field's identity... The very substance of urban planning is founded in time."
Yet in equal measures, planning has turned away from its futures orientation and towards more
present-focused, deliberative processes.
Certain scholars (van der Heijden, 1996; Schwartz, 1996) advance qualitative scenario
planning as one methodology for delivering higher-quality planning and research that are together
able to account for the uncertainty, volatility and complexity in public policy. This approach is
thought to enable researchers to integrate the participation of a wide variety of stakeholders with
diverse perspectives into the planning process (Chermack and van der Merwe, 2007). To date, the
influence of qualitative scenario research on urban planning as a field has been limited. This may be
because methodological, logistical and financial constraints limit its applicability for use in many
multi-stakeholder engagements. Time and resource constraints have meant that scenario exercises
have been limited to small groups of largely senior decision-makers. The number of in-depth
interviews researchers can conduct and analyze has typically constrained the breadth and diversity of
participants involved, particularly when the research question is such that researchers might benefit
from a large sample including a broad and diverse group of respondents. Finally, the constraints
placed on researchers to set up, coordinate, conduct, and analyze interviews can significantly limit
the amount and type of data researchers set out to generate.
At the same time, developments in online approaches, characterized broadly as "Web 2.0",
offer the potential to address both the need for increased participation in complex, future-oriented
planning settings, as well as the constraints of traditional qualitative scenario planning. Recent
developments in large-scale collective intelligence systems have the potential to enable researchers to
generate data from a diverse set of stakeholders (Malone, 2010). These systems are also capable of
rapid data analysis and computation. This suggests that they may be useful in helping participants
understand the interaction between scenario variables and produce more complex, rich narratives of
the future. The potential of large-scale collective intelligence systems, if realized, suggests that it may
be possible to incorporate larger, more diverse perspectives, with more in-depth and rigorous
analysis, in a way that is also rapid and more cost-effective.
But how well do such large-scale collective intelligence systems live up to this potential?
Where do they succeed, in what ways, and where might they still fall short? This dissertation
explores the role that such systems might play in the qualitative scenario planning process in urban
planning, with a focus on their ability to help generate diverse data, facilitate larger and more robust
participation, and add analytical or synthetic value. It focuses on some of the methodological and
practical concerns raised by the design and use of such systems in long-term policy formulation,
with an emphasis on their impact on stakeholder participation in different phases of the scenario
planning process. It also examines the possible evolution of these systems in the future, with special
consideration of their methodological implication for scholarly research.
1.3 Research Questions
This dissertation explores online participatory futures systems as a novel approach to qualitative
scenario planning research. It asks two broad questions:
- Do web-based participatory approaches add value to the traditional scenario planning
process, and if so, where and in what ways?
- If not, where do they fall short, in what ways, and why?
More specifically, what impact do the web-based approaches explored in this dissertation have on:
- The number and tpe of participants involved in the process and at what phase?
- The geographic scope of participation enabled?
- The range of expertprofessional disciplines consulted?
- The number of variables and opinions incorporated?
- The mechanism of analysis, ranking and clustering?
- The time spent on data collection and analysis?
The amount of user debate and reflection?
In light of evidence raised by these research questions, the following discussion points will also be
explored:
- Is more participation necessarily better?
- What impact might such approaches have on the pedagogicalimpact of scenario planning
engagements?
- What potential do such tools have to incorporate the "wisdom of the crowds" for more in-
depth analysis and large-scale engagements?
- What impact might such approaches have on the facilitation of consensus-building and debate?
- How might different levels of interface structure influence user participation?
- What role does particzpant recruitment play in the process of user engagement and analysis?
- How might such systems help preserve dissenting ideas and challenging debate?
- What potential do such tools have to help minimizefacilitator bias?
- What methodological considerations do the use of such tools as data generation instruments
raise for urban planning research more broadly?
. What does this research suggest for a more rigorous evaluative approach in the future?
1.4 Overview of the Literature Review
Chapter Two of this dissertation locates this work within the broader literature on public
participation in urban planning research, qualitative scenario planning research for urban planning,
and participatory collective intelligence systems as data generation instruments. Brief summaries of
each are provided below to add context to the summary of the research design that follows.
1.4.1 Public Participation in Urban Planning Research
Continued pressures for democratic participation and stake-holder engagement has further
emphasized the importance of public participation as a research topic. In the last 15 years, planning
researchers have begun to examine the potential of information and telecommunications technology
as a means to facilitate stakeholder participation in planning, as well as to generate data for related
topics. In recent years, the context of e-government has mainstreamed the use of information
technology to engage citizens in municipal government operations and planning.
As an applied research discipline, urban planning is both responsive to this legal context and
motivated to engage the public in research at least in part to help mobilize understanding of and
support for the resultant plans. Public participation as a context for planning research is both a
historical reality and the topic of intense methodological and practice-oriented debate within the
professional literature of the field. The evolving and contested definitions of and rationales for
public participation in urban planning research provide a context for this dissertation's exploration
of collective intelligence systems as a mechanism for stakeholder participation. This dissertation
explores the lack of suitable technical tools to engage stakeholders in a manner that facilitates
research, and examines the urban planning literature regarding the unique technological needs of the
field. Online participatory systems that engage stakeholders in the planning process are new, but the
practice of engaging the public in urban development is established.
1.4.2 Qualitative Scenario Research Within Urban Planning
Scenario planning is a research tradition within urban planning that explores uncertain futures based
on external trends and complex forces at play over time. Qualitative scenario planning research
typically follows a structured approach to explore the long-term policy impacts of uncertainty and
change in order to enhance traditional planning research techniques. As such, it is both an approach
and a technique for urban planning research. It uses qualitative data generated from stakeholders
and experts to explicitly account for the forces driving uncertainty in planning research.
Porter (1985) defines scenarios as "an internally consistent view of what the future might
turn out to be - not a forecast, but one possible future outcome." Schwartz (1991) defines scenarios
as "a tool for ordering one's perceptions about alternative future environments in which one's
decisions might be played out." Ringland (1998) defines scenario planning as "that part of strategic
planning which relates to the tools and technologies for managing the uncertainties of the future."
Operational researcher Shoemaker (1995) suggests that scenario planning is "a disciplined
methodology for imaging possible futures in which organizational decisions may be played out." The
term comprises several related schools of approach, most of which involve facilitated stakeholder
workshops that focus on external, environmental uncertainties and stakeholder reactions to create
multiple "plausible futures" for a situation. Scenario planners theorize (Chermack, 2003) that the
exploration of uncertainty in its social context produces shared understanding, enhanced learning,
and more robust long-term policies.
Traditional qualitative scenario planning research thus entails a structured process of
generating data in order to create multiple potential future scenarios that reflect cyclical uncertainties
and stretch researcher and stakeholder awareness about the context within which specific policies
will unfold. Indeed, scenario planning researchers suggest that the integration of more robust data
with regard to structural uncertainties can help research and policy move beyond one-dimensional
extrapolations of the past towards more sophisticated, complex modelling of the influence of
uncertainty on planning.
1.4.3 Participatory Collective Intelligence Systems as Data Generation Instruments
In non-urban planning fields, participatory collective intelligence systems are beginning to enable
researchers to generate data from a broad and diverse sample of participants. In urban planning,
traditional qualitative scenario research most often involves interviewing a handful of subject matter
experts and convening 15-25 senior decision-makers in person. Large-scale collective intelligence
systems, in contrast, have the possibility of engaging entire stakeholder groups, interest networks,
and geographies.
Malone et. al at the MIT Center for Collective Intelligence define "collective intelligence" as,
"groups of individuals doing things collectively that seem intelligent" (2010). Pierre Levy (1994)
argues "...that because the Internet facilitates a rapid, open and global exchange of data and ideas",
that the network should "mobilize and coordinate the intelligence, experience, skills, wisdom, and
imagination of humanity" in novel ways.
O'Rielly (2005) writes that Web 2.0 is a way of "harnessing collective intelligence" by
providing "architectures of participation" that embrace experimental "perpetual beta" applications,
and eases experimentation and collaboration between diverse communities. This is often achieved
through an approach termed "crowdsourcing": the act of accomplishing tasks by mobilizing and
capturing the distributed efforts of a large network of diverse, web-based participants. Brabham
(2008) defines "crowdsourcing" as "a new Web-based business model that harnesses the creative
solutions of a distributed network of individuals through what amounts to an open call for
proposals." He goes on to argue that crowdsourced approaches constitute "a legitimate complex
problem-solving model... capable of aggregating talent, leveraging ingenuity while reducing costs
and time formerly needed to solve problems" (Brabham, 2008).
This literature on the architecture for collective intelligence projects provides a useful
context for envisioning the components of an online scenario planning system. Combining this with
the components of scenario planning process outlined previously allows researchers to provide more
detail as to how such a system would ideally operate in order to generate data.
1.5 Overview of Methodology and Constraints
Chapter Three discusses the methodological approach employed in this dissertation, with particular
focus on the case study strategy. I outline my approach to sampling and case selection, and provide
background on the base case, the three comparative examples, and two original case studies, each of
which explores different aspects of online futures research in urban planning. The approach to data
generation, collection, and analysis is discussed and the limitations of the method are also outlined.
Each of these is reviewed briefly below.
This study employed a qualitative, mixed-method approach to investigate the research
questions. Specifically, two novel online platforms were developed and deployed as case studies in
order to generate data for the research questions. Results were then compared pair-wise to a base
case example; which represents a typical face-to-face scenario planning exercise for urban planning
and public policy settings. These in-depth case studies were then augmented with a comparative
analysis of three additional examples of online participation platforms in disciplines other than urban
planning. Finally, in-depth qualitative interviews were used to help add context and interpret the
results of both.
Such a mixed method approach departs from traditional experimental design. An ideal
experiment would allow for the isolation of key outcome variables in advance, manipulation of
specific independent variables through a controlled set of randomized or semi-random tests and
then measurement of their impact on the dependent variables of interest through standardized
measurement techniques and instruments. This would include adequate control for error, variance
and exogenous factors, thereby providing evidence if such approaches are "better" or "worse" than
traditional scenario planning approaches.
A purely experimental approach was infeasible for three reasons: 1) the relevant categories
and variables for measurement were unknown in advance; 2) there was little empirical evidence for,
or agreement on, the key outcome variables of scenario planning and; 3) there was no standard
measurement instruments or protocols that could be applied in their testing. As a result, both the
dependent and independent variables were unknown and no standard method for comparison could
be established. An alternative research strategy was therefore required.
The approach taken involved two stages: first, platform design, and second, application and
comparison to a base case. Because no online participatory futures systems for urban planning
existed at the time of this research, it was first necessary to design and produce a series of
prototypical system designs that could generate data for these research questions. Before their
development, various concepts and designs were tested with expert interviews and groups of
participants to determine potentially relevant design features. These were then used to create
measurement constructs that could be used to evaluate them.
For each case study, I generated a significant amount of detailed data from a number of
sources, including interviews, focus groups, rapid prototype workshops, online participatory futures
system instruments and primary document review (Gomm et al. 2000, p. 2). Each of the cases was
designed to illuminate different aspects of how these novel methodological approaches could be of
use for urban planning research in general, and qualitative scenario planning in particular. This
approach enabled rich descriptions, concept development, and understanding through the analysis
of both the structured and unstructured data as it emerged.
The cases were designed, developed and tested in sequence. Data from the first case was
compared internally as well as pair-wise against the base case. Next, the lessons from this case were
incorporated into the design and deployment of the second case. The second case was explicitly
different from the first, taking an intentionally different approach to data collection, measurement
and evaluation. This was done in order to help explore gaps in the research questions that the first
case was unable to answer, as well as to test new ideas raised by the first. As a result, cross-case
comparison of data was not conducted between the two online cases, but was used in a pair-wise
comparison with different aspects of the base case.
Due to the limitations of the core cases, however, they were supplemented with a detailed
review of three comparative examples of online participation platforms in other disciplines. Each
comparative example was chosen specifically to address key weaknesses or data gaps from the case
studies, thereby providing a richer, more robust source of evidence for review. The results of both
the cases and comparative examples were further supplemented by a series of in-depth, semi-
structured interviews with experts in the field of scenario planning, online participation, or public
policy. These interviews helped provide depth and context to the earlier findings, aiding in concept
definition, interpretation, and evaluation- completing my multi-method approach. Finally, the case
and comparative examples were interpreted in light of the research findings and used to analyze
emergent themes and issues relative to the research questions.
1.6 Overview of Cases and Comparative Examples
The online participatory futures systems analyzed in the two case studies are suggestive of an
approach to these questions that may contribute to future urban planning research needs. This
section introduces the base case, the two online cases and the three comparative examples.
1.6.1 Base Case: Regional Scenarios for the Future of a Northern Spanish Region
This case study was selected as a representative example of a typical qualitative scenario creation
process for urban and regional planning. The exercise, conducted under the employment of a
notable scenario planning company, on behalf of a regional government in the north of Spain. For
confidentiality reasons, the names of both the consultancy and client have been anonymized.
The client for this cases acts as a public-private interface and helps to coordinate stakeholders
around strategic projects and future urban plans. The project that served as the base case was
intended to look forward 20 years to the year 2030 and create multiple qualitative scenarios based on
different development pathways of Europe and the region. These scenarios were then used to
evaluate current investment policies and develop a more robust long-term vision , helping the city to
remain competitive and vibrant in the face of uncertainty and change.
This case focuses on the process of drivers and uncertainty generation, presentation, ranking,
clustering, and distillation into draft scenario frameworks. It also considers the method and output
of draft scenario detailing activities but does not explicitly consider the use of this material to create
the final narrative scenarios and policy documents.
1.6.2 Case 1: Futurescaper
The prototypical collective intelligence system developed to generate data for this research was
called "Futurescaper" (after the term "futurescaping", coined by designer Anab Jain). For this case, I
designed and developed a data generation and analysis platform for exploring various aspects of the
qualitative scenario planning process online. Data generation for this case was completed using data
from the International Futures Forum (IFF) as part of a project run by Tony Hodgson on the
implications of climate change impacts for the UK Government. The purpose of this project was to
identify the systemic linkages between climate change impacts in other parts of the world and the
secondary and tertiary impacts on critical supply chains and governance functions within the UK.
Futurescaper used a structured, form-based approach to the collection of trends and drivers that
could affect the future of the research topic. It stored these trends in an online database and
provided basic tools to aid in their analysis.
1.6.3 Case 2: SenseMaker Scenarios
The second in depth online case was called "SenseMaker Scenarios". For this case, I adapted an
existing commercial software platform to address several themes raised by the first case-
specifically, a desire to involve a greater number of participants, to explore new formats of data
collection, and to improve the user interface to facilitate collective analysis. The approach was
developed in conjunction with two colleagues, Dave Snowden and Wendy Schultz, who were
instrumental in the design and execution of this case. Data was generated for this case in an online
engagement lasting approximately one week, as part of the 2010 International Risk Assessment and
Horizon Scanning Conference for the Government of Singapore. Participants were asked to explore
the future of urban public services under financial uncertainty.
SenseMaker Suite is a platform designed to solicit stories about a particular topic or theme
from distributed contributors. Respondents were asked to relate a story about the subject that may
shed some light on the topic under consideration. Users then coded their story against key themes
and concepts, either with sliders or through locating their story along a spectrum of values. The goal
was to blend qualitative research in the form of stories, anecdotes and narratives (that convey rich
social meaning and are easily transmitted), with quantitative data that can be coded, index, classified
and sorted. The system therefore asks users to code the significance of their story on qualitative
axes, thereby generating quantitative data for subsequent comparison and analysis.
1.6.4 Comparative Example 1: The Institute for the Future's Foresight Engine
The Foresight Engine is an interactive gaming platform developed by the Palo Alto-based
technology forecasting non-profit, The Institute for the Future (IFTF). Foresight Engine uses a
card-game like interface in which thousands of players submit ideas to explore the future of a subject
during a curated engagement period. The example chosen for the dissertation comparison was an
engagement exploring the future of the United States utility network, entitled "Smart Grid 2025".
The event, sponsored by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), engaged
almost 700 participants from 81 different countries over a 24-hour period, creating nearly 5,000
submissions and interactions. Aside from the participants, over 26,000 people viewed the project
website and associated content. Participants included subject matter experts, academics and
students, IFTF staff, and members of the general public. This project was selected as the first
comparison example because its game-like interface and open-ended participation is an excellent
example of leveraging stakeholder participation online.
1.6.5 The WikiStrat Grand Strategy Competition
WikiStrat is an online geo-strategy platform. The platform operates as a for-profit strategy
consultancy, using a distributed network of analysts and subject matter experts who contribute
piecework or competition-based analysis in a crowd-sourced format. Compared to the Foresight
Engine, WikiStrat uses a fairly simple Content Management System (CMS) / wiki platform. In
contrast, however, it supports a more complex community of experts, who participate over time for
both recognition and financial reward. Paying clients pose topics or questions to the community, via
moderation by WikiStrat staff, who then contribute essays, analysis, trends and drivers into the
WikiStrat system via web forms and surveys. Participants are asked to select and evaluate different
trends and factors, suggest implications, and draft narrative comments via questionnaires, which are
then scored by a combination of algorithm and staff to select "winners" for each engagement.
Winners are then paid a portion of the proceeds generated by WikiStrat client engagements. Past
topics included the outcome of the Arab Spring, the future of China, and other geopolitical and
security topics.
1.6.4 Comparative Example 3: OpenForesight's Future of Facebook Project
The last comparative example selected explored the future of the social media platform, Facebook
through an "open foresight" process. This project used entirely free services such as Facebook,
Twitter, YouTube Quora and Kickstarter to conduct an "open source" scenario planning exercise.
The process began with a video on Kickstarter project (the crowdfunding platform) to generate
interest and funds to execute the project. This announcement was promoted via Facebook, Twitter,
blogs and emails and received significant social media coverage. The second phase engaged
approximately 25 thinkers in the field in in-depth video interviews over Skype. These were then
edited into short clips and posted on a public YouTube channel for distribution and review. The
administrators also created a Quora an interactive, user-driven question and answer site, with which
users posed and responded to various questions raised by the interviews. Finally, traditional desktop
research was conducted offline. The results were represented back to the open community of users
in the form of several blog posts and videos, resulting in a series of scenarios describing several
possible futures for the Facebook platform. In addition to the 25 experts interviewed via video
(which received over 17,000 views on YouTube), the project received 109 responses from over 220
subscribers to the Quora and extensive interaction on Facebook from over 50 users.
1.7 Structure of the Dissertation
This section presents a detailed discussion of the purpose of the research and the structure of the
dissertation. In Chapter Two, I review the relevant background literatures from urban planning,
public participation, scenario planning, and online collective intelligence systems. Chapter Three
presents the core research questions and my methodological approach. These chapters comprise the
background research to this work.
Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven present the findings of this research. This includes a
detailed discussion of the Base Case (Chapter Four), the Comparative Examples (Chapter Five), and
Cases 1 and 2 (Chapters Six and Seven, respectively). Each findings chapter focuses on a qualitative
exploration of the subject, analysing who participated, how they contributed and interacted, how this
material was used, and what outcomes were produced.
Chapter Eight, Discussion, integrates these findings into a discussion framework.
Specifically, it compares and contrasts the results of each case and example and highlights themes
and issues relevant to the research questions. This takes two forms: first, a discussion on a set of
themes for which robust data from the Findings exists and; second, a more speculative discussion
about aspects which the data did not support or cover, but which are still interesting and relevant to
the research questions.
Finally, Chapter Nine, concludes the dissertation by reflecting on the discussion
findings in the context of an emerging typology of online approaches to futures research and
scenario planning, suggesting future improvements and research opportunities. I discuss the
limitations of this study, make recommendations for future research, and various ways of generating
better understanding of these systems within the context of planning research.
1.9 Overview of Contribution to the Field
This thesis aims to make several contributions to the field of urban planning research. First, it
explores methodologies that highlight the benefits and drawbacks that collective intelligence
platforms for scenario planning can offer urban planning and design. It examines whether rigorous
social research focused on planning in contexts of complexity might be achieved through a greater
emphasis on large-scale online participatory methods, and discusses how they might complement
more established streams of scenario and urban planning research.
Second, this thesis speaks to the relevance of online tools to enable stakeholder participation
in planning, while addressing their limitations. Online approaches appear to have significant
promise. They allow distributed stakeholders to participate in the process over greater distance and
time, not bound by workshop facilitation style or space constraints. They increase the scale of
participation possible, as well as the data sources and analytical viewpoints that can be considered.
They have the potential to speed up the process by utilizing distributed resources and crowd-
sourcing approaches to conduct work and analysis in parallel. Finally, online approaches allow for
larger sample size collection, increased transparency and further empirical validation of scenario
planning's claims.
Third, this thesis seeks to suggest refined measurement instruments that may be better
capable of integrating a broad and diverse set of stakeholder perspectives into the research process.
It is hoped that a better understanding of the key concepts of measurement and mechanisms of
evaluation for such systems can help researchers better understand related questions in the future.
1.10 Chapter Conclusion
This introductory chapter described my doctoral research, framed the urban planning research
problem statement, and articulated the research questions and exploratory hypothesis. I located my
inquiry within three distinct bodies of professional literature, including public participation in urban
planning research, qualitative research within urban planning, and participatory collective intelligence
systems as data generation instruments. I then described the dissertation's method and core case
studies, and previewed the contributions the research has the potential to make to the field.
2.0 Literature Review
2.1 Chapter Introduction
This chapter introduces the research topic in the context of urban planning research and theory. It
explores how the field of urban planning has historically positioned itself relative to the concept of
the future, arguing that producing knowledge for, and attempting to influence the future has always
been an integral part of the field's purpose. It reviews how this relationship has evolved over time
through the lens of four different philosophical and theoretical traditions, then explores the role that
public participation has come to play in this context.
Next, it situates the field's use of prediction, modelling and forecasting in relation to public
participation, vis-a-vis an exploration of several socio-technical engagement approaches. These
include the literatures around Planning Support Systems (PSS), Public Participation (PPGIS) and
Alternative Futures Analysis (AFA). In parallel, it explores how the literatures on Web 2.0, online
participation and collective intelligence systems have developed in relation to these issues. Finally, it
introduces the history and theory of qualitative scenario planning, reviews the literature on how it is
most frequently practiced, and how its strengths and limitations are discussed. This chapter
concludes with a discussion of how the research in this dissertation fits within the overall landscape
of this literature.
2.2 The Role of the Future in Urban Planning
Urban planning research has a long-standing relationship to the future. Myers and Kitsuse (2000)
observe that, "the future orientation of planning is unique to the field's identity... The very substance
of urban planning is founded in time" (p. 225). Davidoff and Reiner (1973) write that, "we define
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planning as a process for determining appropriate future action through a sequence of choices" (p.
11). Hopkins and Zapata (2007) write, "Planning takes place in the present and engages the future"
(p. 2). More specifically, Myers (in Hopkins, 2007) suggests that, "the essential task of planning, its
heroic challenge, is to build a bridge from present individualism to the community future" (p. 60).
This appreciation for, and desire to influence the future, is deeply rooted in both planning
and public policy. In his review of two centuries of planning history, Friedman (1987) argues that at
least three of the four main strands of planning thought are related efforts to "guide history"
towards more desirable outcomes. These traditions include sodal reform, policy analysis, and the sodal
learning traditions, which Friedman differentiates from the more recent and adversarial, social
mobili.Zation tradition. Each is discussed in more detail below, with reference to their scholarly
relationship to the concept of the future.
2.2.1 The Social Reform Tradition
The first of these is the social reform tradition, which Friedman (1987) writes "focuses on the role of
the state in societal guidance," and is "chiefly concerned with finding ways to institutionalize
planning practice and make action by the state more effective" (p. 76). This tradition was a reaction
to the consequences of rapid industrialization in Europe and the United States. Cities such as
Manchester, England were becoming notorious examples of sprawling, disorderly industrial cities,
replete with slums, congestion, sickness, crime and social upheaval (Sutcliffe, 1977). This rapid
change led to concern about the effects of such environments on the health of both individuals and
society. The influential photo-journal How the Other HalfLives (Riss, 1896), observed of New York
City that "three-fourths of its people live in the tenements, and the nineteenth-century drift of the
population to the cities is sending ever-increasing multitudes to crowd them...We know now that
there is no way out; that the 'system' that was the evil offspring of public neglect and private greed
has come to stay, a storm-centre forever of our civilization" (p. 12). H.G. Wells fearfully warned that
unless its growth was somehow checked, the "whirlpool city" threatened to suck the whole life of
the society into its dense vortex (cited in Fishman, 1998).
Rothman (1971) suggests that the debates behind the social reform movement were
underscored by a "vigorous attempt to promote the stability of the society at a moment when
traditional ideas and practices appeared outmoded, constricted, and ineffective" (Rothman, 1971).
The almshouse, the penitentiary, the reformatory, the asylum and the orphanage were all efforts to
reengineer a new form of stability in the midst of bewildering change and complexity. "It is no
wonder then, that [the supporters of the moral role of planning] held their positions so staunchly,
eager to defend every detail. With the stakes so high and the results almost entirely dependent upon
physical design, every element in penitentiary organization assumed overwhelming importance"
(Rothman, 1971).
The profusion of well-wishing reformers at the end of the nineteenth century, coupled with
an explicit focus on the connection between physical form and social effects, left a powerful mark
on the minds of architects, planners, policy makers and students of urban sociology. Works such as
Howard's Garden Cities of To-Morrow (1902), which Ward (1998) called "the richest single source of
planning ideas over the last century" and those of Frederick Law Olmsted and the City Beautiful
Movement, "gave the public faith [in] technologically expert engineers" (Chudacoff & Smith, 1994;
Stilgoe, 1983). These thinkers laid the philosophical groundwork for the large-scale urban planning
efforts of the twentieth century and were critical in the foundation of the Modern Movement in
architecture. In the words of Dutch sociologist and future studies pioneer, Fred Polak (1974), the
social reform approach to planning was essence-pessimist, influence-optimist; society was at its essence
flawed, but could be "brought towards light" through positive, rational action.
2.2.2 The Policy Analysis Tradition
The polig analysis Iradition was similar, but recognized the pragmatic difficulties in defining, not to
mention achieving, an "optimal" public good. Simon's seminal work, Administrative Behavior, (1945)
is representative of this tradition, which sought to understand how organizations made "satisficing"
decisions in the face of incomplete data using bounded rationality. Simon's contribution was part of
a genre that would influence decades of planning researchers, including early systems thinkers such
as Stafford Beer (1959), Jay Forrester (1968, 1969) and Thomas Schelling (1978).
In general, the polig analysis approach turned away from the explicit, normalizing rhetoric of
the social reform school. But it did not abandon the quest for rational, scientific, empirical influence
over the future. Instead of asserting normative values, members of this tradition focused on the
instrumentalization of rationality as a tool for helping decision-makers. Lindblom (1979) called this
the "rational-comprehensive" approach, whereby values and objectives were clarified independently
before analysis begins, the desired ends are isolated, the means to achieve them are deduced and a
comprehensive analysis is conducted. Finally, policy is chosen based on whatever means meet the
ends best.
Friedman elaborates further by presenting a version of Stokey and Zeckhauser's (1978)
process from their influential, Primer on Polig Analysis. These steps include: (a) formulation of goals
and objectives; (b) identification and design of major alternatives for reaching the goals identified
within the given decision-making situation; (c) prediction of major sets of consequences expected to
follow upon adoption of each alternative; (d) evaluation of consequences in relation to desired
objectives and other important values; (e) Decision based on information provided in the preceding;
(f) implementation of this decision through appropriate institutions; and (g) feedback of actual
program results and their assessment in light of the new decision situation.
This tradition has had a powerful influence on urban planning, vis-a-vis operations research,
urban modelling, and simulation. In his 1994 review of Anglo-American urban modelling, Batty
writes, "Computer models of land use and transportation were first developed in a milieu dominated
by the sense that the early and mid-twentieth century successes in science could extend to the entire
realm of human affairs." These were developed in the context of an increasing emphasis on
positivism and scientific rationality which "together with the concern for systematic decision-making
in such fields as management, politics, psychology and economics, led to a rational model of
decision which came to underpin physical planning" (Batty, 1994; Faludi, 1971).
The role that forecasts played in these approaches makes them particularly relevant for this
review. Although each modelling system had its own specifics, producing forecasts of spatial
interaction and socio-economic outcomes was almost always part of their goal. These forecasts
were used to make policy-making choices; a process demonstrable by faith in both the theoretical
underpinnings and operational mechanisms of such models.
By the early 1970's, however, the limits of the rational positivist approach in the complex
dynamics of urban environments were becoming clear. In 1973, Lee published his seminal article on
the dysfunction of large-scale urban models. Lee identified seven major "sins" of large-scale
models: (1) "hypercomprehensivity", models which tried to replicate too many aspects of the real
world; (2) "grossness", producing outputs at too high a level of aggregation or abstraction to be
useful for decision-making; (3) "hungriness", they had a tremendous need for data to produce
results; (4) "wrongheadedness", they often made assumptions about system behavior based on
scanty or incomplete evidence; (5) "complicatedness", their output lacked validity and rigour and
was presented in an overly complicated form; (6) "mechanicalness", they often propagated errors
and compounded uncertainties in mechanistic, deterministic ways; and finally 7) "expensiveness":
these models were also exorbitantly expensive. Lee concluded his requiem by emphasizing that at
the time no model had produced any kind of relevant theory or decision-ready information.
That same year, Brewer (1973) published an insightful analysis of the political and
organizational limits of forecasts in planning. Brewer's account focused on the social and political
contexts within which such models were applied. He argued that the organizational investment
required in them created maladaptive outputs and political misuse. Even if the models had been
perfect, he suggested, the pressure to produce results resulted in botched analysis, fudged
assumptions, manufactured data, and overinflated promises that ultimately doomed the entire
enterprise.
Larger social and political forces were also sweeping society that would draw urban planning
even further away from a techno-positivist relationship on the future. Banerjee (1993) describes this
larger transformation when he writes:
Planning lost its innocence in the 1960's when pbysical andprojectfocus was much discredited by the social
scientists who joinedplanning and urban studies programs or became advisors to government bureaucracies.
Planning became an advocag for the poor, for the minorities, for the disenfranchised, andfor those who
sufferedfrom decades of social injustices and inequities. Planners were no longer dealing with discrete physical
projects but were very much engaged in a wider range of social and environmentalpolig matters involving
redistribution of income and encumbrance ofpropery rights in aprofound way ( 523).
Returning to Freidman, this transformation would split planning research into two broadly
distinct but related camps, the social learning and the social mobilization camps. These are discussed
below.
2.2.3 The Social Learning Tradition
The social learning tradition developed as a refinement of the policy analysis approach. It recognized
fundamental limits to what planning could and could not claim, yet still shared many goals of policy
analysis tradition. Lindblom (1979) characterized this shift as one from "root to branch", i.e.,
rational comprehensive planning and policy-making to "incremental acts of mutual adjustment" or
less glamorously, "muddling through" (p. 80). But why "learning", and how is this relevant to the
future?
While authors such as Lindblom and others did not reject rationality or the use of science,
their approach was fundamentally post-positivist. They believed that the world was subject to
multiple possible meanings without a single "solution." Problems were often "wicked", unbound,
and undefinable (Rittel & Weber, 1973). Stakeholders had conflicting goals and agendas, not all of
which were rational (Majone, 1989). They also argued that the rational comprehensive approach not
only fell short of handling real-world complexity in socially meaningful ways (Scott, 1998), but also
privileged certain groups and perspectives at the expense of others (Faludi, 1986).
Authors such as Davidoff (1965), Forester (1989), Schon (1983) and others pioneered a turn
away from rational policy analysis in response. Their approach emphasized the social and
psychological dynamics of multi-stakeholder interaction as an "exercise in discovery" (Healey, 1997),
based largely on ideas of communicative rationality pioneered by Habermas (1981).
Instead of a technocratic expert with confident forecasts of the future, the planner was
meant to become an active participant in the "social learning processes" (Schon and Rein, 1994),
thereby helping to build shared understanding and consensus around policy. Thus, the social learning
approach to the future was among the first to acknowledge that parts of the planning process are
fundamentally uncertain, cannot be predicted, and require the co-creation of meaning through
interactions with different stakeholders.
2.2.4 The Social Mobilization Tradition
The last tradition necessary to explore here in relation to planning's approach to the future is what
Friedman (1987) classified as the socialmobilization tradition. This approach was related to the social
learning school described above, but drew more explicitly political conclusions from its analysis.
Forester (1989) summarized this approach when he observed that, "all human interaction and
exchange was embedded in a system of power, domination, and normative roles" (p. 152). Like
social learning, key aspects of this critique assert that: (a) formal optimization strategies are
inadequate in the face of complex social problems; (b) it is impossible to gather the necessary
information to make fully rational decisions; and (c) attempts to do so privilege certain groups at the
expense of others, reinforce existing power relationships and further marginalize under-represented
groups. Castells (1977) even goes so far as to define urban design entirely on these terms:
We call urban social change the redefinition of urban meaning. We call urban planning the negotiated
adaptation of urbanfunctions to a shared urban meaning. We call urban design the symbolic attempt to
express an accepted urban meaning in certain urban forms (P. 303-304)
This approach drew heavily from materialist Marxist theory, which positioned planning in a
matrix of class struggle and social domination. Lefebvre (1991), for example, extended the
traditional Marxist analysis to the urban spatial environment, equating the social production of space
with the production of any other commodity. This process, he claimed, was inherently laden with
class and power relationships (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 33).
Aside from re-theorizing the role of planning in society, one of the most important impacts
of the social mobilization approach is its enduring impact on the role ofparticipation in urban
planning. Davidoff (1965) was among the first to argue strongly for the participation of different
actors in the planning process. In Advocag and Pluralism in Planning, he argued that it was impossible
for the planner to be entirely value-free as regards to ends, since planners as people had values as
well. He therefore sought a method of planning that was open to a greater diversity of values
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"among the plurality of interests within a political community" (p. 25). In this context, he argued,
planners should not stay value-neutral. They should become "value-conscious," thereby declaring
their values and making themselves available to clients who wished to pursue such values.
This led directly to the "communicative approach" of Forester (1989, 1999), Healey (1992,
1993, 1996), Innes (1996, 1998), and others such as Schon (1983), whose attempts to make planners
aware of the value of discussion, debate and information sharing were part of a larger effort to shift
planning culture towards greater community collaboration, consensus building, debate and
discussion. Their goal was to remake planning to focus on issues of social justice, equity, and the
redistribution of power and resources. They saw discursive practices such as community
workshops, public outreach, debate and consensus building as a means by which people could learn
about each other, debate their differences, and become more reflective of their own role in society.
"In this way, a store of mutual understanding is built up, a sort of 'social and intellectual capital'
which can be drawn upon when dealing with subsequent issues" (Healy, 1997; p. 25). They also
argued that this would create a more level political playing field on which to debate power
relationships. Deliberate social change was thus perceived to be an activity that arose from below.
Thus began the era in which advocacy and pluralism became the bywords of planning pedagogy.
2.2.5 Summarizing the Evolving Role of the Future in Urban Planning
In all of these traditions, the future played a central role in the mandate and mechanisms of urban
planning. But the role of the future, and faith in the planner's ability to gain knowledge and
influence over it, has declined over time. This is partially the result of a more mature relationship to
complexity and uncertainty, and partially the result of the political and social reaction against
technical rationalism in favor of political participation and debate.
In its strongest form, some argue that the field has become overly interested in near-term
amelioration of political disputes, driven by both philosophical and practical political concerns for
expediency. Coucelis (2005) argues, for example, that, "urban planning has retreated from strategic,
future-oriented topics to become absorbed in operational and managerial activities characterized by
short time horizons and value choices likely to be equally short-sighted and ad hoc" (p. 1356). While
this interpretation may be overly stark, it should nonetheless be familiar to scholars and practitioners
involved in futures-oriented planning in the public realm. Although mainstream urban planning may
have retreated from futures-oriented technical analysis for the reasons explained above, other sub-
disciplines within it have continued to pioneer formal rational approaches with reasonable degrees
of success. Disciplines such as transportation modelling have made progress with computational
models of traffic volumes and the like, although the success of such rational approaches is still
limited to domains which have fewer variables to compute and do not suffer from conflicting
optomization goals and objectives. Thus while several sub-disciplines have made progress, the
broader political nature of multi-stakeholder urban governance has restricted the wider impact of
these technical improvements.
The following section explores the means and mechanisms of participation in planning in
more detail. It then relates this participation to the literature on scenario planning and uncertainty in
the sections thereafter.
2.3 Participation in the Planning Process
In 1969, a former official at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
Sherry Arnstein published an influential paper on public participation. She defined eight levels of
citizen participation in the planning process, organized through a "ladder" metaphor. The "rungs"
of the ladder were sorted into three levels, including nonparticipation (manipulation), tokenism
(informing, consultation, placation), and citizen power (partnership, delegated power, citizen
control). Although later authors and practitioners would move beyond these categorizations into
more sophisticated approaches, her paper marked the beginning of a significant research effort into
more effective ways of engaging citizens in the planning process. Hulchanski's (1977) bibliography
of participation approaches documents the rapid expansion of techniques and perspectives that
resulted, in part, from Arnstein's seminal paper.
By the 1990's, consultation and public participation was a thriving industry of sub-
consultants, academics and researchers. The APA's 1990 manual, Neighborhood Planning: A Guidefor
Citizens and Planners, presents a variety of methods used for outreach, data-gathering and public
involvement. It argues that public participation is not only "ethical" (thereby echoing the influence
of the sociallearning and social mobili.Zation theorists of the 1960's and 1970's), but necessary to create
better plans that are more likely to succeed. "Doing things democratically takes more effort and
more time, but it is worth it for the quality of product that emerges and the sense of commitment
that people will have toward it" (p. 12). Like other works in a similar vein, participation was
espoused as an effective means to produce "deprofessionalization, decentralization, demystification,
and democratization."
Brody et al. (2003) suggested five approaches to consider when engaging citizens in the
planning process. The objectives of the process should be to "listen" and "empower citizens",
thereby providing them with a chance to influence planning decisions. This should be done publicly,
early and continuously throughout the process, aiming to solicit input from as broad a range of
stakeholders as possible. Different techniques for outreach and engagement should be used to
enhance uptake in a wide variety of communities, and information should be presented in as clear
and value-free way as possible.
Others are more explicit in their assessment of the benefits of public participation.
Creighton (2005) argues that participation produces: (a) higher quality decisions; (b) lower costs and
less delays; (c) increased consensus and agreement; (d) easier implementation; (e) enhanced
credibility and legitimacy; (f) a means to avoid 'worst case confrontations'; (g) a way to anticipate and
respond to public concerns; and (h) more social capital and a stronger sense of 'civil society'.
While the moral value and supposed benefits of participation are clear, not everyone agrees
that its operational impact is as positive as its proponents claim. Day (1997) argued that citizen
participation is an "essentially contested" concept for urban planning and public policy. If
participation is meant to enhance "citizen power", as Arnstein originally defined it, Day observes
that this is rarely actually ever practiced. The final authority, she argued, is reserved for elected
political officials and their professional staff.
Innes and Booher (2004) are even more direct in their criticisms. They first define five
purposes for participation: 1) to discover people's preferences, 2) to incorporate local knowledge, 3)
to advance the principles of fairness and justice, 4) to legitimize governance decisions, and 5) to
fulfill legal requirements. They then observe that these ends are most often met through the use of
public hearings, surveys and focus groups, written public comments, citizen-based commissions, or
citizen appointments to boards of directors, advisory committees and task forces.
While such approaches might fulfill the purposes of planning in letter, they argue that they
fail to produce the kind of transformative empowerment sought by citizens. Indeed, most
participation is a "complicated, convoluted, time-consuming, and intimidating" process that in most
cases "helped to maintain the hegemony of the affluent and the non-minority population" (p. 419).
Such methods "do not achieve genuine participation in planning or other decisions, do not satisfy
members of the public that they are being heard, seldom can be said to improve the decisions that
agencies and public officials make, and do not incorporate a broad spectrum of the public" (p. 419).
Worse yet, they argue that such approaches antagonize the public, pit citizens against each
other, polarize views, discourage additional participation and make it expensive and difficult for
planners to make good planning decisions. In short, Innes and Booher (2004) argue that traditional
methods of public participation fail to achieve their goals "by any measure used" (p. 418).
In its place they propose a more direct, face-to-face form of multiparty problem solving dubbed
"collaborative participation." This approach is distinguished from traditional public participation in
that it allows different individuals and interest groups to interact directly with planners and decision-
makers, in round table-like conversational formats. It uses often uses neutral facilitation and/or
creative and informal techniques such as role-playing and open-ended conversation, to facilitate
consensus through "the transformative power of dialogue" (Roberts, 1997). Innes and Booher
(1999) claim that this approach facilitates shared learning, mutual trust, increased communication,
social capital and in some cases, consensus amongst difficult issues and long-lasting collaborative
networks.
2.4 Planning Support Systems, the Web and Emerging Collective Intelligence Platforms
A variety of interactive approaches have been developed to address the perceived limitations of both
rational policy planning and the shortcomings of public participation as often practiced. These
include digitally-enabled planning tools, loosely defined as Planning Support Systems (PSS), various
Web 2.0 approaches, and an emerging genre of mass collaboration platforms known as collective
intelligence systems.
The following section reviews the literature on these subjects, first by reviewing PSS and
related approaches such as Alternative Futures modelling and participatory agent based modelling,
and then reviewing the literature on Web 2.0, crowdsourcing, and collective intelligence platforms.
2.4.1 Planning Support Systems, PPGIS and Participatory Agent Based Models
Planning Support Systems (PSS) (Brail and Klosterman, 2001) embrace the use of computers to aid
planning efforts in a way which go "beyond geographical information systems", as originally
described in an article by the same title by Britton Harris (1989).
Batty (2003) distinguishes PSS approaches from more formal modeling and optimization
approaches that characterized simulation efforts in the 1970's and 1980's. He notes that most PSS
efforts are "loosely coupled assemblages of computer-based techniques", forming a kind of toolbox
of techniques to help decision-makers in their daily tasks. "In a sense," he writes, "[PSS] reflect the
times in which we live and the dominant way we currently conceive of planning and management,
government and control" (p. 12).
Within this rubric, there are a range of different PSS types, three of which will be discussed
below. These include Public Participation GIS efforts (PPGIS), alternative futures analysis (AFA),
and participatory agent-based modelling exercises.
Public Partiapation GIS
GIS has been recognized as a valuable tool for planning and urban design since the late 1980's,
achieving widespread use in the mid-1990's (Warnecke, Beatie, & Lyday, 1998). One of the early
challenges of GIS was differential access to official data. Heavy investment in the 1990's in data
collection and sharing has largely solved this problem, leading to an age of what some have called
"ubiquitous data" (most recently Drummond and French, 2008). However, access to local
knowledge and non-cadastral data remains an obstacle (Talen, 2000). The nature of the GIS
interface and databases make it difficult to record fuzzy, subjective data that can be very important
in the planning and decision-making process. How does one record a "scary area" for example?
Differential access to the tools of analysis themselves has also been a problem. Groups or
individuals that had access to GIS and the knowledge of how to use it have been found to have an
inherent advantage in policy debates over those that did not (Craig and Elwood, 1998). Leitner et al.
(2004) documents six models that enhanced the availability of GIS to the public, ranging from
university - community partnerships to Internet map servers. The internet is changing this as well,
allowing more people more access to data layers, thematic maps, and even online spatial query
capability. Dragicevic (2004) suggests that the web has enhanced the use of GIS in three primary
ways: through increased spatial data access and dissemination, by allowing online spatial data
exploration and geovisualization, and through online spatial data processing, analysis and modeling.
Published examples include Evans et al.'s (2005) example of using Web-based GIS to enhance
democratic input in the siting of nuclear waste (Geertman and Stillwell, 2003).
Public Participation GIS (PPGIS) has been proposed as a way to address some of these
shortcomings and involve the public in more effective decision-evaluation. Returning to Innes and
Booher's (2004) five purposes for participation, we can see how PPGIS technologies may help
facilitate some but not all of these goals. Such technologies appear most relevant to the first and
second goals of participation (soliciting opinion and incorporating local knowledge) and indirectly to
the fourth (providing increased legitimacy).
Regarding the first purpose, the use of online surveys, user forums, web-polling technologies
and the posting of public documents online for comments may allow for enhanced solicitation of
people's preferences. These have the potential to engage larger audiences, although admittedly only
those with access to and interest in the Web. Experiments by the City of New York used virtual
models of a proposed park in New York City, for example, hosted within SecondLife, to publicize
the process and encourage commentary. City staff "manned" the virtual model during business
hours, talking directly to citizens and recording public comments. Online services such as IdeaScale
and InnoCentive are both popular tools for harvesting and publicizing group opinions based on
collective voting and emergent crowd behavior. It is now common to be able to sort content by the
most popular, the most recommended, the most emailed, and many other emergent community-
preference ranking schemes. Approaches such as these can perhaps be effective at soliciting the
importance of different issues and opinions from different groups. The online resource
PartiapateDB maintains a list of over 250 such online tools related to public participation in urban
planning and policy-making.
Regarding the second area of contribution, tools such as web-GIS servers, GoogleMaps and
GoogleEarth allow for better incorporation of local knowledge. Services such as
"FixMyStreet.com" provide an online submission platform for UK residents to submit complaints
about potholes, broken streetlights, dangerous crossings, abandoned cars, etc. all using an online
map service. GoogleMaps or Bing-like services, which integrate Flickr or Picassa photos in a
geospatial framework, allow for a rich experience of visual evidence in a study area. Other, more
GIS intensive efforts such as "MIT@Lawrence" actually train and empower community members to
collect and map data on topics of interest to them such as foreclosed properties. The Boston
Metropolitan Area Planning Council's (MAPC) "MetroFuture" project is an example where a
planning agency used PPGIS and the web to solicit input from meetings that was then used to
weight different issues and alternatives as part of their growth-modeling efforts.
Alternative Futures Analysis
Karl Steinitz's (2003) alternativefutures analysis (AFA) is one of the more structured ways of engaging
the public through PPGIS efforts (Theobald & Hobbs, 2002). This approach uses GIS
infrastructure to design a small number of alternative plans for landscape and land use change, then
assess them against biophysical and community standards. It often makes heavy use of visualization
and community assessment of alternatives to balance political and natural science constraints.
Software approaches such as CommunityViz, Whatlf? (Klosterman, 2003) and other custom
implementations are often used to create a range of multi-attribute quantitative scenarios for
achieving these goals (Hopkins & Zapata, 2007).
An EPA summary (Environmental Protection Agency, 2002) of a study conducted of the
Willamette River Basin in Oregon characterizes alternative futures analysis as follows:
Alternative futures analysis is an environmental assessment approachfor helping communities make decisions
about land and water use. The process helps communit members articulate and understand their different
viewpoints and priorities. The product is a suite of alternative visionsfor the future that reflects the likely
outcomes of the options being advocated. The visions are expressed as maps of land use and land cover.
Potential effects of these alternative futures are then evaluatedfor a wide range of ecological and sodo-economic
endpoints (i.e., things people care about).
Lagigno and Reed (2003) provide an overview of a range of case studies using this approach,
ranging from watershed conservation issues in the Chesapeake Bay to urban growth evaluation in
Monroe County, Pennsylvania. Other examples include Kepner et al.'s (2004) study of the San
Pedro River, Santelmann et al.'s (2004) study of agricultural landscapes in Iowa, Carr's (2005) study
of land use conflicts in North Florida, Hunter et al's. (2004) study of habitat protection in the
Mojave, and MIT's own research in Cabo San Lucas, Mexico, Albacete, Spain, and Southern Florida.
Although often quite rich in modelling detail, many AFA exercises are essentially static
model runs with varying parameters. A related approach, participatory agent-based modelling
(ABM), endeavours to add more dynamism and uncertainty in the process through the use of
bottom-up stochastic agents and social simulation. These efforts often use role-playing games,
social simulation, and PPGIS to achieve similar ends. Like AFA, participatory ABM approaches
have been successfully used as educational and empowerment tools, as well as for policy impact
assessments (Barnaud et al., 2007; Castella et al, 2005; Bousquet and Le P. , 2004).
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While a full comparison between PSS, PPGIS, AFA and ABM approaches is beyond the scope of
this review, these examples show different ways of soliciting local knowledge using a hybrid
modelling and participation approach. Guhathakurta (1993) argues that the use of such approaches
facilitates "modelling as negotiation" (p. 286). "By anticipating and reacting to a diverse array of
interests," he writes, "urban modelers are constantly involved in the process of negotiating and
resolving conflicts over a variety of actors ranging from techniques involved in the process to the
criteria for evaluating policy choices" (p. 286).
In evaluating the effect of such tools, Guhathakurta (1993) goes on to cite a range of
literature which suggest that, properly constituted, such "Group Decision Support Systems" can be
especially effective in large group settings, where traditional facilitation techniques tend to fail
(Gallupeetal, 1992; Aiken, Krosp, Shirani, and Martin, 1994). "Larger groups typically generate
more unique, high-quality ideas and express higher rates of satisfaction with the process," he writes
(p. 288). These approaches seem to offset the limitations of traditional face-to-face large group
meetings, whereby a few individuals tend to dominate the flow of conversation. Guhathakurta
(1993) cites four advantages to such approaches in planning contexts: (a) anonymity; (b) parallel
communication; (c) extensive information support; and (d) automated recording.
Although such approaches miss many of the more subtle cues of physical meetings, research
suggests that they do offer unique benefits. Such efforts appear to both extend access to
participation and increase the quality of the process through more structured impact assessment and
visualization tools. Development of these later points in particular may help to address some of the
criticism that collaborative planning may be naive and can only produce low-quality decisions (Brand
and Gaffkin, 2007; Harris, 2002), without sacrificing the more inclusive aspirations of public
participation.
2.4.2 Web 2.0, Crowdsourcing, and Collective Intelligence
Parallel to these developments in the planning world, developments in ICT have produced a range
of alternatives known loosely as "Web 2.0" approaches. These are discussed here as an extension of
the modelling and participation literatures presented above, then linked to qualitative scenario
planning in the following section.
Web 2.0 and User Generated Content
Web 2.0 was defined by O'Rielly (2005) as a way of "harnessing collective intelligence" by providing
"architectures of participation" that embrace experimental "perpetual beta" applications in a way
that provides for easy experimentation and collaboration between diverse communities. Put more
simply, the Web 2.0 model allows skilled experts to create easily accessible frameworks for
collaboration that the general public can populate with their own content. This approach is typified
by services such as Facebook and user-generated "mash-ups", which combine data from different
sources to provide unique services of interest to specific communities. Other developments on the
web such as groupware, wiki-style collaborative environments, and middleware applications further
enhance possibilities for collaboration. Anderson (2007) later expanded upon definition, adding that
Web 2.0 approaches must include:
- Individual production of user-generated content, including amateur contributions
- "Folksonomic" tagging, i.e., user-signification of data, shared with the community
(Vander Wal, 2005)
- Data aggregation and social filtering
- Participation and openness in terms of data, API's and intellectual property
Within the Web 2.0 umbrella, a range of different approaches have emerged. These include
crowdsourcing, soa! computing, human computation and collective intelligence. In a survey of these related
terms, Quinn and Bederson (2011) offer a taxonomy of definitions for this growing field
summarized below.
Crowdsourcing is often defined as a subset of activities and systems within the broader
ecosystem of Web 2.0 services. Jeff Howe, the originator of the term crowdsourcing, is explicit
about his definition. Howe (2006) writes,
Crowdsourdng is] the act of a company or institution taking afunction once peformed by employees and
outsourcing it to an undefined (and generaly large) network ofpeople in the form of an open call.. The crucial
prerequisite is the use of the open callformat and the large network ofpotential laborers. (Howe, 2006)
The emphasis is clearly on the distribution of discrete elements of labor to a large group of
people outside a traditional organization (thus the etymological connection to the phrase,
"outsourcing"). The term "collective intelligence" originated earlier from the philosopher Pierre
Levy, who in 1994 was among the first to attempt to describe the impact of Internet technologies on
the cultural production and consumption of knowledge. Por (2008) summarizes his definition of
collective intelligence in the following way:
The creation, aggregation and interpretation of strategically relevant information for decision-making through
distributed means. (p. 7)
Malone et al, at the MIT Center for Collective Intelligence later offer a more general
definition of collective intelligence, which they suggest involves, "groups of individuals doing things
collectively that seem intelligent" (2010). They suggest that the main elements of collective
intelligence include: (a) goals relating to the desired outcome; (b) incentives which motivate
collective involvement; (c) a clear structure or process for accomplishing these goals and; (d) core
staffing to maintain and facilitate the process.
The MIT definition is widely cited, but in recent years scholars have attempted more
rigorous definitions. Quinn and Bederson (2010) provide a more precise description of the
differences between Web 2.0 and collective intelligence approaches in their taxonomy of collective
intelligence, crowdsourcing and social computing. They differentiate along dimensions of
Motivation, Human Skill, Aggregation, Quality Control, Process Order, and Task-request
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Cardinality, corresponding broadly with Malone et al.'s dimensions of How, Who, What and Why.
Sakamoto et al., (2010) expand upon this taxonomy by adding additional specific dimensions in
Table 2.1. Their delineation draws a line between crowdsourcing as an input solicitation mechanism
(and possibly filtering) mechanism, and collective intelligence, which includes the added dimension
of distributed analysis and collective reasoning around complex tasks.
Despite these efforts, the term "crowdsourcing" is still often used as shorthand to describe an entire
family of approaches. Regardless of definition, the family of crowdsourcing approaches is praised
for accomplishing that which face-to-face group work cannot. In the context of urban planning and
public participation, Brabham (2008) suggests that enhanced, "speed, reach, asynchrony, anonymity,
interactivity and the ability to carry every other form of mediated content" enables planners to
engage people in ways never before possible. Schenk and Guittard (2011) add that such approaches
also have the potential to produce better analytical outcomes, leveraging positive network
externalities, enhanced participation and greater stakeholder buy-in.
Table 2.1: Differentiating Dimensions of Collective Intelligence Platforms
(Sakamoto et al., 2010)
Demographics Age, country
What Task Domain Protein folding, image labelling
Nature of the Task Recognition, generation
Output Sequence of folded proteins
How Incentives Contest or prize
Aggregation method Collection, combination
Evaluation method Vote, expert opinion
Visibility of outputs Opaque, transparent
Communication Mediated through tasks,
unstructured
Levels of Hierarchy None, few, many
Workflow Sequence Evaluation following collection
Why Requester's motivation Profit, knowledge
Worker's motivation Money, fun, influence
Applications to Urban Planning and Implicationsfor Partiipation
Development of Web 2.0 frameworks have made an important contribution to public participation
in urban planning, opening new doors for participation. Innes and Booher (2004) emphasize that
successful participatory approaches must be self-organizing in nature, responding to specific topics
of concern for diverse interest groups. Web 2.0 & distributed crowdsourcing approaches are ideally
sufficiently low that we will see an increasingly rapid adoption of their use for even the most trivial
issues.
Innes and Booher (2004) argue that "one of the biggest issues in participation is information,
who controls it and whether it is trustworthy." Web 2.0 platforms can address this concern in two
ways: first, by providing a framework for joint fact finding when data is unavailable, and second,
through providing tools for citizens to review, comment upon and in the case of wiki-style
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collaboration projects, directly modify data and content. These approaches are not without their
problems, however. Innes and Booher (2004) themselves express doubt regarding the efficacy of
the Internet, suggesting that for such processes to be successful they must be face-to-face. More
importantly, Carver (2001) notes that "academics tend to credit the public with more knowledge,
greater rationality and enthusiasm for participation in decision-making than we perhaps ought."
Services such as Twitter and blogging are very popular, yet the value and substance of their constant
stream of information is still evolving. Wiki-style systems like Wikipedia allow anyone to edit
anything, but require constant monitoring to avoid spam, graffiti, defamation, and misinformation.
In summary, the web and crowdsourcing approaches summarized here appear to offer the
potential to address a number of the shortcomings of traditional public participation in the urban
planning process. It should be noted that such approaches are still under development in many
cases. Many of these technologies were not in widespread deployment even as recently as 5 years
ago, thereby suggesting that new opportunities for urban planning will continue to emerge as
technologies develop in the future.
The following section introduces qualitative scenario planning in light of both the state of
the planning literature described and the potential offered by these tools.
2.5 Qualitative Scenario Planning as a Response to Uncertainty
While urban planning wrestled with the limitations of rational policy analysis and predictions in a
public service, corporations and militaries were wrestling with similar issues in the world of business
and warfare. The following section introduces the literature on qualitative scenario planning,
differentiates it from the approaches to modelling described above, and describes its history and
some of its current uses. It then explores some of the limitations of the practice and reflects on how
developments in web technologies explored above may impact the field. Finally, it discusses the
differences between the "zero sum" conditions of business and warfare and those of public policy
and urban planning.
2.5.1 The Origins and Contemporary Uses of Scenario Planning
Studies of group and individual decision-making reveal important shortcomings when faced with
conditions of dynamic uncertainty (Dorner, 1997). These include the "availability bias", whereby
people estimate the future probability of events based on easily remembered experiences from their
past (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), the "experimenter bias", whereby people look for and select data
that confirms pre-existing expectations (Rosenthal, 1966), the "ambiguity effect", whereby subjects
are ignored or discounted for which we have only partial or incomplete information (Frisch &
Baron, 1988), and groupthink biases, whereby groups seek to minimize conflict and reach consensus
without critically testing, analyzing, or evaluating ideas (Janis, 1972).
In addition to these behavioural limitations, fundamental limits to formal analytic
approaches to planning under uncertainty exist as well. Although game-theoretical approaches and
decision-sciences may help individuals optimize their personal choices in the face of uncertainty,
these mechanisms are dependent on a clear articulation of individual goals and objectives. Arrow's
Impossibility Theorem (1951) demonstrated that it is impossible to optimize for the objective public
good under conditions of social choice involving multiple actors, whereby each actor has different
goals and objectives that cannot be reconciled into a community-wide ranking of values. This
means that, although game-theoretical approaches may work in zero-sum competitive conditions
where goals and objectives are clear, they cannot be equally useful in multi-stakeholder situations
with conflicting goals and objectives.
Scenario planning originated as a facilitated process for overcoming these limitations and has
subsequently evolved into a range of diverse approaches for helping managers and policy-makers
understand dynamic uncertainty in their respective fields (Wack, 1985; Van der Heijden, 1997).
Unlike forecasting or quantitative trend analysis, which attempt to reduce uncertainty and project
estimates of future outcomes, scenario planning attempts to uncover and exploit uncertainties within
the strategic environment as a learning and awareness-building tool. Its goal is to expand the range
of considerations and parameters taken into account by decision-makers, thereby helping
participants better understand their assumptions about the future and test these against a range of
possible outcomes.
This section explores the origins of scenario planning in the United States and abroad, how
it differs from similar approaches such as forecasting and simulation, and then discusses some of its
most common current applications.
Origins of Scenario Planning
Scenario planning is believed to have originated at the RAND Corporation in the late 1950's as a
methodology for "thinking the unthinkable" in long-term military planning. What is commonly
referred to as "scenario planning" today, however, is the product of many diverse intellectual origins.
These include roots in various US think tanks and institutions such as the Stanford Research
Institute (SRI), multi-national corporations such as Shell, and various international centers such as
Berger's La Prospective in France.
In the United States, Herman Kahn at RAND is considered to be one of the founding fathers
of the qualitative scenario planning method. Chermack (2003) notes that Kahn gained notoriety in
both military and civilian circles for suggesting that the best way to prevent nuclear war was to
imagine its worst case scenario and then widely publish the results (Kahn & Weiner, 1967). After
producing a range of scenarios about the future of the Soviet Union for the US Air Force, Kahn
went on to found the Hudson Institute in the 1960's.
The Hudson Institute became famous for producing "future-now" reports for a range of
clients, reports which combined detailed analysis with creative imagination, and written from the
perspective of the future. The Institute was also responsible for introducing many corporate clients
to this approach, including Shell, IBM and General Motors. Mietzner and Reger (2005) write that,
"the great value of [Kahn's scenarios approach] was being able to take complex elements and weave
them into a story, which is coherent, systematic, comprehensive, and plausible." Kahn's 1967 co-
authored book, The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thiry-Three Years (1967), is an
excellent example of this approach and is widely regarded as the book which introduced the public
to the notion of future scenarios thinking. Raubitschek (1988) suggests that The Year 2000 was so
influential because:
- It provided one of the earliest definitions of 'scenarios' and introduced the word into the
planning literature
- It demonstrated the use of scenarios as a methodological tool for policy planning and
decision making in complex and uncertain environments
e It strongly influenced the subsequent development and diffusion of scenario techniques as
planning tools in the US, by providing a methodological foundation for other similar future
studies
- It generated significant public controversy which led to a variety of popular follow-up
studies, including the Club of Rome Reports and perhaps most famously, limits to Growth
(Meadows, et al., 1972).
Parallel to Kahn's efforts, the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) began providing long-range
planning services for corporate and government clients using scenario-based approaches. SRI's
approach intended to help forecast and prepare for massive social change such as that experienced
in the late 1960's and 1970's (Ringland, 1998). Although the Institute still provides long-range
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planning services to client to this day, it is best known in the history of scenario planning for
producing several widely read reports for various departments in the US Government, including the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the US Department of Education. Many of the key
personnel responsible for the Futures Group at SRI would later go on to become important figures
in the scenario planning world, including Peter Schwartz- first of Shell and then co-founder of
GBN.
The combination of the Hudson Institute and SRI's influence gradually led to the adoption
of a scenarios approach in corporate planning circles. Royal Dutch Shell stands as the most notable
example, although IBM, GM and many others experimented with scenarios during the 1960's and
1970's. Shell's scenarios team was lead by Pierre Wack, head of Shell's Group Planning unit.
Wack's approach gained notoriety in after the 1973 oil price shock. Before the OPEC crisis, Wack
began systematically exploring events that could affect the price of oil. Observing that the US
demand for oil was rising rapidly but that it was also rapidly exhausting its strategic oil reserves, and
that OPEC Arab states were growing increasingly confident and resentful of US support for Israel
after the Six Days War, he suggested that it was possible if not logical that OPEC would demand
much higher prices for their oil should another conflict occur. The effect would be to create an
artificial supply shortage and a significant increase in price. Shell's consideration of this possibility,
and what it would do if such an event occurred, prepared it to react rapidly when such an event did
unfold. Mietzner and Reger (2005) write that, "Shell's management responded quickly and in the
following years, Shell moved from one of the smallest of the seven large oil companies to the second
in size and the number one in profitability."
Shell's success in dealing with this rapid, unexpected change pushed scenario planning into
the corporate mainstream. In their review of scenario planning approaches, Bradfield et al. (2005)
note that, "Shell has become the most celebrated corporate exponent of scenarios...Its definition of
scenarios and process methods have become the de facto 'gold standard of corporate scenario
generation"'. Students of Wack and other leading scenario planners at Shell (such as Napier Collyns,
Keis van der Heijden and others) moved on to create a cottage industry of scenario planning and
long-range strategy consultancies. The most famous of these is Napier Collyns' (of Shell), Peter
Schwartz's (of Shell and SRI), Jay Ogilvy's, and Stewart Brand's Global Business Network (GBN).
Others included Michael Porter's Monitor Group (now owners of GBN), Batelle, Boston
Consulting, Reos Partners and SAMI, all of whom continue to provide high-level scenario
consulting for governments and private clients around the world. Linneman and Klein (1979, 1983)
found that there were few business users of scenario planning techniques prior to 1974 but in the
two-year period after the first oil crisis, the number of adopters doubled, and then more than
doubled again in the period between 1977 and 1981. They estimate that in the early 1980s, almost
half of US Fortune 1000 industrial firms, US Fortune 300 non-industrial firms and Fortune Foreign
500 industrial firms were actively using scenario techniques in their planning process. A recent
McKinsey report estimates that approximately 65% of today's Fortune 500 companies employ some
form of scenario thinking processes as part of their strategic planning efforts.
Definitions of scenario planning
The term "scenario planning" has been defined in a variety of ways. Porter (1985) defines scenarios
as "an internally consistent view of what the future might turn out to be - not a forecast, but one
possible future outcome." Schwartz (1991) defined scenarios as "a tool for ordering one's
perceptions about alternative future environments in which one's decisions might be played out."
Ringland (1998) defined scenario planning as "that part of strategic planning which relates to the
tools and technologies for managing the uncertainties of the future." Shoemaker (1995) suggests
that scenario planning is "a disciplined methodology for imaging possible futures in which
organizational decisions may be played out."
In his review of the literature, Chermack (2003) produced the following table of definitions
for scenario planning and linked them to their dependent variables. What is clear is that scenario
planning is considered to be a qualitative process of creative synthesis for a wide range of diverse,
highly uncertain outcomes for which probability estimates or numerical models cannot be made.
The goals of scenario planning are also diverse, but all relate to helping participants better
understand key uncertainties in their strategic environment, make use of creative and narrative
approaches to help them synthesize and learn from these uncertainties, and produce plausible stories
about possible futures to aid in learning and decision-making.
Differencesfromforecasting and simulation
RAND was also an early center for a parallel school of quantitative scenario development more
explicitly oriented towards forecasting. Bradfield et al. (2005) and Huss & Honton (1989) identify
two major approaches to quantitative scenario generation, trend-impact analysis (TIA) and cross-
impact analysis (CIA).
These two broad approaches describe more quantitative approaches to scenario
development, whereby quantitative trend data about a range of issues are manipulated through
expert opinion to reflect a range of possible outcomes. This process often involves curve-fitting
historical projects to estimate a "business as usual" scenario, then modifying these projections
through expert and stakeholder surveys or workshops to establish high, medium, and low variations,
as well as possible tipping points and discontinuities. Interactions between variables and scenarios
can then be tested through "cross-impact" analysis, whereby probability distributions are estimated
for pairs or groups of trends and variables, providing a more integrated numerical estimation of
possible futures. Notable users of these approaches include the consultancies The Futures Group,
Batelle, Michele Godet's La Prospective group in France, and RAND Corporation's Center for Long
Range Planning.
Bradfield et al. (2005) group both TJA and CIA into the general category of "Probabilistic
Modified Trends" approaches. This basic forecasting approach shares similarities to other forms of
forecasting and modeling exercises used in urban planning, such as Steinitz's Alternative Futures
Analysis (AFA) described previously. While the specific mechanism varies greatly between these
systems, the underlying approach of using modified trend analyses to generate a range of possible
outcomes is similar across most model types.
While similar in philosophy, these approaches differ from the kind of "qualitative social
simulation" typified by the Shell style approach. Quantitative forecasting aims to provide probability
estimates of future outcomes with the goal of reducing uncertainty. Even if probabilities are not
part of the explicit outcome of these approaches, they are often implied through the choice of
"high", "medium" and "low" inputs or through "most likely" parameter estimates derived from
expert and stakeholder consultation. This approach makes sense in the context of certain
deterministic, natural systems or those with few variables and simple interactions. However, it may
be less appropriate for conditions of dynamic or structural uncertainty, where assigning probabilistic
estimates (explicit or otherwise) to complex systems risks masking assumptions or agendas and
hiding critical uncertainties (Smith, 2007). More to the point, qualitative scenario planning offers the
ability to incorporate factors which cannot be modeled by their very nature, such as so called "wild
cards" and "black swans" (Taleb, 2007).
Knight's early work on risk and uncertainty (1921), and March & Simon's later application to
planning and management (1958) bear mention. March & Simon argued that risk represents the
"probability distribution of the consequences of each alternative." Knight argued that probability
distributions imply an ability to quantify the consequences of an alternative, which is not the case in
complex dynamic systems.
Uncertainty, on the other hand, is when "the consequences of each alternative belong to
some subset of all possible consequences, but that the decision maker cannot assign definite
probabilities to the occurrence of particular outcomes." This definition is consistent with the earlier
work of Knight, which implies that the use of probabilities- even those derived from best-fit or
modified trend extrapolation- under conditions of true uncertainty will result in inaccurate or over-
confident outcomes.
Empirical evidence in decision-making supports this distinction. Courtney, Kirkland, and
Viguerie (1997) suggest that managers employ different analytical tools for different levels of
uncertainty. As uncertainty increases, these authors propose more qualitative tools be used. In
support of Courtney et al., Alessandri (2003) found that managers tend to use analytical, quantitative
approaches in the face of risk to identify the optimal decision; yet as uncertainty increases, they rely
on judgment and experience to a greater extent, employing a more qualitative approach to make the
decision, even while attempting to go through the process of an analytical, quantitative analysis.
Finally, Alessandri's (2003) results show that when considering risk and uncertainty jointly, the effect
of uncertainty dominates over that of risk. The implication is that analytical, quantitative tools, even
ones that can model dynamic decision-making, are not able to model the more qualitative nature of
uncertainty. Other findings from management theory and decision-science support the notion that
higher uncertainty is associated with a more "behavioral" approach to decision-making. (Cyert &
March, 1963; Dean & Sharfman, 1993; Maritan, 2001).
Qualitative scenario planning takes advantage of stakeholder's behavioral judgement and
creativity by focusing explicitly on the domain of uncertainty and discontinuity, i.e., the zone where
probability estimates cannot be had. This approach is different from probability modified trend
extrapolation or other forms of quantitative simulation modeling. Ratcliffe (2002) highlights this
difference when he argues that scenarios are intended to provoke strategic thinking about
uncertainty in a social context, thereby aiming to:
- present alternative images instead of extrapolating trends from the present
- embrace qualitative perspectives as well as quantitative data
- allow for sharp discontinuities to be evaluated
- allow for qualitative shifts in values and expectations
- require decision makers to question their basic assumptions
create a learning organization possessing a common vocabulary and an effective
basis for communicating complex - sometimes paradoxical - conditions
These characteristics are distinct from the aims of traditional forecasting, whose goals are to
reduce uncertainty and enhance accuracy when attempting to predict the future. Qualitative
scenario planning acknowledges the difficulties in forecasting a given outcome for the future,
focusing instead on the critical uncertainties for which quantitative probability estimations cannot be
made or have no meaning. Its goals are primarily educational and perceptual. It intends to help
participants overcome cognitive and social biases which might prevent them from detecting and
understanding environmental change, and aims to help them prepare for such change by mentally
"rehearsing the future" (Schwartz, 1996). Scenario planning is therefore most useful under
conditions of deep uncertainty, computational complexity, or ambiguity where past trends cannot be
relied upon to provide meaningful information about the future.
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Current Applications
Scenario planning and related approaches are in wide use in the corporate, defense, and government
sectors, and to a much smaller degree in academia. The financial crisis of 2008 sparked a recent
increase in demand for scenario planners, similar to that experienced after the oil crisis in 1973. As a
result, several large multi-national corporations have expanded their in-house scenario staff,
including Shell, Intel, Price-Waterhouse-Cooper, and others. A great many more outsource this
expertise to consultancies such as Monitor/GBN, NormannPartners, Kairos Futures, SAMI
Consultants, and a host of smaller firms.
Military and intelligence planners also retain both in-house and external scenario planning
expertise. The US Government outsources much of its scenario planning expertise to the consulting
firm Monitor-360, a spin-off of Monitor/GBN in San Francisco, as well as to other quasi-
governmental think tanks such as RAND and MITRE. The UK Ministry of Defense, the Australian
Ministry of Defense, the Swedish Defense Force and others also retain a mixture of internal
expertise and external consulting.
National and regional governments such as the Government of Singapore and the UK also
retain in-house, non-military related foresight services. The Government of Singapore's Strategic
Futures Group is considered to be the world's best model for this approach, whereby a dedicated
staff of scenario planners work on long-range and on-demand issues directly out of the Prime
Minister's Office. Other government foresight units like UK Foresight rely heavily on external
consultants, including many of those firms already mentioned. Some city and regional governments
in Europe also maintain active scenario planning staff as well, such as the Region of Lyon in France,
whose Millenaire3 group rivals the size and scope of some national units.
Scenario planning's role in academia is more limited and is almost exclusively found in
business schools. International centers for scenario planning include the University of Oxford's Said
Business School, the University of Hawaii, the University of Houston at Clearlake, INSEAD in
France, London Business School, and the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania.
Despite scenario planning's relevance to urban planning and design, it is notably absent from most
planning curricula and design schools. This may be due to the different focuses business and
planning schools. Where-as business schools train their students to succeed in competitive
environments that are often "win or lose", planning schools train students for public policy arenas in
which multiple goals and objectives must be balanced and decision-rights are often fragmented and
contested. This also suggests that the underlying techniques and methods of business scenario
planning may need to be adapted to the public policy context as well; a notion which will be
explored in more detail below.
A Typical Scenario Planning Process
The "intuitive logics" approach created by Wack and later popularized by Schwartz's (1991) and
others (van der Heijden, 1996) is the most widely identified and commonly utilized approach to
qualitative scenario development. Ringland (1998), Shoemaker (1995), and many others all utilize a
similar approach with minor variations. This section outlines the process of scenario planning from
this perspective.
The 'intuitive logics' approach to qualitative scenario planning
Schwartz (1991) outlines a general approach to scenario planning based on Wack's original
methodology. This process involves the eight steps listed below and then presented subsequently in
more detail using van der Heijden's (1997) elaboration.
The scenario planning process includes the following steps:
1. Identify the issue
2. Identify the key factors
3. Research driving forces
4. Rank key factors and driving forces
5. Develop scenario logics
6. Develop scenario details
7. Consider implications
8. Identify indicators
Step 1: Identif@ the issue: This stage consists of a series of scoping conversations to define the goals of
the project, the time frame, the boundaries, and a general agenda. This is most often conducted
through a series of initial meetings and conversations, resulting in a scoping document to clarify the
terms of the project.
Step 2 Ideni keyfactors: A series of individual interviews with subject experts, diverse contributors,
organization staff, and stakeholders then follows. These interviews are designed to elucidate both
the internal dynamics of the client organization, as well as early indicators of major external variables
that may drive environmental change for the organization.
Step 3 - Research drivingforces: Schwartz defines driving forces as "the elements that move the plot of a
scenario, that determine the story's outcome, the motive, the things that influence the outcomes of
events". This step combines interview themes with more detailed desktop research on the subject
area, including market research, literature reviews, position papers, stake holder analysis, and trend
analysis. Other techniques often include creating trends and timelines from history, lists of key
events that influence the present, and other factors with lag-times that will influence the future.
Step 4 - Rank keyfactors and drivingforces: A variety of techniques are then used to sort key factors and
driving forces into themes and clusters. This often takes place in a two step workshop process,
whereby participants group factors into thematic clusters, name them, then rank these themes by
impact on the organization and level of uncertainty in their outcome. Variables with the highest
impact and highest degree of uncertainty are then selected to carry forward into Step 5, in
combination with variables determined to be high impact and high certainty. Wack refers to the
former as "critical uncertainties" and the latter as "critical predetermineds".
Figure 2.1 Typical Example of How Clusters of Driving Forces are Sorted into Critical
Uncertainties (after van 't Klooster and van Asselt, 2006)
High 4
Uncertainty
Low
0
0
0
Low
Selectinc
high impact,
high uncertainty
adiving forms
0
Irnpact Hig I
Step 5 - Develop scenario logics: Scenario logics refer to the primary variables to be considered when
developing draft scenarios, as well as the relationships between them. These include both the critical
predetermined variables (high impact, high certainty) and the critical uncertainties (high impact, low
certainty) developed in Step 4.
van der Heijden (2003) discusses two general approaches to developing scenario logics at
this point, termed inductive and deductive (sometimes called bottom-up and top-down scenario logics).
Deductive scenario logic development is most often associated with Shell-style scenario planning
and works by first establishing a logical framework, then deducing scenarios from this framework.
This process is often conducted in a workshop setting, using multiple groups to decide upon the two
dominant critical uncertainties. These uncertainties are then presented in the form of a 2x2 grid
encapsulating the key characteristics of the critical driving forces. Individual driving forces are then
fit into this framework and combined in different, plausible, internally consistent scenarios. Figure
2.2 displays this approach to building scenario logics, where Driving Forces A and B are contrasted
in extreme variables and their combination is then used to produce four scenario sketches.
An inductive scenario approach uses a more intuitive logic to develop the relationship of
driving forces without putting them in a 2x2 matrix. Inductive scenario development is often also
completed in groups, with small groups mixing key variables along internally consistent dimensions
to produce larger narrative outcomes. This process focuses on building relationships between the
drivers first, then building an argument organically into an overall structure. This process also
follows a step-by-step process, such that different combinations of outcomes can be produced
relative to the internal variables considered. As a result inductive scenarios do not always produce
2x2 grids and can sometimes cover a wider range of critical differences.
Van der Heijden describes the difference between the two in more detail when he writes that
a deductive scenario process develops the inter-scenario structure first (i.e., how each scenario
differs), whilst an inductive scenario process develops the intra-scenario structure first (i.e., how an
A Typical 2x2 Deductive Scenario Grid
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Fig. 2. 'Scenario axes' as starting point for scenarios.
individual scenario plays out). In either case, both intra- and inter-scenario relationships are
explored, the difference being the order in which they are produced.
Step 6 - Develop scenario details: The various draft scenarios from Step 5 are then taken away by the
consultant to synthesize into a single scenario structure, or selected from by the client in meetings or
a workshop. Once a final set of logics is decided upon, each key factor and driving force is given
individual attention and then manipulated within the structure developed in the scenario logics
phase. At this stage, consultants elaborate upon the key actors, motivations, plots, and histories to
create "mini-stories" or scripts which describe the difference between the two. Internal plausibility
is also reviewed at this time. This is often done through the use of qualitative cross-impact grids,
comparing the impact of each variable against each other within a given scenario to ensure
feasibility. External experts can be consulted or additional workshops can also be held. Whatever
the process, the resulting scenarios are often represented to the main client group for feedback and
refinement before finalization.
Figure 2.2
Step 7 - Consider implications: After finalization, scenarios can then be put to use in an actionable
strategic context. This is most often done by reflecting back on the original purpose of the
scenarios exercise and "wind-tunneling" various strategic decisions in the context of each alternate
future. Quantitative models are often introduced at this point if relevant, or various SWOT analyses
and stakeholder role playing can be conducted relative to the organization's mission and goals. This
is a critical component of the scenarios process because it forces the organization to test what it has
just learned, and plot future decisions against each alternative.
Step 8 - Identif indicators: The final step after testing various policies and strategies in a scenario
context is often the creation of an "early warning system" or war-room. This process is used to help
planners monitor the unfolding environment around them, track progress relative to critical
bifurcation points in the scenario tree, and revise the organization's position and strategy relative to
emerging changes.
Many scenario practitioners advocate repeated environmental scanning, or "horizon
scanning", to make sense of external events in the context of strategic scenarios. They also suggest
that it is important to revisit and recreate the scenario creation process at appropriate time scales
(such as every 3 to 5 years) to reposition their understanding and "relearn" about the future relative
to recent changes and events. This so-called "institutional foresight process" is often most practiced
in government, although a range of private clients also offer Bloomberg-style environmental
scanning and scenario updating services. This is also the stage at which most scenario projects are
reputed to fail, in that they lose relevance after the workshop engagements are completed and
"gather dust on the shelf."
Figure 2.3 Summary of a Typical Eight Step Scenario Planning Process
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2.5.2 Theoretical Foundations of Qualitative Scenario Planning
A common assertion among scenario planning practitioners is that its main purpose is to challenge
dominant perceptions of "the official future" and combat "the perils of too narrow thinking"
(Schwartz, 1992). Schwartz and others suggest that the "illusion of certainty" and the "tyranny of
the past" can be a significant impediment to understanding and preparing for uncertain outcomes in
rapidly changing environments, and that organizations must be more perceptive and adaptive in
order to successfully compete (Ringland, 2003; Wilkinson, Heinzen and Van der Elst, 2008).
Divergent sources of information are therefore sought out which challenge the status quo and reveal
implicit assumptions about the future (van der Heijden, 2003) and narrative strategies and story-
telling techniques are often employed to increase the effectiveness of scenarios on management's
attitudes and perceptions.
This section explores the theoretical foundation of such claims, drawing heavily on Thomas
Chermack's work, "A Theory of Scenario Planning" (2003). It then goes on to link Chermack's
theory of scenario planning to that of organizational learning and the social construction of strategy.
It concludes with a discussion of the implications of these theories in the context of public
participation in urban planning and design.
Chermack's Theory of Scenario Planning
Although previous authors provide anecdotal argument for how and why scenario planning works,
Thomas Chermack's PhD thesis (2003) and subsequent peer-reviewed papers (2004, 2005, 2006)
represent one of the more rigorous attempts at theory-building within the scenario planning
literature. Chermack used Dubin's (1978) model of theory development to clarify the specific units
of measurement, laws of interaction, boundaries, system states, propositions, and hypotheses at the
heart of scenario planning. Chermack uses Dublin's model to explicate a proposed body of theory
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for scenario planning. Beginning with Step 1, Chermack proposes five units for theory building
related to scenario planning. These include: (a) scenarios; (b) learning; (c) mental models; (d)
decisions; and (e) performance.
Scenarios as theoretical units are defined using Porter's (1985) definition, which Chermack
clarifies in the following way; "Scenarios are narrative stories of the future that outline several
possible paths through various challenges to arrive at varying future states." De Geus (1988),
Schwartz (1991) and van der Heijden (1997) argue that scenarios are used for learning. Chermack -
therefore defines "learning" as the "process of gaining knowledge or skill" based on Trumble et al.'s
(2002) definition. Mental models are also often reported as an important aspect of scenario
planning. Chermack uses Doyle and Ford's (1999) definition of a mental model as a "relatively
enduring and accessible, but limited, internal conceptual representation of an external system
(historical, existing, or projected) whose structure is analogous to the perceived structure of that
system." Decision is defined as "an act or process of reaching a conclusion or making up one's
mind" (Trumble et al., 2002). Finally, Chermack defines performance as "the valued productive
output of a system in the form of goods and services" (Swanson, 1999).
Chermack then uses these definitions as theoretical entities to determine their laws of
interaction, system boundaries, and system states, producing several testable propositions about the
nature of the scenario planning process. These are presented below, from Chermack (2004).
Proposition 1: If scenarios are positively associated with learning, then learning will increase as
a result of participation in scenario planning.
Proposition 2: If learning is positively associated with the alteration of mental models, then
mental models change as a result of learning.
Proposition 3: If a chance in mental models alters decision structure, then a change in mental
models implies a change in the approach to decision making.
Proposition 4: If changes in decision making are positively associated with firm performance,
then firm performance will increase as a result of altered decision making strategies.
Proposition 4: If scenarios are positively associated with learning, learning is positively
associated with altered mental models, altered mental models are positively associated with
firm performance, then scenarios can be positively associated with firm performance.
Chermarck's theoretical propositions and their relationships are summarized visually in
Figure 2.4. His formulation provides a clear, logical, and testable foundation for hypothesis
generation and testing at any stage in the scenario planning process, although the specific constructs
he employs are open to criticism and may be difficult to operationalize as research instruments.
The following sections elaborate on the causal mechanisms of these steps in more detail, drawing
from theories of constructivist learning, cognitive bias and the social construction of strategy.
Figure 2.4 Chermack's (2003) Theoretical Model for the Process of Scenario Planning
Organizational earning and change
Chermack's theory of scenario planning fits into a range of other scholarly investigations into the
process of organizational learning and change. In their seminal article on organizational learning,
Fiol and Lyles (1985) refer to the "environmental alignment" school of scholars who argue that the
ultimate success criterion of any organization is longer-term survival and growth, and that alignment
between the organization and its environment helps maintain competitiveness and survival over the
long run (Barnard, 1938; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967). A firm (or indeed any
individual or organization) must have the potential to "learn, unlearn, or relearn" based on past
behaviors in order to sense environmental change and respond appropriately. Management thinkers
such as Chakravarthy (1982) go so far as to argue that organizational adaptation should be the main
goal of strategic management, because, "it is the key activity for dealing with changes occurring in
the environment and involves the continuous process of making strategic choices." They conclude
that an organization's ability to learn and adapt is key to its survival.
Weick et al. (2005) suggest that learning occurs when individuals and groups perceive a state
of the world which is different from what they expect. "In such circumstances," they write, "there is
a shift from the experience of immersion in projects to a sense that the flow of action has become
unintelligible in some way." To make sense of this disruption, they argue that people look first for
reasons that allow them to explain it away and resume "business as usual." These "reasons" are
"pulled from frameworks such as institutional constraints, organizational premises, plans,
expectations, acceptable justifications, and traditions inherited from predecessors."
Weick and his colleagues refer to such reasoning as "sensemaking" (1979). "To focus on
sensemaking is to portray organizing as the experience of being thrown into an ongoing,
unknowable, unpredictable streaming of experience in search of answers to the question, 'what's the
story?"' (Weick, et. al., 2005). This process is supported by Klein (1999) and other's studies of how
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people make decisions under circumstances of high stress in uncertain environments such as house
fires, combat situations, and emergency rooms. Klein's Recognition-Primed Decision Model
(RPDM) corresponds closely to Weick's process map of sensemaking, presented above.
Klein and Weick's process of sensemaking and iterative recognition testing are supported by
Argys and Schon's (1974) process of "double-loop learning" in organizations. They argue that
learning to change, or learning about learning, is qualitatively different from simply learning about a
subject. Schon (1983) suggests that this process has five steps:
1. People learn through doing; they develop theories in action. It would help if they became
more conscious of the learning in action, becoming 'reflexive'.
2. There are two dimensions to such learning; single loop, involving how to perform a task
better within given parameters, and double-loop, which involves learning about the
parameters and thereby changing the conditions under which the tasks are performed.
The reflective practitioner focuses on the latter.
3. Double-loop learning can take place in social situations through dialogue in which people
explore and learn about issues and each other's attitudes towards them.
4. Problems and objectives, facts and values, emerge through such group processes; they are
not waiting out there to be discovered.
5. Group discussion processes which achieve double-loop learning can reset parameters for
subsequent action, creating a new framework.
Social learning
Weick (1979), Klein (1999), and Argys and Schon's (1974) models of organization take place in
explicitly social contexts, through an interactive process of discussion, action and interpretation.
This process of verbalization and embodied learning in the context of organizational activities is
thought to produce "communities of practice" (Lave and Wenger, 1991). Communities of practice
are described as a group of individuals with a common repertoire of knowledge about, and ways of
addressing similar shared problems and purposes. The key insight connecting communities of
practice with the process of organizational learning in uncertain environments is that learning is a
collective, distributed effort. "Activities can be distributed among a group of students [for example], such
that distinctions that might be hard for an individual student to maintain can be encoded in the
organization. The organization becomes the interpretive frame that provides the basis for a change
in understanding" (Newman, 1989).
This has important implications for organizational learning and performance in uncertain,
rapidly changing environments. First, groups and organizations constantly pattern match their
expected picture of the world with available data. Quality of perception, in particular detection in
gaps between expected and experienced information, is an essential first step towards organizational
performance. An organization must therefore be able to perceive change in its environment before
it can begin to act on it.
Second, the interpretation of environmental information and the creation of planned
response always occurs in the context of social practice. The social norms, habits and behaviors of
an organization can produce dominant frames of interpretation- commonly referred to as the
"official wisdom" or "party line"- which profoundly color a group's ability to judge the
significance of environmental data and strongly influence their response pattern. Studies of
individual and group cognitive bias suggest that organizations revert to shared norms based on past
experiences and accepted definitions in the face of uncertainty, a strategy which may not produce
the most successful results in a changing environment.
The theory of scenario planning outlined by Chermack focuses explicitly on the social aspect
of environmental perception and organizational strategy making. Chermack (2005) writes that, "the
process of scenario planning creates categories for stakeholders, competitors, and in order to
accomplish the task of shifting mental models, must frequently consider the perspectives of different
communities of practice." Van Der Heijden (1997) goes on to write, "scenarios are developed
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collectively to build shared images of possible futures... scenarios nurture openness to change by
allowing more complexity in futures states of a system and environment to be taken into account."
This is done through seeking out differing points of view, divergent information sources,
paradoxical perspectives and uncertain variables.
Scenario planning is therefore theorized as an intervention in the social process of
environmental scanning and interpretation in an organization, producing a shift in the internal
representation of the world through exploration of outside trends and forces in a way which
highlight gaps between "how the world is" and "how the world is perceived to be." This process is
intended to force sensemaking inquiry into the meaning of these changes and the potential
directions of their growth, resulting in organizational learning and increased change ability.
Umitations
Despite widespread application of qualitative scenario techniques, there are significant constraints to
the discipline as currently practiced (Pang, 2009). First, the process is labour-intensive, involving
significant investment in background interviews, data collection, face-to-face discussion, and group
workshops. This creates a limit on the number of people who can participate in, and benefit from
the process. It is also expensive to execute, thereby limiting the organizations and companies which
can afford to use it. Next, it commonly involves a predominance of senior decision-makers and
subject matter experts, many of whom exhibit conscious or unconscious biases towards vested
interests and status quo perspectives. By reducing the range of sources considered and relying upon
the input of established figures and subject experts, important perspectives and information sources
can be excluded (Tedock, 2006). Finally, scenario planning is highly dependent upon the skill and
experience of the workshop facilitators and scenario writers. Different futures consultants working
with the same group may produce totally different outcomes, a fact which makes the process highly
idiosyncratic (Curry and Schultz, 2009; Shoemaker, 1995).
The combination of participation limits, participant bias, facilitator bias, and author
subjectivity can cause important viewpoints to be missed, important data or trends to be ignored, or
unpopular and unpleasant futures to be dropped. More importantly, the very nature of a workshop-
based process may limit the scalability of such an approach as an economical, robust and large-scale
tool for increasing governmental flexibility and stakeholder involvement. Finally, the focus on
small-group, business-environment decision-making suggests that elements of the process may need
to be adapted for public policy settings, in which more participants need to be involved, the goals of
the exercise are often contested and the outcomes must communicate to a wide variety of interests
and values.
2.6 Chapter Conclusions
This chapter argued that the future has always been an integral concern for urban planning. It
reviewed the evolution of the field's relationship to the idea of the future, using four different
philosophical and theoretical traditions. It then explored the role of public participation in the
context of urban planning theory and practice. Next, it situated the field's use of prediction,
modeling and forecasting in the context of participation, through an exploration of approaches such
as PSS, PPGIS and AFA modelling. It then surveyed the perspective that the literature on Web 2.0,
online participation and collective intelligence systems had to offer, integrating this with urban
planning theory, public participation, and communicative approaches to modelling. Finally, it
introduced the history and theory of scenario planning, exploring how it is most frequently practiced
and how its strengths and limitations are presented in the literature.
One of the clear areas of limitation in scenario literature is the lack of formal evaluation
studies on its effects and outcomes. While the theory of the process is quite clear, there is little
empirical evidence for its success. Without such measures, it is difficult to evaluate different kinds
of scenario approaches, the effectiveness of different practitioners or the impact of other methods
of achieving the same ends. The literature on collective intelligence is still growing rapidly, with
multiple contested definitions of what entails a collective intelligence system, how it differs from
other approaches to social computing, distributed analytic techniques, social media, etc. Like the
scenario literature, there is also a need for more formal studies of the effects of different systems on
their stated goals. This would need to both advance and defend appropriate measurement
constructs and instruments, as well as apply them across different system designs and interaction
types. Finally, the literature on the effects of public participation in urban planning are equally
diffuse, subject to multiple competing methodological positions and ideological assertions. If public
policy makers are to take the claims of participation more seriously, it will be necessary to link this
body of research to those explored above, thereby offering more robust evidence for the value and
impact of participation in better decision-making.
The following chapter presents how these ideas informed this research from a
methodological standpoint, and how they were used to explore the use of online participatory
collective intelligence systems in the urban planning research process.
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the methodological approach employed in this dissertation, with particular
focus on the exploratory case study strategy used. I introduce the research questions and the
exploratory hypotheses, introduce the overall research design strategy, and discuss the rationale
behind the sampling and case selection. I then describe the three cases conducted, focusing on
comparison between the base case and two novel online approaches to explore different aspects of
the scenario planning process. The approach to data generation, collection and analysis of these
cases is also discussed, including the phases of data collection for each case and the tiers of data
analysis. Finally, the limitations of the method are outlined.
3.2 Research Questions
This dissertation explores the role of online participatory futures systems as a novel methodological
approach for data generation at different stages of the scenario planning process. Such approaches
are both novel and untested, requiring a mix of exploratory research and comparative reflection.
Towards that end, the primary research questions guiding this dissertation are:
- Do web-based participatory approaches add value to the traditional scenario planning
process, and if so, where and in what ways?
- If not, where do they fall short, in what ways, and why?
More specifically, what impact do the web-based approaches explored in this dissertation have on:
- The number and type of participants involved, and in what phases?
- The geographic scope of participation enabled?
- The range of expertprofessionaldiscglines consulted?
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- The number of variables and opinions incorporated?
- The mechanism of analysis, ranking and clustering?
- The time spent on data collection and analysis?
- The amount of user debate and reflection?
In light of evidence raised by these research questions, the following discussion points will also be
explored:
- How might different levels of inteface structure influence user participation?
- What role does partiapant recruitment play in the process of user engagement and
analysis?
- What impact might such approaches have on the pedagogicalimpact of scenario
planning engagements?
- What potential do such tools have to incorporate the "wisdom of the crowds" for
more in-depth analysis and large-scale engagements?
- What impact might such approaches have on the facilitation of consensus-building and
debate?
- How might such systems help preserve dissenting ideas and challenging debate?
- What potential do such tools have to help minimizefacilitator bias?
- What methodological considerations do the use such tools as data generation
instruments raise for urban planning research more broadly?
- What does this research suggest for a more rigorous evaluative approach in the future?
3.3 Research Strategy and Design
A mixed method approach was employed to investigate these questions. Specifically, two novel
online platforms were developed and deployed as case studies in order to generate data for the
research question. Results were then compared pair-wise to the base case: representative face-to-
face scenario planning process typical of those used in urban planning and public policy settings.
These in-depth case studies were then augmented with a comparative analysis of three additional
examples of online participation platforms in disciplines other than urban planning. Finally, in-
depth qualitative interviews were used to help add context and interpret the results of both.
Such a mixed method approach departs from traditional experimental design. An ideal
experiment would allow for the isolation of key outcome variables in advance, manipulation of
specific independent variables through a controlled set of randomized or semi-random tests, and
then measurement of their impact on the dependent variables of interest through standardized
measurement techniques and instruments. This would include adequate control for error, variance
and exogenous factors, thereby providing evidence if such approaches are "better" or "worse" than
traditional scenario planning approaches.
Such an approach was infeasible for this research for three reasons: 1) the relevant categories
and variables for measurement were unknown in advance; 2) there was little empirical evidence for,
or agreement on the key outcome variables of scenario planning and; 3) there whereas no standard
measurement instruments or protocols that could be applied in their testing. As a result, both the
dependent and independent variables were unknown and no standard method for comparison could
be established. An alternative research strategy was therefore required.
Yin (1994) suggests that an exploratory case study approach is useful in such a situation,
specifically using "revelatory case?' to highlight key areas of difference and similarity. This approach is
useful for a research subject, such as this, which is still developing or that was otherwise previously
inaccessible to investigation for various reasons. The research questions of this dissertation were
good candidates for revelatory case study research precisely because online participatory scenario
systems are novel approaches, with aspects of both methodology and practical design still in
formation, and because scenario planning lacks a well-established baseline for key outcome variables
that could serve as measurement proxies.
This approach involved two stages: first, platform design and second, application and comparison to
the base case. Because no online participatory futures systems for urban planning existed at the time
of this research, it was first necessary to design and produce a series of prototypical system designs
that could generate data for these research questions. Before their development, various concepts
and designs were tested with expert interviews and groups of participants to determine design
features that could be relevant. These were then used to create measurement constructs that could
be used to evaluate them.
The first of these data generation platforms was then tested against the base case. Data from
this study was compared against both the process and results of the base case and used to reflect
upon the research questions. Next, the lessons from this case were incorporated into the design of a
second online system for application on the second case. This second system was explicitly different
from the first, entailing an intentionally different approach to data collection, measurement, and
evaluation. This was done in order to explore gaps in the research questions that the first system
was unable to answer. As a result, cross-case comparison of key data was not possible between the
two online cases, thereby necessitating pair-wise comparison with different aspects of the base case.
For each case study, I generated a significant amount of detailed data from a number of
sources, including interviews, focus groups, rapid prototypes workshops, online participatory futures
system instruments, and primary document review (Gomm et al. 2000, p. 2). Each of the cases was
designed to illuminate different aspects of how these novel methodological approaches could be of
use for urban planning research in general, and qualitative scenario planning in particular. This
approach enabled rich descriptions, concept development and understanding through the analysis of
both the structured and unstructured data as it emerged.
Due to the limitations of the case study approach employed and the systems developed to
generate data, the core cases were supplemented with a detailed review of three comparative
examples of online participation platforms in other disciplines. Comparative examples were chosen
specifically to address key weaknesses or data gaps from the case studies, thereby providing a richer,
more robust source of evidence for review. The results of both the cases and comparative examples
were further supplemented by a series of in-depth, semi-structured interviews with experts in the
field of scenario planning, online participation or public policy. These interviews helped provide
depth and context to the findings generated previously. This aided in concept definition,
interpretation and evaluation, thereby completing my multi-method approach to this area of
emerging research.
The following sections describe the cases as developed and present the rationale behind their
choice and development.
3.4 Case Selection
In this section, I detail the approach to case selection and describe the cases chosen. Preliminarily, a
range of potential projects over a three-year period provided possible insights into my research
questions. In an iterative, reflective manner, I then considered and narrowed down these
possibilities to the three presented in this dissertation.
3.4.1 Base Case: The Future of a Northern Spanish Region
The base case selected for comparison was a face-to-face scenario planning exercise conducted for a
regional urban planning think-tank in the north of Spain. This project was conducted on behalf of
the regional government, by a world-leading scenario planning consultancy. The case involved a
scenario generation exercise for the area's main metropolitan region, which involved creating four,
research-based narratives on different potential futures for the region's development. The focus of
the exercise was on economic, political and social shifts, not geospatial or design issues, and was
therefore conducted purely as a qualitative scenario generation exercise without the aid of GIS or
quantitative simulation.
In summary, the method of this case employed a standard qualitative scenario generation
process, typified by Schwartz's (1991) eight-step process described in Chapter Two. This involved a
detailed research period on the historic trends and issues influencing the history of the region's
economy and politics, a round of in-depth qualitative interviews with regional officials and experts, a
face-to-face scenario creation workshop, and then summarization and reporting by the consulting
facilitators. A total of 15 experts were interviewed and a total of 20 stakeholders participated in the
scenario creation workshop, which took place over two days in Bilbao, Spain. From start to finish,
the process took approximately 12 weeks to complete.
3.4.2 Case 1: Futurescaper, The Impact of Climate Change Impacts on the UK
Government
The first online data generation platform was developed as part of a project with the International
Futures Forum (IFF), run by Tony Hodgson on the implications of climate change impacts for the
UK Government. The purpose of this project was to identify the systemic linkages between climate
change impacts in other parts of the world and the secondary and tertiary impacts on critical supply
chains and governance functions within the UK. The online data generation platform for this case,
entitled Futurescaper, was designed by myself and implemented and developed in the programming
languages mySQL and PHP by a colleague, Nathan Koren.
This case was designed to be used in the early and middle stages of scenario creation
research. It sought to address the task of generating trends and drivers, exploring their interactions,
ranking them, clustering them into high-level themes, and then assembling them into analytically
useful visualizations. It was not designed to address the latter stages of scenario creation, including
scenario logic creation, selection, detailing, or narrativization.
Towards this end, an expert scientific panel selected 186 representative scientific articles and
news clippings, which were then uploaded onto the system for analysis and clustering. Users could
browse this data, add new trends and drivers, explore how they interact, and download them for
subsequent visualization.
3.4.3 Case 2: SenseMaker Scenarios, the Impact of Financial Uncertainty on Government
Public Services
The second online case adapted an existing commercial software platform to build upon lessons
from the first case. In particular, the case sought to address several themes raised by the
Futurescaper case; notably, a desire to involve a greater number of participants, to explore new
formats of data collection, and to improve the user interface to facilitate collective analysis.
This case was developed with two colleagues, Dave Snowden and Wendy Schultz, and
deployed in an online engagement for the 2010 International Risk Assessment and Horizon
Scanning Conference for the Government of Singapore. A total of 265 participants from around the
world contributed mini-scenarios, narratives, anecdotes and opinions as part of this case. These
were then clustered using a structured evaluation process and summarized by the researchers into
three representative scenarios.
The topic of the case study was the future of urban public services under financial
uncertainty. The goal was to explicitly explore different formats for user contribution, including free-
form narrative or anecdotal formats, and to prototype methods for generating draft scenario logics
more directly.
3.5 Comparative Examples
A number of other examples were developed during this course of this research by other parties,
which were found to contain additional data or insight relevant to the research questions. These
were used as supplementary evidence to help plug gaps in the case study data and supplement
understanding from their analysis.
The three examples analyzed were:
- The Institute for the Future's Foresight Engine
- The WikiStrat collaborative forecasting platform
- OpenForesight's Future ofFacebook project
Although none of these systems were designed for urban planning research, they
nonetheless offered useful lessons for various aspects of online user engagement, crowdsourcing or
scenario planning. Each was selected because it represented either pioneering, unique or typical
efforts in one or more of the following ways: a) it was an adaptation of a similar function like
scenario planning in an online environment; b) it used emerging Web 2.0 and collective intelligence
tool kits to model similar activities or processes (but focused on different content); c) it employed
design decisions that were exemplary of different approaches to generating data relevant to the key
variables and/or; d) it was notable or unique for its originality or early-mover status. Each
comparative example is described briefly below.
3.5.1 The Institute for the Future's Foresight Engine
The Foresight Engine is an interactive gaming platform developed by the Palo Alto-based technology
forecasting non-profit, The Institute for the Future (IFTF). Foresight Engine uses a card-game like
interface, in which thousands of players submit ideas to the future of a subject during a curated
engagement period. The example chosen for the dissertation comparison was an engagement
exploring the future of the United States utility network, entitled "Smart Grid 2025". The event,
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sponsored by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), engaged almost 700
participants from 81 different countries over a 24-hour period, generating nearly 5,000 submissions
and interactions. Aside from participants, over 26,000 people viewed the project website and
associated content. Participants included subject matter experts, academics and students, IFTF staff
and members of the general public. This project was selected as the first comparison example
because its game-like interface and open-ended participation is a strong example of leveraging
stakeholder participation online.
3.5.2 The WikiStrat collaborative geo-strategy forecasting platform
WikiStrat is an online geo-strategy platform. The platform operates as a for-profit strategy
consultancy, using a distributed network of analysts and subject matter experts who contribute
piecework or competition-based analysis in a crowdsourced format. Compared to the Foresight
Engine, WikiStrat uses a fairly simple, Content Management System (CMS) / wiki platform. In
contrast, however, it supports a more complex community of experts, who participate over time for
both recognition and financial reward. Paying clients pose topics or questions to the community, via
moderation by WikiStrat staff, who then contribute essays, analysis, trends and drivers into the
WikiStrat system via web forms and surveys. Participants are asked to select and evaluate different
trends and factors, suggest implications, and draft narrative comments via questionnaires, which are
then scored by a combination of algorithm and staff to select "winners" for each engagement.
Winners are then paid a portion of the proceeds generated by WikiStrat client engagements. Past
topics included the outcome of the Arab Spring, the future of China, and other geopolitical and
security topics.
The particular example chosen for this dissertation was WikiStrat's "International Grand
Strategy Competition", a four-week invitation-only engagement exploring geopolitical scenarios
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around the world, for a cash prize of $10,000. This event engaged approximately 30 teams from
universities in 13 countries who produced an average of 7,000 - 8,000 words of content per week on
a range of subjects. While somewhat atypical of the usual WikiStrat engagement, it is a valid
example for exploring how the system worked and how the competition format functions at scale.
3.5.3 OpenForesight's Future of Facebook project
The last comparative example selected explored the future of the social media platform, Facebook,
through an "open foresight" process. This project used entirely free, existing services such as
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube Quora and Kickstarter to conduct an "open source" scenario planning
exercise. The process began with a video on Kickstarter project (the crowdfunding platform) to
generate interest and funds to execute the project. This announcement was promoted via Facebook,
Twitter, blogs and emails and received significant social media coverage. The second phase engaged
approximately 25 thinkers in the field through in-depth video interviews over Skype. These were
then edited into short clips and posted on a public YouTube channel for distribution and review.
The administrators also created a Quora page, an interactive, user-driven question and answer site,
with which users posed and responded to various questions raised by the interviews. Finally,
traditional desktop research was conducted offline. The results were represented back to the open
community of users in the form of several blog posts and videos, resulting in a series of scenarios
describing several possible futures for the Facebook platform. In addition to the 25 experts
interviewed via video (which received over 17,000 views on YouTube), the project received 109
responses from over 220 subscribers to the Quora page and extensive interaction on Facebook
from over 50 users.
3.6 Informant Interviews
The last component of the research design involved in-depth, semi-structured interviews with
experts in scenario planning, crowdsourcing, and urban planning. The interviews were conducted
over a period of six months with the aim of generating a range of themes about how online
participatory collective intelligence systems may work, as well as a series of methodological insights
related to their study.
Over 45 semi-structured interviews were conducted, of which 30 were substantially
transcribed. Individuals were selected for interviews in a purposive manner. Securing interviews
with desired participants was an ongoing, iterative process of gaining and maintaining access.
(Bardach 2000, pp. 49-50). As Bardach discussed, this process of securing interviews snowballed.
Interviews with key informants led to recommendations of further suggestions for interviews,
secured primarily through my own personal, professional, and academic connections.
These interviews served two purposes: first, to solicit input on platform design and
measurement protocol used for this dissertation and second, to help interpret the meaning and
context of the data generated from them and the comparative examples.
3.7 Case Selection Criteria
I employed theoretical sampling to guide the selection of these cases and sources. Theoretical sampling
refers to an approach to identifying and choosing research sites, cases, and informants to compare
with the ones that have already been selected and studied. Theoretical sampling focuses on
achieving deeper understanding of cases and resulting concepts. Both case selection and data
generation was purposive, ongoing, and oriented towards understanding and developing categories
of understanding (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 45).
Consistent with a theoretical sample approach, I selected cases, informants and scenario
planning participants that would help generate full pictures of categories and facilitate their
comparison (Glaser and Strauss 1967, p. 49). As distinct from probabilistic sampling - which aims
to capture data that is representative of general variations - this sampling approach does not aim to
collect representative data. Instead, it maximizes variance in the selected cases and participants in an
effort to achieve a deeper understanding of different dimensions of the concepts and phenomena
under study.
My prototypical online participatory scenario systems were designed in an iterative,
progressive manner to support this sampling approach, and cases chosen for their application were
selected to vary the richness of data generated for analysis. Theoretical sampling thus enabled
concept development, modification and refinement through the intermittent analysis and generation
of additional data sources during the course of this research.
Deliberately generating varied data helps to identify the range of types, variations,
conditions, relationships, processes, and mechanisms relevant to the research questions. Glaser and
Strauss argue that with "theoretical sampling, no one kind of data on a category nor technique for
data collection is necessarily appropriate. Different kinds of data give the analyst different views or
vantage points from which to understand a category and to develop its properties; these different
views we have called slices of data." (1967, p. 65)
3.8 Data Categories and Availability
The following data categories were developed for data generation. Data categories were divided into
two groups: particpation characteristics, which deal with aspects related to who participates with the
data generation system and why, and interaction characteristics, which deal with aspects about how users
participated, what actions they took and how they interacted with each other.
Table 3.1 Data Categories and Availability, by Data Source
Participation Characteristics
Degree of public openness (including
promotion & recruitment efforts)
Amount of preparation required
The number of participants involved
Reasons for participation
Degree of user anonymity
Type of participants involved
Level of Education
Professional Experience
Professional Discipline
Age
Geographic Origin
Interaction Characteristics
Tasks Performed
Driver Identification
Driver Exploration
Driver Ranking & Selection
Driver Clustering & Aggregation
Scenario Logic Creation
Scenario Logic Selection
Scenario Logic Detailing
Implications Development
Implications Detailing
Full Scenario Narrative Creation
Types of input considered
Amount and type of visualization
tools used
Amount and type of analytical tools
used
Amount of socialization enabled
Amount and kinds of feedback
provided
Table 3.1 presents the data categories and their availability for each case, each of which is then
described in greater detail. Green cells represent categories for which empirical measurements have
been made. Yellow cells represent categories for which evidence-based estimates have been made.
Red cells represent categories for which no data is available because none was captured, while grey
cells represent categories for which no data was captured because that activity was not performed
for that case and therefore could not be measured.
3.7.1 Construct Definition
The following definitions were developed to add resolution to the data categories introduced above.
Degree ofpublic openness (including promotion)
This category measures the degree of accessibility each system allowed during observation. This
includes whether or not the system was public, required registration but allowed anyone to register,
was invite only, or was completely private. This also relates to the degree of external promotion
each case involved, ranging from none to extensive advertising on multiple media channels and
outlets.
Amount and type ofpreparation required
This category measures the amount of pre-work required by participants for their participation. This
could range from none, to reading or watching basic background texts and video, to extensive pre-
work requiring the review of complex material, completion of exercises, training courses, etc.
The number ofpartiapants involved
This measure simply records the number of people involved from start to finish in the entire
process.
Reasons forparticipation
This measure, most often estimated, begins to explore people's reasons for participating in the case.
At the most basic level, this construct follows a modified version of Malone et al.'s (2010) discussion
of why people participate in CI activities. This includes "direct compensation", "for learning", "for
influence / self promotion", and for "love / friendship".
Degree of user anonymity
This measure records the amount and type of privacy involved with using the system. This could
range from none, in which every user is required to register with a high burden of identity proof, to
significant, in which users are provided with significant privacy, either in the form of log-ins or more
explicit means.
Type ofpartiipants involved
This category includes the following sub-categories:
- Level ofEducation: Number of years of education, a proxy for expertise
- Professional Experience: Number of years of professional experience, another proxy for
expertise
- Professional Discipline: Professional training, discipline or industry
- Age: Estimated participant age
- Geographic Origin: Place of residence relative to project location
Interaction Characteristics
The following measurement categories reflect upon data related to how users interact with the
system, with the process of scenario planning and with each other.
Tasks Performed
The first sub-category of task categories relates to the various aspects of the scenario planning
process. The activities in Table 3.2 were measured if they were present or not and if so, how they
were performed and by whom.
Types ofInput Considered: The format of information collected, ranging from text-based input of facts,
article summaries and other analytical abstracts, to user opinion, narratives, photos or links.
Amount and Type of Visualization Tools Used: Whether and in what way visualization tools were used as
part of the process, where, how, and by whom.
Amount and Type ofAnaltical Tools Used: Whether and in what way various supplemental analytical
tools were used as part of the process, where, how, and by whom. These include network analysis
tools, clustering algorithms, cross-impact analysis support tools, etc.
Amount ofSocialization Enabled: How much, and what kind, of reflective dialogue and interaction
between users was allowed. This includes voting, forums, commenting and discussion boards, as
well as more advanced features such as user accounts, scoring, leaderboards, social networking,
friend circles, etc.
Amount and Kinds ofFeedback Provided: Whether and in what way the system, or other users, recognizes
user input and interaction. This may range from timely, on-screen feedback to input and inquiries,
or email notification, elaboration and response from other users.
Table 3.2 Tasks Performed and Measured
Drver 1dentgreation ithe process or scanning tor trends, rivers and uncertainties tnat may inluence
the focal question of the research. This includes entry of these drivers into the
system.
Driver Exploration The process of exploring, reading, sorting through and making sense of drivers.
Essentially a pedagogical engagement exercise, sometimes performed through
video or web-resources.
Driver Ranking & Selection The process of ranking and selecting key drivers from a larger list from which to
build scenarios.
Driver Clustering & After exploring interaction between drivers, this phase involves synthesizing
Aggregation lower level trends into higher-level themes and issues, both for communication
and for scenario building.
Scenario Logic Creation The process of creating draft logical frameworks and causal arguments for later
refinement and filtration.
Scenario Logic Selection The act of choosing from competing alternative scenario logics to define the
driver characteristics and uncertainties to drive final scenario creation.
Scenario Logic Detailing An intermediate step involving the fleshing out of basic plot elements, story arcs,
characters, actors and events in a scenario logic framework (but before writing up
as a narrative).
Implications Development Preliminary exploration of implications, including high level review of winners
and losers, impacts on policy, etc.
Implications Detailing Fleshing out these implications in significantly more detail for the purposes of
scenario narrative writing and working group pedagogy.
Full Scenario Narrative The process (usually consultant-led) of converting the aggregated drivers of
Creation change, the final scenario logic and draft implications into full, text-based stories.
3.8 Relationship of Each Data Source to the Scenario Planning Process
As explained in the Research Design, each case was compared pair-wise against the base case, which
represents a fairly typical face-to-face scenario planning engagement. Due to the constraints of the
data generated and research method used, not every case was directly comparable to all phases of the
scenario planning process. Figure 3.1 clarifies the relationship between each data source and the
eight-step scenario planning process, as outlined by Schwartz (1991).
Figure 3.1
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While Figure 3.1 illustrates the overall relationship of each data source to the core
components of a face-to-face scenario planning process, it should be noted that each case and data
source employs very different approaches to execute each step. For example, Case 1, Futurescaper,
spends significant time and effort on the identification of driving forces and their relationship. Case
2, SenseMaker, covers this step as well, but in an indirect fashion. Thus Figure 3.1 should be
considered a rough road map for how each data source relates to the core process, and will be
explained in more detail in the sections dealing with each source.
3.9 Data Analysis
After generating data in the described categories, I undertook a systematic consideration of the
evidence relative to the research questions. After Hammersley's (1992) guidelines, I first developed
a list of data relevant to each research question. I then clustered data thematically by identifying
repetitive sources or like responses from the interviews, or relevant descriptive statistics from the
cases.
I also sought to triangulate consistencies between the various forms of data. Simple
descriptive statistics were employed to understand gross variation in measurement variables across
the cases. Great care was taken given the small sample size and non-experimental research design to
limit the claims of such data. Given the range of exogenous factors affecting the cases, descriptive
statistics were taken to represent the general magnitudes of effect, not precise measurements. At no
point were causal claims made based on this data, given the significant limits to the accuracy and
precision of both the theoretical constructs employed and the measurement instruments used.
Upon coming to preliminary findings, these were reviewed with expert practitioners and
researchers in the field, ensuring that the conclusions and insights generated through the exploratory
interviews and case studies were accurate, and comprehensive. This helped to verify and test my
conclusions, which further provided both social and professional sensitivity (Glaser, 1992).
3.10 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter introduced this dissertation's research strategy and research questions. It proposed a
multi-method research design in the context of a case study approach, discussed how cases were
selected, how data was generated, how these data were measured, and how they were analyzed.
Finally, it discussed the limitations of this approach and explored various pitfalls and risks associated
with such an approach.
Chapter 4 Base Case: The Future of a Northern Spanish Region
4.1 Chapter Introduction
This chapter presents the findings of the base case, which included a face-to-face scenario planning
exercise for a regional urban planning think-tank in northern Spain. This chapter discusses the
background on the case, details of the approach taken and the relevance of these findings relative to
the research questions. It also discusses the relative comparability and representativity of this
example, compared both to other typical scenario planning exercises and the online cases explored
as part of this research.
4.2 Case Background
This project was conducted on behalf of a regional government in northern Spain, by a world-
leading scenario planning consultancy. Both the name of the client and the consultancy have been
anonymized. The case involved a scenario generation exercise for the main metropolitan region,
which involved creating four research-based narratives on different potential futures for the region's
development. The focus of the exercise was on economic, political and social shifts, not geospatial
or design issues, and was therefore conducted purely as a qualitative scenario generation exercise
without the aid of GIS or quantitative simulation.
4.3 Process Description
The case followed a standard qualitative scenario generation process, typified by Schwartz's (1991)
eight-step process described in Chapter Two. In summary, the process involved a detailed research
period on the historic trends and issues influencing the history of the region's economy and politics.
96
These were supplemented by a round of in-depth qualitative interviews with regional officials and
experts. Interviews and research data was then summarized into a "pre-reading" packet, which was
distributed to a group of approximately 30 people in the run-up to a face-to-face scenario creation
workshop. The workshop took place over two days in Bilbao, Spain, and involved a total of 20
participants.
During this workshop, the past trends and issues document was reviewed, including the key
themes from the interviews. Various brainstorming exercises to generate additional driving forces
were conducted, which concluded in a clustering exercise to generate a series of higher-level themes.
Finally, these clustered themes were combined into draft scenario matrices, from which the
participants chose to develop draft scenario logics. Draft implications were also discussed and
recorded.
After this workshop, I developed the material created into a series of draft scenario narratives
(in my capacity as a consultant on the project). These were then reviewed by a small group from the
client, who provided specific feedback on plausibility and narrative interpretation. A final set of
qualitative scenario narratives was then created and distributed to the workshop participants. Later,
these scenarios became the basis for a second series of workshops that developed the implications in
more detail and made strategic recommendations for the region to follow. The latter workshops are
not considered as part of this case study, which instead focuses on the scenario creation and
detailing aspects of the process. This is done for comparability with the other cases in this research.
4.4 Findings
This section presents descriptive findings from the case relative to the measurement constructs
defined in Chapter 3.
4.4.1 Participation Characteristics
Degree ofAcessibility
Like most face-to-face scenario planning projects, this case was invitation only. Pre-workshop
research drew from both public databases and statistical sources, as well as private, proprietary trend
databases and market reports. The qualitative interviews comprised a significant contribution to the
data generation phase before the workshop. This was done on the basis of handpicked invitations,
curated on behalf of the organizing group. The list represented a mix of regional elite and various
subject matter experts, ranging from the heads of regional banks to expert consultants who had
worked in the region in the past.
Invitation to, and participation in the scenario generation workshop was also private and
chosen by the consultants and organizers. This involved a mix of local residents, professionals and
content matter experts. Finally, the circulation of the draft reports for comment and review was also
restricted to a limited, private group of experts.
Amount of preparation required
No preparation was required of the experts interviewed, although they were given the interview
protocol in advance. Participants in the scenario creation workshop were asked to read the pre-
reading packet distributed a week before the workshop, which summarized the results of the pre-
workshop research and interviews. Anecdotal observation on the day of the workshop suggested
that relatively few attendees had read the pre-reading material in depth, although no data was
collected to support this observation.
The number ofparticipants involved
A total of 15 experts and stakeholders were interviewed, and 20 stakeholders attended the
workshop. Six consultants and three staff members from the organizers also participated, bringing
the total number of participants to 23. The actual scenarios were written by a consulting team of
one full-time consultant with the oversight of two additional consultants who edited and reviewed
drafts.
Reasons forparticipation
Using Malone et al.'s (2010) framework, participation in the case of the interviewees was most likely
governed by the desire to influence the process, as well as personal interest. Only one of the experts
interviewed was paid for their participation, so financial reward was not likely to be a factor.
Participants in the workshop, however, were likely to be there for a combination of influence, learning
and personal interest. Over 80% of those invited to attend the workshop did, indicating a high degree
of interest in the process and its outcomes.
Degree of user anonymity
Interviews were conducted under Chatham House rules, whereby no statements were attributed to
specific individuals. Participation in the workshop was face-to-face, however, and many of the
participants seemed to either know, or know of each other in both personal and professional
capacities. While no recording of the scenario creation workshop was made, and no attribution or
quotation was made of specific contributions in the scenario write-up, it was clear that the workshop
participants were operating in familiar territory with full attribution, reputation and identity-
awareness.
Type ofparticipants involved
Participants in the interview process were all male with one exception, almost all over the age of 40
years old, and all well established professionally and economically. All were also residents in and
around the region of Bilbao, with the exception of two external experts interviewed who were
consultants familiar with the region. Workshop participation was more balanced in terms of gender
and age. Participants were a mix of independent creative artists and shop-owners, local politicians
and notable personalities, researchers, academics and business-people. The mean level of experience
was approximately 10 to 15 years of professional practice and the mean age was approximately 40
years old. Most participants were well educated by their professional standards, either in terms of
PhD's and higher qualifications, MBA's, or fine arts degrees. The facilitators noted after the fact
that the "harder professions" such as economics, business and industry were not well represented,
leading to a possible bias towards more creative, community-oriented input.
4.4.2 Interaction Characteristics
Tasks Performed
The following Table 4.1 presents a checklist of the activities performed during this case.
Table 4.1 Tasks Performed in the Base Case
Driver Identification Yes
Driver Exploration Yes
Driver Ranking & Selection Yes
Driver Clustering & Aggregation Yes
I cenario Logic Creation Yes
Scenario Logic Selection
Scenario Logic Detailing Yes
Implications Development Yes
Implications Detailing Yes, post-workshop
Full Scenario Narrative Creation Yes, post-workshop
Driver Identification
Drivers were generated both before and during the workshop. An initial list of drivers, with
explanation and supporting data, was generated from the in-depth interviews before the workshop.
These were summarized into four overall themes: Economy, Society, Politics and Culture, for a total
of 14 themes. Initial themes included topics such as "the failure of the educations system", "large
companies are leaving the region", "it is harder and harder to get credit," etc.
These themes were then presented in the workshop, which were used to spark a series of
discussions and brainstorming sessions. Participants were then asked to create a new list of drivers
in the form of topic headings. This was done through an "open-outcry" brainstorming session
lasting approximately 30 minutes, in which any participant was permitted to call out a driver or
factor they thought might be important to the future of the region. A total of 90 additional drivers
were created, ranging from the vague and non-directional, such as "religion", to the specific and
directional, such as "the creation of new architectural icons like the Guggenheim". These were
categorized by hand on a wall chart using a traditional STEEP framework (Social, Technological,
Environmental, Economic, Political).
Yes
Upon reflection, the facilitators agreed that the general quality of the drivers was less than ideal.
Drivers were biased towards more vague, general headlines with little specific consideration of
economic factors in particular. It was thought that this was a direct outcome of the professional
composition of the room, leading one senior facilitator to reflect that, "there wasn't enough
horsepower in the room" to generate a more comprehensive or high-quality list.
Driver Exploration
Preliminary drivers from the interviews and pre-read packet were presented as a PowerPoint
presentation, lasting approximately 20 minutes. This was followed by a 20-minute discussion of the
drivers and their implications. Drivers generated during the brainstorming session were discussed
for approximately 15 minutes after their generation, to answer any questions and clarify their
meaning.
Driver Ranking & Selection
After generating the list of 90 additional drivers (which contained the original list of 14 drivers and
themes as well), participants were asked to prioritize which of these they felt was the most important
and most uncertain. This was conducted over an approximately 30 minute period, during which
participants were given five red dots to distribute across the drivers as they saw fit. Participants
were instructed to allocate the dots to the drivers they felt were both the most important and
uncertain, thereby selecting for factors which were most likely to influence the region's future in an
uncertain way. Drivers were thus ranked based on those which received the highest number of dots.
Driver Clustering & Aggregation
After the initial selection process, high-ranking drivers were then clustered together into a smaller
subset in a facilitated session. This involved two steps, both of which were done initially by the
facilitators while participants were at lunch, then repeated with the participants upon their return.
First, drivers with similar names or concepts were joined into one, based on the facilitator's
suggestion and group agreement. Drivers such as "civil participation" and "citizen involvement in
politics" were joined into one, for example, on the grounds that they were different ways of
describing the same phenomena. The votes for both were then summed into a new driver indicative
of both. This shrank the number of drivers by approximatelyl /3.
After the first round of clustering based on definitional similarity, a second round took place
exploring higher-level conceptual similarities. Drivers such as "educational standards", "parental
involvement in education" and "educational funding" were grouped together, for example, into
meta-categories such as "quality of education". This was done through a process of guided
facilitation whereby the facilitator suggested clusterings to the group, who then debated, rephrased
or agreed with the proposed suggestions.
In the end, a clustered list of three to four themes was chosen for further exploration. These
high-level themes, now called "critical uncertainties", were then reviewed as a group to create a
series of linear, binary "end points" for each uncertainty. Thus, "quality of education" was given
two end-points, representing plausible extremes for how this uncertainty might play out. This
included examples such as "high quality, open access education" versus "lagging standards, poor
enrolment and exclusive access".
It is worth noting that this process took a significant amount of time when compared to the
effort invested in driver filtration and clustering. Participants were very involved in debating the
specific wording of the end points and appeared to be more heavily invested in the naming of the
axes and their extremes than in the choice of drivers in the first place. Subsequent experience in
other workshops suggests that this is a typical experience, whereby participants recognize that a
finalization of content is approaching and become invested in bundling their ideas and agendas into
the specific wording of the final subset of variables.
Scenario Logic Creation
The final subset of three critical uncertainties, with endpoints, were used to create a series of draft
scenario frameworks. These took the form of typical Shell-style 2x2 scenario matrices that
combined two critical uncertainties from the final list. Figure 4.1 illustrates the combinatorial
possibilities that were explored, including AxB, AxC, and BxC. These matrices, referred to by the
consultancy as "candidate matrices" were then tested out one by one, with the facilitator spending a
few minutes imagining with the group what each combination of key variables might look like.
One candidate matrix, for example, used the drivers of "quality of education" and "quality of
public leadership" to create four discrete worlds. Scenario A involved high quality education and
high quality leadership; scenario B involved high quality education but low quality leadership, and so
on. Next, a short sentence and a suggestive name was given to describe the feel of each scenario
quadrant. Participants then voted on which matrix they thought "felt right", was the most logical
and plausible, and offered the most descriptive power to capture the key dynamics in the region's
future.
Given the pivotal role that this decision would play in defining the outcomes, relatively little
time was allocated to the discussion and debate of the meaning of each axis and their combination.
This is often typically the case in time-limited workshops. While it is important to acknowledge the
logistic realities involved with running such workshops, the process involved little room for nuance
or discussion, a fact which many participants commented on as feeling artificial or forced. Thus the
degree of conflicting judgement and debate, or the lack there-of, was highly influential at this stage.
tainty B Unc
A+, B+ C-, B+
Uncertainty A
C-, B-
tainty B
C+, B+
Uncertainty C
U
C+, B-
Scenario Logic Selection
The selected scenario matrix was then used to divide the workshop participants into four groups,
each of which spent approximately 90 minutes imagining the future end-state in more detail and
imagining how the region could evolve from today to that state. This involved the use of wall-sized
paper templates, onto which participants affixed sticky notes of indicative events or headlines that
could move present-day conditions towards the endpoint of their scenario. These notes were
divided into standard STEEP categories.
Participants found it somewhat difficult to work backwards from a high level scenario
description towards a plausible chronology of events, starting from today. A good deal of time was
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Figure 4.1 Example Scenario Logics
AAL
Unc
A-, B+
spent discussing the scenario "end state", then brainstorming possible events that could get the
region from what it was today to that state. This process of deduction resulted in several false starts
and blind-alleys, requiring the professional facilitators to intervene at several points and suggest
actions of events that could get the group towards the desired goal. In this way the professional
facilitator played yet another decisive role, helping to guide the group's thinking towards storylines
that were consistent with the end goal, even if the end goal appeared not to make sense from the
perspective of events and trends described by the participants. It should also be noted that of the
many ideas and post-it notes created by participants in the process, only a small subset were used by
the consultants after the fact to construct the actual narrative. This involved a further round of
judgement and filtration (and potential bias or manipulation).
Draft Implications Creation & Selection
After creating draft scenario narratives, participants were asked to spend approximately 60 minutes
detailing high-level implications for the region in their scenario. This involved selecting key
"winners and losers" from among present day stakeholder groups, identifying what major industries
and economic sectors would succeed or fail, and what the major challenges and opportunities may
be. This process was also conducted in small groups, by scenario. Finally, participants then
presented their scenario sketches to the group in approximately five-minute segments and the
workshop concluded.
Detailed Scenario Narrative Creation
At the end of this process, consultants took these results back to their office and produced a draft
report of the scenario process. This involved first a detailed review of the suggested storylines and
plot events created by participants in the workshop, as well as minor- to medium-degrees of
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interpretation, revision, and rationalization. After this process of review, the consultants created a
draft report describing the event and its outcomes. This included a summary of all the trends and
drivers selected in the workshop, an overview of the two major critical uncertainties chosen, a
presentation of the scenario matrix, and a detailed 5-10 page narrative write-up in the form of a
fictional story. This narrative described in detail the kinds of events suggested by the participants
and modified by the consultants. This process took approximately two weeks of full-time analysis
and writing to produce.
Kinds of inputs considered
Inputs considered in this case involved baseline statistical data from various official State and private
sources, news clippings and journal articles, in-depth interviews, and suggested "headline" drivers.
Amount and type of tisualiZation tools used
Aside from PowerPoint visualization of representative pictures and quotes from the pre-read
document, no visualization was used in any part of the process.
Amount and type of analytical tools used
No special analytical tools were utilized to collect, interpret, analyze, or summarize the interviews,
nor were any such tools used during the scenario creation or write-up.
Amount and kind of socialization enabled
The face-to-face workshop enabled a significant amount of both directed and undirected
conversation. Numerous opportunities were provided for participants to discuss key issues and
implications, both as a group and in smaller, breakout groups. The workshop also allowed for
107
behind-the-scenes side conversations, between the event organizers, the facilitators, and amongst the
participants themselves. This informal sharing of opinion, ideas and reactions, often over coffee and
between cigarette breaks, is considered by many experienced scenario practitioners to be as
important as the formal workshop itself. This is especially true when it comes to the secondary
goals of scenario planning, which include enhanced socialization of different stakeholders and
interest groups and, in its ideal form, increased consensus building and appreciation of diverse
perspectives.
Amount and kind offeedback provided
During the workshop several opportunities for "checking in" were allowed. This helped to
moderate the timing and focus of the workshop. Participants were also given chances to offer and
receive feedback in the form of questions, comments and observations, both in the large group and
in small breakout groups. No formal feedback mechanisms were conducted, such as post-workshop
evaluation surveys or the like. Aside from client review of the scenario document drafts, no
subsequent feedback on the final scenario set was solicited.
The overall speed and timeline of the process
The entire process, from start to finish, lasted approximately 12 weeks. This included the project
set-up, research question discussion, interviews, workshop and post-workshop write-ups. The actual
amount of time involved in each phase of scenario construction was less, however. Background
research before the interviews lasted approximately two weeks. Setting up and conducting the
interviews lasted approximately one week. Analysis and summarizing of the interviews, including
production of the pre-read document for the workshop, lasted approximately three weeks. Setting
up the workshop occurred in parallel, lasting approximately two weeks. The workshop itself
comprised two days, and the post-workshop write-up took two weeks for the initial draft and two
additional weeks for all comments and revisions to be completed.
4.5 Discussion
The base case represents a fairly robust example of the current state of the art in mainstream, face-
to-face scenario planning. Other instances may involve slightly more or less participants, more or
less interviews, or slight variations on the overall process. But the core process involved is strongly
representative of best-practice in scenario planning, particularly for government and public-sector
clients.
One of the key strengths of such an approach is that it engages influential stakeholders in-
depth discussions about these issues before bringing them together as scenarios. This has two
effects: first, collecting data and information for the study itself and second, ensuring understanding
and buy-in from influential political figures who will later be instrumental in the scenario's reception.
The dual nature of both the interviews and, to a lesser degree, the workshop, enabled the
consultants and scenario sponsor to spend significant one-on-one time with key influencers
throughout the process. This helped to build social capital, build awareness and understanding of
the work and concepts and get high-level input to the process. The purpose and benefit of such a
labor-intensive face-to-face approach is therefore to maximize the social interaction component of
the scenario process.
The same can largely be said for the scenario creation workshop, although this served a more
functional role as well. The goal of such workshops is to bring together diverse stakeholders
interested in or affected by the issues at hand and solicit their input and discussion on the topics
presented. The importance of diversity also therefore serves two purposes: first, to ensure adequate
breadth of perspective so that important trends and perspectives are included and second, to ensure
a vibrant and stimulating social experience. Even though the workshop in particular suffered from a
slightly lower than desired diversity of professional expertise, it was highly successful as a social
networking and capital building event. Several experts interviewed in relation to this topic suggested
that while online systems may be perfectly suitable for the former goal (data gathering and analysis),
they are far less likely to be effective at the latter (social capital construction and the creation of
entertaining, stimulating experiences).
While both the interviews and workshop clearly met their political and social goals, there
were questions as to whether or not they adequately met their data collection and synthesis goals.
As explained, the lack of professional diversity in the workshop itself, combined with the short
period of time to explore driver interactions, understand and agree on clustering approaches, and
develop scenario logics, meant that the material itself coming out of the workshop required
significant post-processing by the scenario consulting team. While the client felt that the final
product was ultimately very successful, there is a clear danger that core concepts, participant
perspectives and attitudes may be lost during this period of expert production. This could become a
significant issue in the hands of inexperienced or biased facilitators, or in situations with highly
contentious interpretations and agendas.
The strength therefore of this approach is its ability to successfully convene deep social
interactions between key stakeholders. This, by necessity, limits the number of participants
involved. It may therefore have indirect impact on the quality of the scenarios created, either
because critical factors are missed, under-analyzed, or subject to conscious or unconscious bias on
behalf of the scenarios team. Keeping a balance of the social richness of the scenario experience
and the analytical richness that software systems may provide was therefore identified as a clear goal
by several experts interviewed.
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4.6 Conclusion
This chapter introduced the base case, which will be used for pair-wise comparison with the two in-
depth online cases and the three comparative examples. It explored how the process of face-to-face
scenario planning typically works, elaborating on each of the key measurement dimensions defined
in Chapter 3. It then discussed the relative strengths and weaknesses of this approach, setting the
stage for further reflection in Chapter 8: Discussion. The following chapters presents the two in-
depth case studies, followed by a short chapter on the comparative examples to complete the
presentation of findings.
Chapter 5 Case 1: Futurescaper, The Impact of Climate Change Impacts On
the UK
5.1 Chapter Introduction
After completing the Base Case, the first prototypical collective intelligence system was developed to
generate relevant data for the research questions. The first system was called Futurescaper. This
chapter presents the background on this case, an overview of the system design and functionality,
the findings it generated relative to the constructs defined, and discussion of how these categories
relate to the research questions.
5.2 Case Background
For this case, I designed and developed a prototypical data generation and analysis platform for
exploring various aspects of the qualitative scenario planning process online. Data generation for
this case was completed using data from the International Futures Forum (IFF) as part of a project
run by Tony Hodgson on the implications of climate change impacts for the UK Government. The
purpose of this project was to identify the systemic linkages between climate change impacts in
other parts of the world and the secondary and tertiary impacts on critical supply chains and
governance functions within the UK. The Futurescaper system was designed by myself and
implemented and developed in the programming languages mySQL and PHP by a colleague, Nathan
Koren.
5.3 System Description
Futurescaper used a structured, form-based approach to the collection of trends and drivers that
could affect the future of the research topic. It stored these trends in an online database and
provided basic analytical tools to aid in their analysis.
This case platform was designed to be used in the early and middle stages of scenario creation
research. It sought to address the task of generating trends and drivers, exploring their interactions,
ranking them, clustering them into high-level themes, and then assembling them into analytically
useful visualizations. It was not designed to address the latter stages of scenario creation, including
scenario logic creation, selection, detailing or narrativization. Towards this end, an expert scientific
panel selected 186 representative scientific articles and news clippings, which were then uploaded
onto the system for analysis and clustering. Users could browse this data, add new trends and
drivers, explore how they interact, and download them for subsequent visualization.
Figure 5.1 presents a flow chart detailing the steps undertaken by a typical user of the system,
and Figure 5.2 presents a screen shot of the main user interface. Figure 5.1 shows how a user first
selected a scientific or news article for entry, entered its details into the form, and then explored how
this new data point related to others within the system. It can be seen that the major emphasis was
on data entry, exploration and analysis. There were no in-built functions for story-building,
discussion, voting or socialization in any way. This is one of the limitations of the system that will
be described below, but one that makes it a focused example for considering different ways of
collecting, exploring and clustering driver data for early-stage scenario generation.
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Figure 5.1 Futurescaper Process Overview
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Figure 5.2
5.4 Findings
This section presents descriptive findings from the case relative to the measurement constructs
defined in Chapter 3.
5.4.1 Participation Characteristics
Degree ofAccessibiliy
Use of the Futurescaper platform for this case was confined to the project team working on the
project, the panel of experts involved, and the client working group. There was no promotional
effort conducted to enhance participation or encourage additional participants. The platform was
tested on a password-protected server and all data was considered confidential.
Amount ofpreparation required
The case began with an expert panel who identified over 800 scientific papers, journal articles and
press clippings related to various aspects of climate science, hydrology, food supply, shipping
infrastructure, epidemiology and other fields. This collection of articles, which was prepared before
the platform was developed, was summarized by a consulting intern. 186 of these summaries were
then uploaded into the Futurescaper prototype to test the driver entry and clustering components of
the process. Articles were selected for inclusion based on those deemed most useful by the expert
panel.
Although extensive background research was conducted for the preparation of material as part
of this case, the system was designed to accept input without the need for rigorous background
screening. Any kind of driver or trend, entered into the form described below, could hypothetically
be entered and used with minimal preparation. The high degree of participation required in this
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instance was therefore a feature of the project, generating data for this case, not of the system design
itself.
The number ofpartiaipants involved
Approximately 12 experts participated on the expert panel. A single intern input the article
summaries into the system for analysis. Four distributed analysts from the consulting team then
used the platform to explore, summarise and visualize the data. In this case, the experts acted as
"users", in the sense that they selected data for input, the intern mirrored the role of a user actually
entering data into the system and the consulting analysts acted as users making use of the output of
the system as part of their larger project goals. Thus participation in this case was more a function
of the project logistics from which the case derived its data, and not a design of the system itself.
Reasonsforpartiapaion
Participants were either involved because it was their job (vis-a-vis the expert panel), because they
were being paid as consultants, or because they were interested in the research and motivated by the
topic. As per Malone et al.'s (2010) framework, participation was governed by direct compensation
and learning.
Degree of user anonymity
No user-account system was created as part of this platform for this case study; thus all entries and
user actions were anonymous.
Type ofpartiapants involved
Given the small number of participants, the demographics of the participating population were
skewed heavily towards highly educated content experts. Although a formal demographic survey
was not conducted, their general level of education was PhD and above, they were well-respected
experts in their fields with over 20 of years experience, and from a range of specialities within the
fields of physical sciences, biology, economy and public policy. Few business interests were
represented.
The average age of the participants was estimated to be over 50 years old; most were Anglo-
Saxon white men. Thus, while the sample represents a highly educated, professionally diverse group
of participants, they were unrepresentative of the general population mix of Great Britain; no efforts
were made to include specific minority groups or young people.
5.4.2 Interaction Characteristics
Tasks Performed
The following Table 5.1 presents a checklist of the activities performed during this case.
Table 5.1 Tasks Performed During Case 1
river Identification Yes
Driver Exploration Yes
Driver Ranking & Selection Yes
Driver Clustering & Aggregation Yes
Scenario Logic Creation Partial
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Scenario Logic Selection
Scenario Logic Detailing
Implications Development Partial
Implications Detailing
Full Scenario Narrative Creation
Driver Identification
Drivers and trends deemed useful by the expert panel for qualitative scenario planning were derived
from over 186 article summaries of scientific papers, news clippings and journal articles. The
following dimensions were entered manually into a web form, which is reflected in Figure 5.2,
above:
1. Title
2. Primary Subject Category (using pre-defined subject "nodes")
3. Secondary Subject Category
4. Time scale (vis-a-vis a "horizon" metaphor defined by the lead researcher)
5. Description
6. Subject tags
7. Relationships to other themes
8. Quality
These data fields were determined by the consulting team in advance of data entry, meaning that
participants had no control over the kinds of information the system was set up to collect.
Although useful as a data collection mechanism (as well as a facilitation mechanism to help focus
user attention on variables of importance), a true collective intelligence system would also allow user
reflexivity on the fields collected. This would impose a wide range of technical challenges, however,
so for both project-specific and technical reasons, a more static form was chosen.
When entering each item, users were also asked to map the relationships between that item
and other driving forces. In this case, this means the consulting intern entering the data was asked
to spend time thinking about how this article related to others, vis-a-vis systemic relationships of
influence. This was achieved through a two-by-two matrix which prompted users to consider what
subjects or data items may be driving forces for the subject, and what impacts the subject or trend
might have on others. This was built upon a predictive text engine that drew from a database of
futures-related key words based upon the UK Government's database of trends and drivers called
"Sigma Scan".
By typing any letter into one of the boxes, the system suggested additional subject tags with
similar patterns of letters to the user. If no tags existed that were close to what the user typed, the
system would save their entry to the tag database for future use. This combination of pre-coded
subject tags and folksonomic data entry techniques allowed for flexible categorization of subject tags
and driver relationships. Figure 5.3 displays an example of this process.
Figure 5.3 Subject Tag Relationship Definition
Relationships: Increasing: Decreasing:
Driven by:
Drives causality
autoritaanism
~auomated vehicles /
Driver Exploration
The platform provided basic tools for exploring related trends and drivers. Once the amount of
data in the system reached a critical threshold, users could begin exploring the trends and linkages
between them. This was achieved using tag-based relationships with the information specified by
the user in the "Relationships" fields. For example, if Item A was coded as being "Driven by
Increasing water scarcity", and Item B was coded as "Driving Increasing water scarcity", than the
platform would identify this linkage and connect the drivers in a functional, direct connection. This
allowed for both direct linkages (i.e., A is connected to B) and secondary and tertiary network
connection (i.e., A is connected to B, B is connected to C therefore A and C are partially related).
The system employed a modified 'instant run-off approach' to evaluate connection strength between
nodes, based on how many data points are related in their use of similar key words. One significant
feature of the design is that Futurescaper explores the connections of those connections, so that the
user gets a networked effect instead of merely a sense of the immediate influence of a trend.
In its simplest guise, this took the form of a browsable database of any of the field categories
provided (including title, subject tags, subject categories, etc.), sorted in a variety of ways. Users
could search the database of content to explore the articles and then view and modify existing data
entries with Wikipedia style revision editing. Figure 5.4 displays an example of a typical browse
query and Figure 5.5 displays an instance of a single coded data item.
The exploration of such queries operates in two ways. First, is what might usefully be
considered a "bottom-up" analysis. This approach starts with a single data point or subject area. It
proceeds to explore the types of forces and facts that are linked to that subject. To employ a
hypothetical example, a user might start with a single trend or news items, such as "Mexican Zetas
Win Firefight with State Police Forces", and explore what other trends and news items Futurescaper
identifies as related via user designated tag relationships.
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Browsable Driver Database
Global increase in mean temperature
Food production shifts
A global increase of temperature
Changing temperatures produce global
variation in food crops
Climate
Climate
Extreme weather events Increasing storm surges, hurricanes, land Climate
slides and other natural disasters cre...
Urgent necessity to develop crops that Food
produce greater yields In harsher conditL.
Generating a'milracle for the ailing BaltSe Over-fished, poULutd by agricultural nutrient Ecosstemn
discharge and uncared for, the Ba...
Cities prepare for life with the electric car The San Francisco bulding code will soon be En
revised to require that new structu...
Branson Warns That Oil Crunch is Coming Within 5 Years Sir Richard Branson and fellow leading Enerv
businessmen will wamrn ministers this week...
Another way that the platform enabled users to explore trends and themes was to take a high-
level "top-down" approach, beginning with the "Primary" and "Secondary Nodes", or subject
categories. This functionality was developed at the request of Tony Hodgson, project leader from
the IFF who was leading the project generating data for this case. When using a top-down
approach, a user can select any number of high-level themes such as "water", "energy",
"governance", etc. Futurescaper would then generate a ranked list of all the data and trends that
influence or connect all three. Thus, instead of going from a specific trend or force and seeing how
it links to others, the "top-down" analysis allows the user to pick high-level relationships and see
what data points and trends are strongly connected across these themes. This type of analysis
proves to be particularly useful in the context of thematic research, as opposed to more exploratory,
unguided research.
Figure 5.4
Figure 5.5 Example of Driver Summary
Exploitation of groundwater
Entry Date 2010-08C20 00: 15
Primary Chmte
Node:
Secondary Infrastructure, Water
Node(s):
Horizon : Crisis (HI
Description Because of the inefficiency of large water irrigation systems, people have been
forced to exploit groundwater. The bulk of Indian agricultue remains rain-fed, but
also depends on groundwater rather than surface water - a worrying fact in the
context of climate change and increasingly variable rainfall. Thus, due to excessive
withdrawal of groundwater, groundwater use is exceeding the rate of groundwater
recharge.
Tags : agric hureclimate changeg, ja water, water resources development
This
Fragment: Increasing: Decreasing:
Driven by : inefficiency of lare
water irrigation systems
vaiable rainfall
Drives: groundwater depletion
Quality: Reliable
For more complex queries, Futurescaper provided tools for users to explore the primary,
secondary and tertiary connections between driving forces. This was accomplished through a tag
cloud-like interface, word trees and systems maps. In the first instance, a tag cloud of the most
referenced subject tags was presented. Users could then select a single subject tag and see what
factors were driven by it (i.e., what its impacts were perceived to be). They could then select impacts
and browse a list of data entries associated with it. Figure 5.6 presents an example, using the
subject tag for "climate change". The subject "context" is selected in blue on the frame on the left,
the impacts (or "actions") associated with that tab are presented in the frame in the center, and any
fragments associated with selected actions are displayed in the frame to the right.
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In the example from Figure 5.5, "Climate Change" impacts a large number of other trends and
forces, which are displayed as a tag cloud whereby font size represents the number of connections
between the driver and the impact. Thus "Climate Change" as a subject tag is related to "Increasing
Droughts" as a secondary tag, which itself will have a variety of associated fragments linking to
evidence from the summary articles. Use of this cloud allowed for users to visually and textually
search the database for key trends and subjects, then explore how they related to other drivers and
impacts. Figure 5.6 displays the database structure of these relationships.
Figure 5.6 Explore Relationships Between Drivers via Tag Clouds
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Drver Ranking & Selection / Driver Clusteing & Aggregation
In this case, driver ranking and selection occurred after clustering and aggregation. Thus both are
dealt with jointly in this section. Recognizing that the tag relationships between articles comprised a
directed network of relationships, a network analysis plug-in was created to export data as a Pajek
database. This was then imported into an open-source network graphics visualization package
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developed by Rosvall and Bergstrom at the University of Washington (2011), which includes various
clustering, network analysis, and visualization algorithms.
The first step in drivers ranking involved restructuring the database upon export to make
nodes, links and link direction explicit for the software. These followed the standard Pajek network
map syntax, summarized below in Tables 5.2(a), 5.2(b) and Figure 5.7. The reformatted database
was uploaded into Rosvall and Bergstrom's online network analysis platform, allowing for several
forms of network analysis to be conducted. The first involved a simple ranking of the number of
times a subject tag was mentioned in the database, thereby providing a crude ranking mechanism.
Table 5.2(a) Pajek Network Syntax
Vertex VaIiable-s Arc Vari s
Vertex ID, "Name" Vertex 1 ID, Vertex 2 ID, Weight (number of
connections)
Table 5.2(b) Example of Network Export for Driver Relationships
Vertices Arcs
1 "Biofuels" 231
2 "Decreasing cost" 421
3 "Increasing participation" 461
4 "Increasing carbon sequestration" 7 12 2
5 "Coal" 7 13 1
6 "Increasing creativity" 7 15 2
7 "Decreasing barriers to trade" 7 17 1
8 "Bubbles" 7181
9 "China" 7 19 1
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Structure of Database Relationships
A more sophisticated approach involved calculating rank based on the number of connections
per node (i.e., its local neighborhood size). This began to take into account the network centrality of
a node, but evidence from applied network analysis suggests that local neighborhood size is often a
crude measure for the degree of influence or importance of a node in a system. Other, more
complex network analysis approaches were therefore explored, including varying the neighborhood
size considered for each node, performing multi-radius nearness and centrality measurements within
Pajek, and using basic clustering algorithms such as k-means testing.
Proper exploration of the effects of these network parameters was beyond the scope of this
research. The default clustering settings based on research by Rosvall and Bergstrom were used to
demonstrate proof-of-concept validity of such an approach to driver ranking and influence. This
approach works by estimating the probability flow of random walks on a network, then considering
that as a proxy for information flows in a real world system. It then decomposes the network into
modules by compressing a description of the probability flow using Hoffman encoding. See Rosvall
and Bergstrom's 2011 paper for more detail.
Figure 5.7
Once analysed, ranking and clustering was visualized and performed in four ways:
1. List-based
2. Circle diagrams
3. Causal loop diagrams
4. Cluster-based diagrams
List-based output
The most basic form of activity made possible by this analysis was a list-based ranking by degree of
influence. This straightforward process simply sorted driving forces by their degree of influence on
other drivers. As explained above, this ranking score was bi-directional. Variables with the highest
degree of systemic influence received the highest score. These could then be exported as any kind
of list, allowing analysts to better understand the main drivers of change in a system. This
understanding could subsequently be used to suggest their consideration amongst the main drivers
in a scenario construction exercise, as opposed (or in addition to) the more traditional voting
process often conducted in a workshop.
Circle diagrams
Given the multi-directional interaction between drivers, it was found that simple lists were often
inadequate for representing complexity of relational information captured by the Futurescaper
platform. Circle diagrams were used to allow for simultaneous ranking of overall influence, as well
as visualization of first-order relationships in the context of all other variables. Figure 5.8 displays
the output of this visualization technique for this case. Circle size represents the network centrality
of a driver (and thus its implied importance), whereas the color and thickness of connecting lines
indicate network edges.
Figure 5.8 Circle Diagram of Driving Forces
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Such a full representation of the systemic complexity of the interacting variables can be
overwhelming; additional visualizations of subsets can easily be created by confining the number of
variables for consideration. Figure 5.9 displays just the top 20 interacting variables from the
Futurescaper climate change case as an illustration. This reduced form allows for a more useful
estimation of influence (by rank and circle size) as well as interaction (by links, their direction, and
their strength).
Reduced Circle Diagram, Ranking Drivers
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Causal loop diagrams
Further information was able be extracted from this case using an additional visualisation technique
from system dynamics known as causal loop diagramming (Sterman, 2000). One main potential
advantage of engaging users to explicate near-term relationships of variables when entering data is
that the platform is then able to perform multi-link analysis behind the scenes on the entire set of
data generated through user participation. This allows for the automatic creation of relational
systems maps, which when combined with the graph analysis techniques explained above, produce a
causal loop diagram detailing the main forces of interaction between component parts. Users can
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Figure 5.9
determine the number of variables visualized in the diagram and the level of links to show, thereby
allowing users to customize causal loop diagrams to their analytical needs. In the instance of this
case, participants created the causal loop diagram presented in Figure 5.10.
Cluster-based diagrams
Finally, the case also generated high-level thematic summaries based on Rosvall's clustering
algorithms. These summaries, presented in Figure 5.11, clustered drivers into high-level themes
based on their clusters of influence and similarity. The links between themes were then represented
with lines, the thickness of which were indicative of the level of interaction between themes. Thus
in the example below, "Climate Change" was found to be linked most directly to "Economic
Growth", "Expanding Population" and "Pollution", each of which had various sub-themes and
secondary connections between them. Although quite high-level, analysts found the use of such
summary diagrams to be a useful and important tool to communicate high-level concepts in the
case. These were then supplemented with the more detailed visualizations and analysis explained
above.
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Figure 5.10 System Map of Driver Relationships
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Figure 5.11 Cluster Diagram of High Level Thematic Concepts
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Scenario Logic Creation & Imphcations Development
Although this case did not use the Futurescaper platform for full scenario creation (as long form
narratives, for example), the ranking and diagramming process generated during this case proved to
be useful as input for rapidly prototyping draft scenario logics. This was achieved by identifying the
top drivers that were most influential on the system (via a network analysis), then using the systems
diagram to explore how perceived changes in these variables are understood to impact other
variables. Thus in the example from Figure 5.10, "Decreasing Water Availability" would impact
"decreasing crop yields", "increasing migration" and "increasing hardships for women". "Increasing
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droughts" would have implications for "decreased agricultural productivity", "increasing food
prices", and several other outcomes.
Kinds of inputs considered
The platform developed for this case accepts abstracted descriptions of trends, forces and events in
the form of a text-based web-form. It therefore requires the user to enter data in a somewhat
specific epistemological form.
Amount and type of visualiZation tools used
As detailed above, Futurescaper relied heavily on Rosvall and Bergstrom's (2011) clustering platform
for visualization and analysis. This involved the export of data from Futurscaper and transfer to
their package, in which analysis could then be conducted. After conducting analysis, interactive
visualizations could be created for export as standard web graphic formats.
Amount and tpe of analytical tools used
The case used a combination of standard sorting and querying tools with somewhat more advanced
network analysis and clustering approaches. Given the complexity of the clustering and network
algorithms used, and the extent to which the testing of these particular tools were beyond the scope
of this research, they are reported "as is" for purposes of this case.
Amount and kind of socialization enabled
The use of the Futurescaper platform for this case did not incorporate social features such as
commenting, discussion boards or user groups which would encourage social interaction. Nor were
social features such as voting enabled. Thus the kind of reflective dialogue and debate typified by
many face-to-face scenario generation workshops was not facilitated or captured by this process.
Amount and kind offeedback provided
Generating data for the system provided users with direct feedback on their entry via
acknowledgement notifications and direct, on-screen response to interactivity. Users exploring
relationships within the system were also prompted to explore related topics or entries. No form of
email notification, Twitter integration, scoring, leaderboards or other feedback mechanisms were
incorporated into the design of the system for the purpose of this case.
The overall speed and timeline ofthe process
Once the core aspects of the system were operational, the process of inputting trends and evidence
comprised approximately three days of effort. Had this effort been distributed amongst many users,
as opposed to being centralized with a single intern, this process may have taken less time. Ranking
and analysis of drivers and their relationships took between three and four hours total.
5.5 Discussion
Based on the findings from this case, it appears that the Futurescaper online collective intelligence
system has the potential to augment, but not supplant, the traditional scenario-building workshop
format in the urban planning research process. It appears to have the greatest utility at the early
phases of scenario creation, specifically at the horizon scanning, trend generation and thematic
analysis stages. It offers a way to engage a broader and more diverse audience in the scenario
creation process, has the potential to speed up the drivers ranking process, and has the potential to
provide increased transparency in the choice of key drivers. Futurescaper also allows for further
133
interactive exploration of complex trends and patterns that could be difficult or impossible in the
traditional workshop setting. In addition to these general observations, the following key themes
were also identified from the findings of this case.
5.5.1 Low participation makes this case difficult to evaluate against diversity and
participation claims
One of the core research questions behind this dissertation is what impact online participatory
approaches to scenario development may have on the number and kinds of people involved. Given
the experimental nature of this case, the number and diversity claims could not be addressed. This
shifts the analytical value to the other aspects of the research question, particularly the role that these
approaches can play in the speed and timeliness of such cases, as well as the kinds of analysis
conducted.
5.5.3 The platform offered enhanced transparency and visibility during the decision-
making process
The use of both sortable databases and rudimentary clustering algorithms meant that greater degrees
of transparency were possible throughout the scenario-creation process. Because many face-to-face
scenario workshops are constrained by time and participation limits, it is not always possible to
explain and justify all the design decisions taken in a scenario-creation process. The use of a digital
platform like Futurescaper allows for a more transparent "paper-trail" behind decisions taken,
thereby offering greater visibility throughout the entire process.
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5.5.1 Visualization provides significant added value
While the formal query capability of the system was of some use, it was not until the systemic
relationships were visualized as graphs and networks that the platform became truly useful to the
consultants. These visualizations, particularly the causal-loop diagrams, allowed for the rapid
exploration of 2nd and 3rd order relationships between drivers and enabled analysts to quickly
identify potential pivot points within the story. This appears to capture more real-world complexity
in participants' understanding of the system dynamics, thereby facilitating the kinds of "strategic
surprises" most sought after in scenario workshops. Although not used for such in the formal
project of from which this case was derived, subsequent scenario consultants could use this to
created draft scenario logics based on inductive, causal reasoning instead of deductive, 2x2 matrices.
This could add significant value to the realism and level of complexity that such scenarios can
encompass.
5.5.2 An explicit focus on uncertainties would be valuable
That said, the design and functionality of Futurescaper for this case did not incorporate functions or
capacity to translate the connections and themes into scenario logics or scenario narratives. The
case did not explicitly draw out uncertainties in the form most often used in deductive scenario
workshops, therefore placing additional analytic burden on the user to build scenario frameworks.
Connections were based solely on the number of times they appeared in the database, which can be
a function of both popularity as well as influence. To address this, it is suggested that the addition of
either a second round of drivers clustering, selecting for the most influential and uncertain, or the
demarcation of uncertainty estimates at the point of data entry, would be useful. This would be
useful in both inductive and deductive scenario building modes, regardless of the final form of
scenarios chosen.
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5.5.4 The expert interface was difficult to use and may discourage use in a more open
setting
Because the process of employing Futurescaper, as executed in this case, required a substantial
amount of up front data-entry, this platform was perhaps best suited to situations where a dedicated
team of researchers and research assistants had the capacity to scan for relevant news items, data
sources and trends, and input them into the system. In this situation, it took about 30 seconds to
one minute to enter each trend or force into the system. The data entry process was not particularly
enjoyable or intellectually stimulating.
5.5.5 Incorporation of other forms of data entry and analysis would offer greater flexibility
The strength of this platform for this case was that it offered a structured way of entering and
relating data in distributed ways. However, the use of segmented web-forms may discourage
broader participation, which suggests that alternate forms of contribution may be valuable to
explore. Instead of abstract summaries of articles and news clippings, this could include more
narrative-based inquiry ("Tell me a story that is representative of something important"), opinion, or
even graphics and links to other data sets. The ability for other users to critique, comment upon and
revise data points would also add more flexibility in this regard.
5.5.6 Socialization and engagement mechanisms were missing
No effort was made in this case to facilitate user-to-user social interaction. It is clear that as a design
and experimental variable, Futurescaper should be integrated with social media in manner consistent
with notions of "social scanning" raised by Pang (2009). This idea suggests that users should be able
to see what each other are rating as interesting and important, as well as comment or vote upon
what others felt was worthy of attention. This could function similar to the Facebook "like" button
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or the Google "+1" function, both of which allow a community of users to collectively evaluate the
submissions of individuals into the system.
Such integration with scanning would take advantage of the geometry of activity on the web -
many people doing many small things in parallel - to create greater scanning breadth, diversity of
input, and larger participation. Combined with basic analytical tasks, it could also allow for greater
user involvement and processing of the data.
The user interface, which is rather clunky and drab, is not yet effective at facilitating social
engagement. Basic Web 2.0 features such as commenting, tagging, and evaluating trends and forces
within the system should therefore be considered in future cases.
5.6 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter presented the background on this case, described the design and development of the
first prototypical online scenario creation tool, presented findings from its application, and reflected
on its relationship to the research questions. The following chapter illustrates how these lessons
were incorporated into a second system and applied on a different analytical case.
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Chapter 6 Case 2: Sensemaker Scenarios
6.1 Chapter Introduction
Sensemaker Scenarios is the name of the second prototypical collective intelligence system
developed to generate data for this research. This chapter presents the background on this case, an
overview of the system design and functionality, the findings relative to the constructs defined, and a
discussion of how these categories relate to the research questions.
6.2 Case Background
For this case, I adapted an existing commercial software platform to build upon the lessons from the
first case. In particular, the case sought to address several themes raised by the Futurescaper case;
notably a desire to involve a greater number of participants, to explore new formats of data
collection, and to improve the user interface to facilitate collective analysis. The goal of this case
was to explicitly explore different formats for user contribution, including free-form narrative or
anecdotal formats, and to prototype methods for generating draft scenario logics more directly.
To explore these questions, an approach was developed in conjunction with two colleagues,
Dave Snowden and Wendy Schultz, who helped design and develop all aspects of this case. After
designing the approach, data was generated in an online engagement lasting approximately one week
in conjunction with the 2010 International Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Conference for
the Government of Singapore. The topic of the case study was the future of urban public services
under financial uncertainty.
6.3 System Description
SenseMaker Suite is a platform that collects data in the form of stories, anecdotes, and narratives
about a topic or theme from distributed contributors. Respondents were given the broad request to
relate a story about the subject that would shed light on the topic. Figure 6.1 displays a flow chart
of user activities and Figure 6.2 displays a screen shot of the story submission screen.
Figure 6.1 SenseMaker Scenarios Process Flowchart
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Figure 6.2 Screen Capture of the Driver / Story Entry Screen
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After submitting a story, anecdote or opinion in the free-form textual interface, users were asked to
code their story against key themes and concepts. The goal was to blend qualitative research in the
form of stories, anecdotes and narratives (which have the potential to convey rich social meaning
and are easily recalled and communicated), with quantitative indices allowing for this data to be
quickly coded, classified and analyzed. The system therefore generated qualitative open-ended
narrative data, wrapped in quantitative descriptions that encouraged easier analysis for scenario
creation. Figure 6.3 displays a screen shot of the codification process with which users tagged and
coded their stories.
Although the core platform allowed for the collection of stories on any topic, the system was
adapted for scenario creation through the use of the "scenario archetype method" pioneered by Jim
Dator (1996) and Wendy Schultz while at the University of Hawaii (2009). This method (explored in
the literature review) suggests that many stories of the future fall within a handful of archetypical
categories following similar narrative structures and outline. Whilst the details may vary, the overall
significance of each archetype remains constant. Examples include story structures such as "the
hero's quest", "decline", "collapse", "continued growth", etc. Schultz (2010) and others employ
these archetypes to create narrative indices, which were adapted for the use of this case.
This platform therefore differed significantly from Case 1 in that it did not explicitly capture
drivers as discrete objects for subsequent combination. It also did not employ any algorithmic
sorting or clustering mechanisms. Instead, it relied on user input to code stories against quantitative
extremes, then sorted and ranked stories that were most representative of key dimensions of each
scenario archetype. This subset of narratives was subsequently used to build scenario logics directly
in a highly inductive fashion.
Screen Capture of the Tagging and Coding Process
6.4 Findings
This section presents descriptive findings from the case relative to the measurement constructs
defined in Chapter 3.
6.4.1 Participation Characteristics
Degree of Accessibility
Data generation during this case ran for approximately one week. The process was open to anyone
interested in contributing, and participation was encouraged through advertisement on a range of
academic list-serves and public fora, including Twitter, Facebook and academic email lists such as
the MIT DUSP student body, the list-serves for the Association of Professional Futurists, and
various Cognitive Edge practitioners around the world. Because the web-interface was designed to
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Figure 6.3
have a greater degree of openness and accessibility than that used in Case 1, no login information
was required for participation.
Amount ofpreparation required
No preparation was required on behalf of the users. Participants were asked to submit stories that
they felt were representative of the drivers and trends, impacts, and even end-states that would
influence the future. The system's focus on open-ended narrative allowed for ease of contribution
with minimal cognitive processing, although feedback received after the case suggested that more
introductory videos or instructions would have reduced the burden of participation to a greater
extent.
The number ofpartiipants involved
A total of 265 participants responded to the open invitation. Over 9 5% completed the entire
submission process. However, no data from server logs was available to compare the submission
rate with the response rate. The call for participation was forwarded and retweeted across several
interest groups, communities of practice and distribution channels, so it is likely that several
thousand people received the invitation to contribute.
Reasonsforparticipation
Unlike Case 1, participants contributed solely out of their own personal interest in the system, the
topic, or the experiment. Using Malone et al.'s (2010) framework, participation was therefore likely
governed by personal interest and learning. After contributing, over 60% of users volunteered data
on their impression of the platform, which served as a useful data set for further analysis and
reflection. Amongst the comments submitted, several participants voiced their strong interest in
both the method and the project, thereby suggesting that personal and academic curiosity was a
significant motivating factor explaining why people chose to participate.
Degree of user anonymit
Although no user-account system was created for this platform, participants were asked to volunteer
their name and email information at the end of their submission. This data was not available to
other participants, however, and this information was only collected at the end of the process. Thus
the platform was functionally anonymous because user details were solicited only after contributions
were made. Over 8 0% of respondents volunteered their contact details at the end of their
submission.
Type ofpartiapants involved
Demographic data was collected from a total of 265 participants under a variety of headings . In
terms of levels of experience, one of the key metrics for this research, approximately 10% of
respondents identified themselves as "expert" in the subject matter, nearly 55% said they had
"significant personal or professional experience", 25% had "some personal or professional
experience", and approximately 20% indicated that they had "read about it" or knew "relatively
little" about the subject area. Thus the majority of participants were highly experienced, with
approximately half declaring limited or no experience. This suggests a relative diversity of
professional experience, although no more detailed data was collected on the exact nature of their
field or profession. Figure 6.4a displays the breakdown of user expertise for this case.
With regards to educational level, 72% of all respondents reported being educated "up to the post-
graduate level", with an additional 16% reporting having education "up to graduate school". This
represents a highly educated population contributing to the data for this case; a situation which is
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both unusual and unrepresentative of most multi-stakeholder public participation projects. The
distribution of education levels is displayed in Figure 6.4b.
Other demographic data such as age was also captured. Over 50% of respondents reported
themselves to be aged 50 years old or above, 27% aged 40 to 49 years of age, 17% aged 30 to 39,
and less than 5% aged 19 to 29 years old. Geographically the sample was quite diverse as well.
Approximately 39% of respondents stated that they were based in the Americas, 39% from Europe,
19% from Asia and the Pacific and the remaining 4% from Africa, the Middle East, or elsewhere.
Figure 6.5a displays the age profile and Figure 6.5b displays the geographic profile of respondents.
Figure 6.4a/b Experience and Education Level of Respondents
a) Experience Lovel b) Education level
Expert
Significant personal or professional experience * Up to high school 0 Up to college
Some personal or professional experience Up to graduate school Up to post-graduate level
Have read about it 0 Don'twishtosay
Know relatively little
Age and Geographic Origin of Respondents
Age of Respondents Geographic Origin
Below 18 years old 19 to 29 years * 30 to 39 years
40 to 49 years 50 and above
* The Americas
* Europe
* Other areas
* Asia and the Pacific
* Africa and the Middle East
6.4.2 Interaction Characteristics
Tasks Per/ormed
The following Table 6.1 presents a checklist of the activities performed during this case.
Table 6.1 Tasks Performed in Case 2
P river Identification Yes
Driver Exploration
Driver Ranking & Selection Yes
Driver Clustering & Aggregation Yes
Scenario Logic Creation Yes
Scenario Logic Selection
Scenario Logic Detailing Yes
Implications Development Yes
Implications Detailing Partial
Full Scenario Narrative Creation
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Figures 6.5a/b
Driver Identification
Participants were asked to submit narrative answers in response to the following questions:
1. What is the future of public service provision under financial uncertainty?
2. How will governments and cities adapt to managing public resources under increasing
constraints?
3. What factors will be critical for public service provision in the coming decade?
4. How will these factors combine to influence public service provision in the 201 Os and
beyond?
Although 265 responses were received, these submissions were not formatted in a manner that
could be readily disaggregated into specific drivers. Instead, each narrative contribution represented
a mix of opinions, narrative about the present, speculation on the future, and conjecture about how
things might turn out for the topic. Whilst this made the process of data ranking and clustering
more efficient, one consequence was that there was no clear methodology for evaluating the total
number of independent drivers submitted.
Narratives for this exercise were therefore used in place of the traditional drivers
identification phase. Responses ranged from one paragraph opinions to in-depth exploration of
trends and drivers over multiple p. s. The average submission comprised approximately two long
paragraphs. Figure 6.6 illustrates a typical response.
After submitting a narrative, respondents were asked to code the significance of their stories along
several dimensions, using both graphical and textual interfaces. Figures 6.7 and 6.8 display
examples of these interface types
Example of Typical Narrative Submission
My favourite story of responding creatively to financial constraints is the "Pothole sponsorship repair scheme In German
town". (see BBC news video here: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8SS691S.stm ). Strapped for money to repair
potholes this small German town created a scheme where people can buy a pothole for (50 via the council's website (see
here: http://www.nlederzimmem.de/index02.htm). The website is also in English. There are pictures of the potholes on
the website and you choose the one you want to buy. In return the fixed hole will have a Badge with your name. So far they
have already sold 111 potholes.
I believe this story is a good example for getting the public involved to help the council improve the quality of life in a
community. There are 2 benefits for the public:
1. they get many potholes repaired, which improves driving quality in town
2. you instil some pride in the community because the badge makes visible who participated and cared.
However, I am not quite sure whether this approach would work in large towns or even on a national basis. I think few
people would be prepared to sponsor failing banks, jobsentres or the NHS. I think it would work in small communities
which are quite close knit. However, this pothole initiative makes participation fun.
Slider-based Narrative Coding
Figure 6.6
Figure 6.7
Geometry-based Narrative Coding
Whereas sliders need no explanation, the geometry-based interfaces used in the case are slightly new.
This coding mechanism worked by asking participants to position a circle representative of their
story on a spectrum of mutually exclusive but related values. In this way, users provided quantitative
scoring of their narrative against several dimensions that would later be used for sorting and analysis.
This process required slightly more reflection and consideration on behalf of the user, but
after explanation, allowed for the expression of more nuanced meaning about why they chose to
submit their story. These questions and categories represent "stories about their story", which
proved essential for clustering and analysis in later stages.
The final questions and coding formats are presented in Table 6.2. Definition of the
questions and their end-states were taken directly from Schultz's 2009 work on the distinguishing
characteristics of scenario archetypes. This linked participants' open-ended responses to a coherent
theory of scenario building that could be used to generate draft scenario narratives.
Figure 6.8
Whereas Schultz defined a total of six archetypes frequently found in the futures literature,
the limitations of the SenseMaker Suite software deployed at the time of this case study only allowed
for three to be tested at any given time. Thus, three exemplary archetypes were selected for use in
this case study and are presented in Table 6.2 below.
Table 6.2 Narrative Coding Categories Employed
Technological Slider Bar Low High
Impact
Environmental Slider Bar Low High
Impact
Economic Impact Slider Bar Low High
Political Impact Slider Bar Low High
Level of Slider Bar Low High
Uncertainty
What is the time Geometric Short Term Medium Term Long Term
scale of the impacts Placement, Triangle
in your story?
How new are the Geometric New to the public New to businesses Totally new, even to
ideas you describe Placement, Triangle and entrepreneurs scientists and
in your story? designers
Impact subject tags Textual, tag-based Primary Secondary
What does the Geometric Individual before Community before Central authority
political system Placement, Triangle community individual before all
emphasize in your
story?
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What is at the heart
of people's values in
your story?
Geometric
Placement, Triangle
Environmental
quality and balance
- harmony with the
natural world
Social discipline an<
security - harmony
with the rules of
acceptability
Exploration and
manipulation of the
material world -
harmony with the
next frontier
What does Geometric Win = exclude Win = maximize Win = invent an
"winning" look like Placement, Triangle other people from the benefits to entirely new game
from the point of power everything in the
view of people in system
your story?
ow do people Geometric Set boundaries and Look for systemic Experiment and
learn and explore in Placement, Triangle acceptable interconnections invent first
your story? definitions first first
How do people Geometric Distrustful, control Adaptive, evolve Addictive,
relate to change in Placement, Triangle it with it accelerate it
your story?
What long term Geometric Social anarchy Ecological collapse Technological and
outcome do people Placement, Triangle infrastructural
in your story fear collapse
the most?
Driver Exploration
One limitation of the prototype platform generated for this case was that it did not offer facility
platform for users to explore the narratives submitted by other users online. Once collected, the
researchers were required to download the data from the collection server (in the form of an XML
and text dump) and analyze it in Cognitive Edge's SenseMaker Suite desktop software package.
While this allowed for robust querying and filtering along a range of dimensions, the system lacked
the capability for users to do this online. Thus driver exploration was confined entirely to an off-
line, desktop analysis by the researchers after the capture period of this case study was complete.
Driver Ranking & Selection
In addition to the quantitative scoring process explored above, respondents were asked to score
their contribution in terms of the "Magnitude of Impact" on various topics. They were also asked
to identify the relative levels of uncertainty associated with their story and the relative time frame
within which the impacts implied by their story might unfold.
This data was used to rank narrative data along a number of dimensions. The first was the
degree of uncertainty, which applied to the entire narrative. The second was the level of impact,
which participants were asked to score separately for each of the five categories traditionally used in
scenario planning: Social, Technological, Environmental, Economic and Political, also known as
STEEP. Using this framework, narratives were ranked in the following ways:
* 160 stories were classified as having high Social impact
* 49 stories were classified as having high Environmental impact
* 127 stories were classified as having high Economic impact
0 159 stories were classified as having high Political impact
* 41 stories were classified as having high Technological impact
Of these responses, 83 were classified as having a "High" level of uncertainty and 21 were classified
as having a "Low" level of uncertainty. Finally, 29 stories were classified as "Short term", 88 as
"Medium term" and 55 as "Long term". Because a single story could be classified as having impact
in multiple categories, the total number of high impact scores was higher than the total number of
stories submitted. Impact rankings are displayed in Figures 6.9 as an intermediate step in the
drivers ranking process.
This mix of subject factors, uncertainty levels, and time frames provided the basis for the
identification and clustering of impact factors into critical certainties and critical uncertainties in the
next stage.
Figure 6.9 Number of High Impact Drivers Generated for STEEP Category
200
180
100-
50
doc Techno alEnvilnina cnmP
Driver Clustering & Aggregation
After narratives were ranked by impact and uncertainty, the top 25 high impact, high uncertainty
narratives and the top 25 high impact, high certainty narratives were exported as a subset for
clustering and analysis.
The sample size of 50 narratives was chosen based on a qualitative assessment about how
these stories clustered relative to the mean scores of all other stories in the sample. The number 50
was chosen because it captured both those with highest values, but also included a strong sample of
those within one standard deviation of the mean. The goal was to produce a rich enough sample for
in-depth analysis, but one that did not select only outliers and extreme examples. Samples with 20,
40, and 60 were also tested. These 50 narratives were then clustered into those that scored the
highest across each of the key archetypical dimensions. In other words, narratives that scored
highest in all dimensions were selected. While this is useful to capture explicitly representative
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stories, it does mean that "weak signals" and outliers that could be important were excluded. This
final selection of stories were then used for preliminary scenario logic creation, as described below.
Figure 6.10 presents the visual query interface which SenseMaker provides for sorting and
querying narrative data along these lines. The blue dots represent the normalized score of each
narrative in the analytical sub-set. Their position on the graph is determined by their normalized
value across the five archetypical dimensions introduced previously, in Table 6.2.
Figure 6.10 Visually Querying Extreme and Representative Examples for Driver
Aggregation
Scenario Logic Creation
A final subset of representative narrative fragments was then used to create draft scenario logics.
This was done by exporting the top 5-7 fragments from each narrative archetype for traditional
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textual content analysis. The narrative content of each fragment was analyzed for consistency,
repetition and intensity to extract the key themes for scenario construction. This process was aided
by the fact that each fragment was given "Primary" and "Secondary" impact tags, which served as
useful proxies for general subject tags.
Figure 6.11 provides an example of the kinds of stories clustered around narrative archetype
values. The window to the left displays the title of five stories displaying the highest values that were
associated with the "Environmental and Social Balance" archetype. The window to the right
displays the text for the highlighted story. All of this information was entered by participants and is
just displayed as a summary, here. The highlighted story, which the used called "Inner operating
system" describes a situation where different groups need to reassess their values and collaborate
together to create balanced policy. Both the tone and the language of this story are highly consistent
with the values of this archetype, which typifies values of balance, harmony, equality, and
integration.
Figure 6.11 Representative Story Fragment Used to Build Draft Scenario Narratives
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Additional analysis of the emotional content of anecdotes coded by archetype provide
further detail. Respondents were asked how their story made them feel, through a drop-down menu
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of various emotional states. Clustering anecdotes by archetype uncovered rough groupings of
emotional states, with the "Socio-ecological balance" archetype attracting stories coded primarily as
"Angry" and "Informed", the "Centralised control" archetype coded predominantly as "Sad", and
the "Free market exploration" archetype coded primarily as "Glad".
The combination of subject tags and narrative analysis produced themes for each scenario
archetype, which were then sorted into multiple scenario plot lines. Figure 6.12 displays one of the
draft scenario narratives generated during this process.
Scenario Logic Selection
Draft scenario plot lines were selected from this sample of drafts by the researchers, based upon
their internal consistency and narrative plausibility. This entailed a degree of professional judgement
and discretion typical of a normal scenario planning project. No user or participant feedback was
used at this stage. The final scenario logics were then sorted into a system of relationships linking
inter-scenario themes into a plausible framework. This used a modified inductive approach which
explored the causal links between scenarios as part of the overall scenario selection process. Figure
6.13 displays the system of scenarios resulting from this process.
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Figure 6.12 Draft Scenario Narrative Themes, Example
Given: Diminished resources
Higher expectations from the public
Thematic headlines:
1. Internal control & pressures to produce
e "My organisation is into 'operational efficiencies', which means losing staff."
e "I have noticed that what we do is has become increasingly tinged with messages about
'picking up the metabolic rate, doing more and more, 80% is good enough, don't over-
deliver."'
* "Getting tighter and harder, less loving and generous"
2. Attempt to control risk by changing as little as possible
* "Don't over-deliver"
e "Control the risks, don't do anything that might rock the boat."
e "Doing more with less, don't do anything too risky."
3. Deception, double-think & propaganda
* "Rhetoric is about partnerships and flexibility when the reality is about control"
e "They say 'innovation & collaborate' but mean 'giving up responsibility"'
* "Becoming more adept at spin"
e "Senior management understands the need to consult, but is fearful that this would leave the
organisation being held accountable"
* At the international level, "will they do a Greece and pretend that they can cut things back, lie
to Brussels and the Euro central bank, but in reality do nothing?"
4. Decreased innovation, poor performance and economic stagnation
* "I'm working the innovation group at a large public agency. They can't even open attachments
in email."
e "Being forced to do more with less."
* "Reduce costs and minimise risks while delivering fewer services."
5. Slow realization of the public and markets
e "It doesn't take much to send fear into the hearts of the trading public... sell currency and
force the hands of govt's perceived as under-performing."
6. Anger & blowback
* "US will have to devalue the dollar to repay its loans, the only real question is when? When it
does all hell will break loose."
e "Large numbers of the population will be in shock when the real crash comes."
* "Their malleable souls will be easily manipulated into seeing the benefits of any new order.
The tool is fear."
e "Chaos in the streets! Like Greece. Willingness to take to the street, take back the streets, but
in fact, to see the streets again as public space."
Figure 6.13 The Final Scenario Set Chosen
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Draft Implications Creation & Selection
Draft implications were derived from the "Primary" and "Secondary" impact tags associated with
the fragments comprising each draft scenario. A prototypical user interface was developed to engage
participants in the exploration and generation of more detailed implications, but was not successfully
implemented for this case.
Kinds of inputs considered
The platform developed for this case differed from Case 1 in an effort to accept more "natural
language" expressions of user input. The goal was to engage users in more direct, narrative based
expressions of future trends and issues. Thus the primary inputs considered were free-form
narrative contributions, supplemented by analytical tagging and coding by the participant
themselves.
Amount and ype of tisualization tools used
The SenseMaker Suite platform utilizes both visual and numerical querying approaches. Although
basic visualization capabilities are possible within the Suite, particularly in the form of 3D scatter
plots and data landscapes, these were not used as part of the analytical or participatory process on
this case.
Amount and type of anafytical tools used
The ability to sort qualitative narratives into thematic clusters based upon quantitative, user-signified
values enabled the rapid aggregation of distributed contributions into coherent draft scenarios. The
primary goal of this case study was to evaluate how more user-friendly submission formats such as
stories, anecdotes and opinions could be incorporated into the distributed data generation process.
The key challenge with this kind of data is the relative labor-intensity required to sort, categorize,
analyze, and summarize such data. The use of the SenseMaker platform for this case provided a
hybrid format, which allowed for nearly instantaneous, real-time sorting and aggregation of user
narratives into thematic content areas for easier extraction and summary. While not fully automated,
the purpose of this analytic technique was both to enhance the ease with which users could
contribute, as well as to minimize the interpretive burden on behalf of the analyst. The analytic
tools inherent in the SenseMaker platform were useful and effective in this regard.
Amount and kind of socialization enabled
Like Case 1, the use of this prototypical platform did not incorporate social features such as
commenting, discussion boards or user groups. Nor were other features such as voting enabled.
Although the primary purpose of this Case was the incorporation of unstructured narrative
contribution, many participants noted that they missed the ability to browse other users'
contributions and build upon them. As in Case 1, the opportunity for reflective dialogue amongst
participants was not available in this process.
Amount and kind offeedback provided
Several participants noted that they were frustrated with the lack of feedback provided by the
prototype system used for this case. Although the user received on-screen notification when they
had submitted their story, there was no way to explore other users' stories, add or receive comments,
or interact in any meaningful way other than by contributing. One participant noted that they felt
that the process was a "mysterious black box", into which they contributed something they cared
about but had no idea what happened on the other end.
The overall speed and timeline of the process
The data generation component of this case took approximately one week to set up and one week to
administer and collect, during which the researchers promoted participation through a range of
email and web fora. Once data collection was complete, downloading and interpreting the data took
approximately two days, not counting methodological experimentation during this period. The
largest time savings were achieved in the analysis phase. This process was facilitated through the
auto-aggregation of user-contributed narratives, made possible by the quantitative coding indices
against key scenario themes.
6.5 Discussion
The selection and execution of this case was designed to explore the role that more natural, free-
form interfaces might play in the distributed, collective intelligence process. It also sought to focus
159
on how these contributions could be used in the later stages of scenario building, particularly with a
focus on draft narrative construction.
This case generated meaningful findings that were useful for reflecting on the overall
questions of this dissertation. It also generated a large amount of data from a more diverse sample
population, the natural language interface worked well, and the process of auto-aggregating scenario
narratives based on archetypes proved useful and effective. A lack of socialization and exploration
methods was observed to be a drawback of the system as designed for this case, as was the inability
of users to gain transparency on the role that their contribution played in the overall effort. Thus
the prototypical system designed for this case proved effective as a data generation and analysis
platform, but not as a social, participatory experience.
In addition to these general observations, the following key themes were also identified from
the findings of this case:
6.5.1 The online approach taken here seemed to afford geographically diverse, but highly
educated and experienced, participation
The data generated as part of this case found that the majority of participants interacting with the
system were older, more experienced, and professionally diverse. There could be many explanations
for this, ranging from the nature of the user interface, the questions themselves, or simply who
responded to the open call for invitations.
Because recruiting was not controlled for in this study, it is impossible to estimate the effects
of different recruiting methods on participation. It is therefore difficult to say if the increased
participation experienced in this case was a function of different recruitment mechanisms or of
specific user interface design features. Although I cannot claim causal or even correlatory
connections based on this data, it is worth noting that the case was promoted heavily by researchers
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on email list serves at MIT, the University of Oxford, the London School of Economics and the
UCL Bartlett School of Architecture. This may contribute to the significantly older and more
experienced age profile observed.
While it has been noted that server logs were not available to determine where visitors to the
site came from (and therefore what the ratio of visitors to contributors was), it is nonetheless
plausible that a large number of university-aged participants accessed the site. This suggests that
there may be something in the design of the system itself or the nature of the questions asked which
encouraged older, more experienced participants to contribute.
Reflecting on the core research questions of this research, it is clear that the online approach
employed in this case offers utility for engaging larger numbers of people in a short period of time.
The inputs collected, in the form of anecdotes, stories and opinions, aggregated into useful and
insightful stories of the future that appeared to resonate with key issues of concern in many of the
contributions.
However, the question of diversity in experience and age must remain an open one from this
case alone. Respondents were clearly biased towards higher levels of expertise and age, which does
not reflect the hypothesis that online systems are more likely to attract a broader range of
participants across key dimensions such as age and expertise. Without more rigorous measurement
of the universe of possible respondents that this sample was drawn from, it is impossible to say if
the response rate and demographic profile of respondents was in any way representative or valid.
We must therefore conclude that while the system used in the case study is capable of handling
greater levels of participation in a meaningful way, questions of diversity remain unaddressed.
6.5.2 The use of narrative submission formats seemed useful and flexible, but the interface
requires better structure
A significant component of Case 2 was the experimentation with narrative contribution as an
alternative form of data generation. The open-ended narrative structure used by SenseMaker
allowed users to contribute to the exercise in a manner with which they felt comfortable, ranging
from observations that, "there are more potholes on my street" to more reflective, in-depth,
reference-heavy analysis of the trends and issues concerning them. This open-endedness allowed
for a range of response types to be captured without losing significant analytical depth. Although it
is beyond the scope of the data available to suggest which approach "worked better", it can said that
the narrative-based approach did work well in the context of this case and that it would be fruitful
for further exploration.
6.5.3 The use of scenario archetypes was an effective way of sorting and classifying user
submissions to create representative scenario narratives
The challenge with large volumes of qualitative data is that it is relatively effort intensive to sort
through and analyze it. The use of Schultz's scenario archetypes allowed for the pre-definition of
key distinguishing characteristics which, once users selected where their contribution fit on the
spectrum of these values, allowed for fast and effective aggregation of like content into easily
manageable buckets. This provided rich material that was sufficiently clustered to be of analytical
power, but varied enough to develop rich draft scenario logics. The material generated in the
process fed directly into the scenario creation task, effectively facilitating the rapid generation of
scenario plotlines.
One challenge to this method, however, is the crucial influence of the values chosen for the
rating scale at the beginning of the process. As mentioned, Schultz and others argue that most
scenario planning projects rely on between four and six generic story-types. Despite this, how a user
defines the key characteristics of these stories, the dimensions along which they vary, and the values
which comprise their end points is still subject to significant interpretation. Further, given the
limitations of the platform as deployed for this case study, only three archetypes were able to be
tested at any time. Thus the researcher faced two design choices that are likely to strongly influence
the outcome of any scenario narratives created.
Finally, even though research indicates that a significant degree of qualitative variance in
scenarios can be captured through archetypical representation, it is possible that idiosyncratic, non-
archetypical scenario structures could emerge and have value in any given process. It would
therefore be desirable for this platform to allow for more organic clustering of one form or another.
This would also safeguard against significant survey bias introduced by design choices at the
beginning of this research process. Although the utility of such an approach was demonstrated by
this case study, additional research is clearly necessary to evaluate the effect of altering these
variables on the types of scenarios generated by the process.
6.5.4 Need for greater levels of interactivity, socialization and visibility
Another area of clear discussion is the role of visualization, socialization and interactivity in this case.
It was already observed that a variety of participants felt that the "one way nature" of the experience
was unfulfilling and mysterious. Although the use of user generated content was clearly spelled out
at the beginning of the process, there was no readily available way for participants to see the results
of their efforts, nor those of others, nor interact with them in any way. This posed a major
disadvantage for interaction and user-driven analysis, which is one of the hallmarks of collective
intelligence systems of this type. Greater user involvement and visualization of systemic input
would therefore make a significant improvement to the case study system as developed here.
6.5.5 Impact on workshop process and timeline
Despite these challenges, the process proved to be robust to a variety of challenges and served to
address the main goals of this case study: first, can alternative formats of user input be utilized
instead of highly structured, expert-analytical web forms, and second, can scenario archetypes be
used to "auto-generate" draft story lines for subsequent refinement? Given that the capture and
analysis period took less than two weeks in total, it appears that this approach could be adapted to a
more rapid engagement process. The inclusion of more granular demographic capture information,
for example, would also allow more fine-scale stakeholder based representations to be made.
Whereas the current case study drew upon the entire sample population to generate the scenarios, it
is easy to see how, with enough participants, different scenario sets could be generated for different
stakeholder groups. This would provide rich material for implications development, as well as useful
meta-data on conflicting points of view and images of the future. These could be useful either as a
stand-alone exercise or as part of a larger process (either workshop-based or otherwise). It is
therefore suggested that this case demonstrates a proof-of-concept data generation tool that may be
of further use for urban planning researchers in other areas of inquiry.
6.6 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter presented the background on this case, described the design and development of a
second prototypical online scenario creation tool, presented findings from its application, and
reflected on its relationship to the research questions. The following chapter illustrates how these
lessons were incorporated into a third system and then applied to the last analytical case.
Chapter 7 Comparative Examples
7.1 Chapter Introduction
Cases 1 and 2 (described in Chapters 5 and 6) presented two different approaches to the generation
and analysis of online data for qualitative scenario planning. A number of other examples developed
during the course of this research by other parties were found to contain additional data or insight
relevant to the research questions. These were used as supplementary evidence to help plug gaps in
the case study data and supplement understanding from their analysis. This chapter presents these
examples in a summarized version of the same comparative framework used for the Base Case and
Cases 1 and 2.
The three examples considered were:
1. The Institute for the Future's Foresight Engine
2. The WikiStrat collaborative forecasting platform
3. OpenForesight's Future ofFacebook project
Although none of these systems were designed for urban planning research, they nonetheless
offered useful lessons for various aspects of online user engagement, crowdsourcing or scenario
planning. Each was selected because they represented either pioneering, unique or typical efforts in
one or more of the following ways: (a) it was an adaptation of a similar function like scenario
planning in an online environment; (b) it used emerging Web 2.0 and collective intelligence tool kits
to model similar activities or processes (but focused upon different content); (c) it employed design
decisions that were exemplary of different approaches to generating data relevant to the key
variables and/or; d) it was notable or unique for its originality or early-mover status. Each
comparative example is described in the section below.
7.2 The Institute for the Future's Foresight Engine
The Foresight Engine is an interactive gaming platform developed by the Palo Alto-based
technology forecasting non-profit, The Institute for the Future (IFTF). Foresight Engine uses a
card-game like interface, in which thousands of players submit ideas to explore the future of a
subject during a curated engagement period. This project was selected as the first comparison
example because it's game-like interface and open-ended participation is a strong example of
leveraging stakeholder participation online. Figure 7.1 displays a screenshot of the Foresight
Engine interface, which is explained below (note that this screen-shot is from a pre-game capture,
with nonsense Greek text taking the place of real contribution for each card).
Participants were first asked to register with the IFTF to create an account. Users were allowed to
choose any screen name they preferred and were required to enter very little personal information.
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Upon creating an account, a participant arrived at the game's homep. , which featured a one to three
minute video outlining the key themes and concepts of the challenge at hand. This served both to
excite the participants and to orient them to a common set of tasks. They were then able to begin
interacting with the system by submitting data in the form of Twitter-length (140 character) "micro-
forecasts". Each micro-forecast was categorized in one of four categories; "Positive Imagination",
"Dark Imagination", "Momentum", and "Antagonism". Essentially, each card type represented a
different kind of response whereby users would submit a Positive or Dark Imagination card to
suggest forecasts and drivers that were either optimistic or pessimistic, and other users could build
on these by either agreeing and expanding on them (in the form of a Momentum card) or
disagreeing and challenging them (in the form of a Antagonism card). User interaction was
therefore funnelled directly into both content creation and content discussion from the very
beginning.
The example chosen for the dissertation comparison was an engagement exploring the future
of the United States utility network, entitled "Smart Grid 2025". The event, sponsored by the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), engaged almost 700 participants from 81
different countries over a 24-hour period, generating nearly 5,000 submissions and interactions. In
addition to the participants, over 26,000 people viewed the project website and associated content.
Participants included subject matter experts, academics and students, IFTF staff, and members of
the general public.
The game-like nature of this platform meant that very little preparation was required from
participants. While it is likely that all the participants watched the video, the platform was designed
to engage users directly in contribution and commentary. Because no financial reward was offered,
and no explicit public policies would be created, it is likely that most participants were motivated
purely out of their interest in the subject or their enjoyment of the process. The explicit competitive
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dynamic of the scoring, however, served as an extremely effective "hook" to keep participants
involved once they began. The system used leaderboards, individual scores, and specific "attribute"
scores to help players track their contributions and reaction of others, creating an engaging and
enjoyable experience. Out of all the systems reviewed for this work, the Foresight Engine
experience is by far the most enjoyable and easy to participate in. The combination of simple user
interface options and engaging user experience dynamics is one of the key lessons that this example
offers this dissertation.
The task performed with the Foresight Engine does not map directly to the eight-step process
of the Base Case. Submission of "Positive" and "Dark Imagination" cards map loosely to the driver
identification phase of the scenario process, while "Momentum" and "Antagonism" cards map to
driver exploration. Although there were no explicit ranking or clustering mechanisms, the degree to
which a driver sparked conversation and interaction served as a proxy for ranking and selection.
This is not to say that those conversation threads which received the most traffic were explicitly
chosen to be influential. Instead, they may represent a range of factors which participants found
worthy of discussion, ranging from humor to controversy to actual agreement. The role of the game
moderators played a particularly important part in this regard. Their attribution of awards and
"super-interesting" notifications served to both elevate the visibility of certain cards and ideas, as
well as reward players for pursuing those kinds of ideas and insights. Although the degree of
socialization and imaginative emotional exploration was the highest of all the examples reviewed,
this example also suffered from a lack of synthetic analytic tools to help convert this activity into
true analysis and insight. The platform offered no visualization tools in this regard either.
On the whole, the Foresight Engine successfully engages participants in high-volume, high-
engagement exercises around futures topics. However, the result was less about generating actual,
divergent scenario logics and more about stimulating an in-depth conversation through a distributed
168
medium. It was successful at participant engagement and early stage driver creation, as well as driver
exploration and socialization. It therefore represents a highly relevant example of online attempts to
engage large online crowds in futures-related issues, although it is hard to tell if this participation
translates into useful synthesis of user-submitted data.
7.3 The WikiStrat Grand Strategy Competition
The WikiStrat platform is an online geo-strategy platform. The platform operates as a for-profit
strategy consultancy, using a distributed network of analysts and subject matter experts who
contribute piecework or competition-based analysis in a crowdsourced format.
Compared to the Foresight Engine, WikiStrat uses a fairly simple Content Management System
(CMS)-like wiki platform. This is designed to help support a more complex community of experts,
each of whom participate in much greater depth over a longer period of time, for both recognition
and financial reward. The process works as follows: paying clients pose topics or questions to the
community, via moderation by WikiStrat staff, who then contribute essays, analysis, trends and
drivers into the WikiStrat system via web forms and surveys. Participants are asked to select and
evaluate different trends and factors, suggest implications, and draft narrative comments via
questionnaires, which are then scored by a combination of algorithm and staff to select "winners"
for each engagement. Winners are then paid a portion of the proceeds generated by WikiStrat client
engagements. Past topics included the outcome of the Arab Spring, the future of China, and other
geopolitical and security topics.
Although data was unavailable for a typical WikiStrat project, the site launched a Grand Strategy
competition during the course of this research which sheds light on the possibilities of the platform.
During this time over 30 university teams from around the world participated in the competition,
which sought to highlight major geopolitical challenges and potential futures in light of recent
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massive changes. Teams participated in over 30 countries, from elite institutions such as the
University of Oxford, Georgetown University, the EU University and others. These teams
represented a diverse mix of expertise in foreign policy, regional history, economics, military affairs
and sociology, drawing primarily upon MA and PhD-level participants.
In terms of user engagement, the platform used a complex format of administrator-led challenges
and responses whereby participant teams were required to submit essay-length analyses of complex
geopolitical forces. This raised the bar for user submission, suggesting that total participation would
be lower, but that quality of submission (and analysis) would likely be greater as well.
Various other awards were given that helped to differentiate very active or particularly high-
quality participants. WikiStrat took this principle several levels further, giving participants explicit
"ranks" based on their past performance, years of experience, level of education and other criteria.
This both recognizes varying levels of expertise, but also provides additional roles and
responsibilities for higher-ranking participants. High-ranking participants were also entitled to
greater financial returns on their analysis, should it be deemed useful by paying clients or expert
judges.
Unlike the Case Studies or the IFTF example explored above which engaged users primarily
in the early stages of drivers identification and exploration, the WikiStrat process engaged teams
through-out the entire scenario process to produce content at every stage. While the final output
was not narrative scenarios per se, they were geopolitical forecasts of different regions and countries.
This focus on "end-to-end" full text submission is distinct from the other examples reviewed here.
This suggests that, although the Grand Strategy competition may not be representative of the typical
scenarios process, the WikiStrat platform does offer a sophisticated environment for highly-qualified
participants to think about, analyze, and synthesize drivers and their outcomes. It is unclear how
successful the model will be as a business, but as a content creation and analysis platform it clearly
has strong potential. However, as a model of large-scale public engagement, the high standards and
in-depth effort required to participate produce relatively strong analytical output, but suggest that it
may not be as effective as a mass engagement tool.
7.4 Comparative Example 3: OpenForesight's Future of Facebook Project
The last comparative example explored the future of the social media platform, Facebook, through
an "open foresight" process. This project used free, existing services such as Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube Quora and Kickstarter to conduct an "open source" scenario planning exercise.
The project began with a video on Kickstarter (the crowdfunding platform) to generate interest and
funds to execute the project. It was created by a pair of researchers and social media experts
affiliated with New York University. Before launch, the project was promoted via Facebook,
Twitter, blogs and emails and received significant social media coverage. This generated the funds
to complete the project, which involved several phases. The first phase, which corresponded to the
driver identification and exploration phase of the Base Case, engaged approximately 25 industry
analysts and content-area experts in questions about the future of Facebook, through in-depth video
interviews over Skype. These were then edited into short clips and posted on a public YouTube
channel for distribution and review. At the time of this writing, the channel had received over
18,000 views of these clips.
At the same time, the project team created a Quora p. . Quora is a Web 2.0 question and answer
service, through which users can pose and answer each others' questions. In this case, the
OpenForesight team posed the same questions to the open community as they did to the experts.
This generated 109 responses from over 220 subscribers, and paralleled a second conversation on
Facebook between approximately 50 additional participants.
This combination of video-based expert interviews and open, community input maps very
well to the traditional driver identification and exploration phase. Like the face-to-face project in the
Base Case, the project team then filtered these manually using traditional content analysis
techniques. At this stage, analysts underwent a clustering and aggregation process to generate key
themes in a process similar to that carried out in the Base Case. This involved reviewing the
collected material for patterns, repetition, contrasting viewpoints, and notable examples. The team
then synthesized these into another short video presenting them back to the community of
participants.
Of the three examples explored here, this project is the least well documented and is, in fact,
only partially complete. Unlike the Base Case, where a face-to-face workshop was conducted that
integrated key themes and clusters into a scenario framework, it is unclear how the project team will
integrate the synthesized drivers it has collected over the Web. This poses an interesting challenge,
because without additional analytical or visualization tools to help sort through this increased
volume of information, the actual implementation of the traditional scenario process becomes less
effident with greater participation. In an email interview, one of the project leaders alluded to this fact
when she said, "none of us had any idea it would take this long to complete." Because the project
team is only part way through the exercise, it is unclear how this problem will be addressed in the
future.
The Future of Facebook example is notable to this research because of its extensive use of
video and multi-media enhancement. The curated clips of key themes and issues from the expert
interview process, as well as the summary videos generated by the team themselves, ensures a high
level of visibility at each stage completed. Judging by the popularity of these videos and their
coverage in the social media sphere (the launch of their first synthetic video received coverage on
CNN.com, for example), this appears to be a particularly effective way of presenting both raw
concepts and more synthetic themes and issues. It also served to differentiate this process from
other, more traditional means and helped engage a range of users in a way that helped "make ideas
come alive."
The explicit use of social networking services such as Facebook, Twitter and Quora also
prompted a vibrant discussion of these themes and issues amongst the participants. However, no
demographic data is available from the participants, so it is difficult to determine who was
participating, or why. Like much web-based commentary, the majority of this social interaction
consisted of short affirmation or disagreements. Very little in-depth, rich discussion occurred, at
least in the public forums visible from the outside, despite the rich material presented by the experts
interviewed on video. While there may be significant analytical activities taking place in the
background, the use of video and social media in this capacity seems to serve primarily as a data
generation and early stage driver exploration tool. It is possible that more intensive reflection similar
to the WikiStrat platform could be achieved, but on its own this approach seems primarily
promotional as opposed to analytical.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter introduced three comparative examples meant to supplement data from the primary
cases. The first example employed a game-like interface to create an enjoyable social experience that
helped generate and discuss various drivers and trends. The second employed a more rigorous,
competition process to produce high-quality, rich text analyses of geopolitical issues. The third
leveraged existing social media platforms to collect interviews and commentary relevant to drivers
creation, but with an unclear methodology for synthesis.
Together, these three examples represent effective ways of incentivizing participation (vis-a-
vis enjoyment of the experience, interest in the subject, or desire for reward), leveraging multi-media
173
to enhance understanding, and employing transparent mechanisms to facilitate more open analysis
and decision-making. The WikiStrat platform was the only example that produced scenario-like
narrative outputs, although the Future of Facebook example will, in time, presumably do the same.
The tension between the deeper analytical insight generated by WikiStrat, and the more open,
engaging experiences created by the Foresight Engine, suggest that the design decisions taken while
creating online collective intelligence systems for scenario research may have significant impact on
their participation rates and depth. Because neither Case 1 nor Case 2 could address these elements
of rich socialization, deep narrative investigation or aesthetically pleasing presentation, the examples
represent an important, if secondary source of data for this work.
The following chapter, Chapter 8, Discussion, reflects upon the findings of all three cases and
examples in order to better understand what they mean for the research questions of this
dissertation.
Chapter 8 Discussion
8.1 Introduction
This chapter reflects upon the findings from previous chapters, relative to the core research
questions of this dissertation. The core questions guiding this dissertation are:
1. Do web-based participatory approaches add value to the traditional scenario
planning process, and if so, where, and in what ways?
2. If not, where do they fall short, in what ways, and why?
The chapter explores these and related sub-questions in two parts: first by identifying where
the multiple sources of evidence generated in the case studies address the questions in robust,
defensible ways and second, by exploring the more speculative issues and implications suggested by
the evidence but for which data is unclear, unavailable or ambiguous. The first section discusses the
impact and character of increased participation, where this participation fits into the traditional
scenario creation process, the relationship between task structure and data generation / analysis, and
the role of social dynamics in these systems and in the process. The second section discusses the
possible impact of these systems on the outcomes of the scenario process (i.e., quality, learning,
etc.), impacts on the profession and trade-craft of scenario planning and public participation, various
methodological considerations for the use and study of such systems in urban planning research, and
speculation on future development pathways for online scenario planning systems. The chapter then
concludes with a reflection on how these discussions and supporting evidence address the research
questions and what this implies for future research.
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8.1 Core Themes
8.1.1 Increased Participation
It is clear that online collective intelligence systems can provide a variety of mechanisms to facilitate
increased participation in the scenario creation process. At their most basic level, the data generated
in the cases studies and comparative examples shows increased participation along three key
dimensions: 1) numerically, in terms of the absolute number of participants involved; 2)
geographically, in terms of the distribution of participants, and; 3) professionally, in terms of the
range of disciplines and expertise able to be involved. Each is discussed in detail below.
From a purely numerical standpoint, Case 2, the SenseMaker Suite case study, provided the
most obvious evidence for increased participation, involving over 265 participants in the scenario
creation process. The Institute for the Future's SmartGrid 2025 example also had nearly 700
registered participants, of which 166 participated substantially. Quora (the online question and
answer platform) discussions for the Future of Facebook project solicited over 100 responses, with
nearly twice as many registered users following the conversation as observers. Finally, over 30 teams
participated in the WikiStrat Grand Strategy competition. Compared to the base case, in which a
total of 35 participants were involved from beginning to end, it is clear that such systems are capable
of facilitating at least an order of magnitude more participation in the scenario planning process than
traditional, face-to-face means.
The same appears true from a geographic standpoint. All cases indicated the ability to focus
diverse participants from around the world on scenario creation tasks. The IFTF's Foresight Engine
involved users from 82 different countries (comprising nearly 50% of total participation), for
example. Case 2 involved participants from the Americas, Europe and Asia. WikiStrat's Grand
Strategy competition involved teams from over 30 countries. While it is clear that global or even
national contribution may not be appropriate for every project, the evidence presented here
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demonstrates that such online systems have the ability to convene participants from a much larger
geographic area than possible in the traditional process.
Finally, from a professional diversity standpoint, a similar pattern was found. While
participation in these cases did not bridge the "digital divide" in its totality (by involving a
representative sample of a given population, for example), they were able to successfully convene a
wide range of subject matter experts and professional disciplines in almost every case. Case 1 drew
explicitly from the published literature involving over 35 different academic disciplines and peer-
reviewed research communities. Over 70% of participants in Case 2 had post-graduate education
and nearly 65% classified themselves as either "expert" or as having "significant professional
experience" in the subject. The WikiStrat Grand Competition also brought together more in-depth
expertise in foreign policy, regional history, economics, military affairs and sociology.
To a lesser degree, with the exception of Case 1 and the WikiStrat example, each system also
involved members of the general public. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these participants also
had a deep subject-matter interest or local expertise in the topic at hand, without which they would
probably not have chosen to participate. While none of the cases and examples achieved true
demographic or statistical representativity of a given community (which was not their aim), they do
appear to be successful at attracting a wide range of professional disciplines and levels of experience.
The combination of increased numerical participation, increased geographic participation,
and increased diversity of subject matter expertise helps to address the main concerns raised with
the scenario planning process. The following section explores the nature of this participation in
more depth, reflecting specifically on the role of participants and depth of participation in various
stages of the process.
8.1.2 Areas of Influence in the Scenario Planning Process
While increased participation is clearly possible, what is the nature of this participation? Was it
uniform throughout the process? Was it substantive and deep? Did it add value, where and in what
ways?
Looking at the nature of participation in more detail, we can see that most instances of
participation from any given participant were fairly limited. In Case 2, each person contributed on
average only a single entry, with an estimated involvement of 6-12 minutes. In the IFTF example,
the median number of contributions per user was six, which varied between original content
creation (1.5 median submissions per user) and responses to others' submissions (4.5 median
responses per user). Participation was also heavily skewed towards a small group of very active
participants in this case: less than 20% of the total users (48 out of 237) contributed over 70% of the
content. The same patterns appeared to apply in the OpenForesight example as well.
It also appears that most participation was focused on the early stages of the scenario
process in the cases and examples explored, specifically in the driver generation and analysis phases.
Case 1, Futurescaper, focused exclusively on driver entry and analysis, building open-ended
relationships between drivers, and the creation of emergent systems maps as analytical tools. Case 2
took a different approach, asking users to submit complete stories of the future or stories they
thought would influence the future. The IFTF and OpenForesight examples did the same, asking
users to both submit and discuss drivers and forces in change in various ways. All of this activity
was focused on building early-state data and interpretation necessary for draft scenario creation.
The WikiStrat platform offered an interesting contrast, however, in that it engaged teams of
users throughout the entire process to produce content at every stage. While the final output was
not narrative scenarios per se, they were geopolitical forecasts of different regions and countries.
This focus on "end-to-end" full text submission is distinct from the other cases and examples
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reviewed here, but does not distract from the majority emphasis on early stage data generation and
analysis.
How did the use of these tools as data generation platforms compare to the base case?
From a purely numerical standpoint, the base case generated 17 major drivers from in-depth
interviews, divided into three categories (Political, Economic and Social). The process took between
80 - 90 working hours to conduct and analyze, including the logistics associated with arranging and
conducting interviews (but not counting travel time to and from the client's location or time spent
developing the final presentation documents). This amounts to an average of approximately five
hours per driver. In the workshop, an additional 90 drivers were also identified, which took
approximately 120 minutes to brainstorm and cluster into a final set of three to four "critical
uncertainties".
In comparison, Case 1 brought this time down to approximately 15 minutes per variable,
while Case 2 brought this down to less than 10 minutes. The IFTF's Foresight Engine generated
over 900 drivers in less than 24 hours, which equates to approximately 90 seconds per driver.
Although imprecise (the definition of "driver" varied between cases), this data suggests the potential
for a massive reduction in the time taken to generate initial drivers and forces of change.
The second area where the systems may have added value was in the clustering and synthesis
of these trends and drivers. Because this was done in a single afternoon for the Base Case,
comparison along temporal dimensions is less appropriate. However, one of the main criticisms of
a workshop-based approach is that the amount of time devoted to exploration of these trends and
their interactions is often insufficient in a 2 - 3 hour workshop session. One expert interviewed
suggested that, "you often spend all your time in the build-up, just synchronizing vocabulary and
ideas. Then the critical discussions about uncertainties and their interaction is jammed into a quick
afternoon, when everyone is rushing to get back to their real lives."
179
The key dimensions of comparison then may be whether or not the systems explored
offered either greater processing time for the analysis of variables and their interactions, or new
mechanisms for analysis and exploration that helped to more effectively leverage the existing time
available.
Compared to these dimensions, Case 1 fell primarily under the latter category. By allowing
users to specify the relationships between drivers with folksonomic subject tags, the platform
divided the burden of analysing complex systemic relationships into a variety of micro-tasks,
performed in real time by each user at the point of data entry. Participants thus entered a trend or
driver and contributed to building an understanding of how it might relate at the same time. This
enabled rapid summary and analysis of drivers and trends, vis-a-vis their systemic relationships, in a
way that provides greater analytical depth than would be possible in an unaided workshop session.
Case 2 followed a related approach to distributed, user-based analysis. Users coded their
stories relative to subject-tags and a series of pre-determined archetypical values. These were then
auto-aggregated for easier clustering and synthesis through a variety of means. Although the
mechanism of clustering was quite different from Case 1, the same principle of dividing analytical
tasks into small units and shifting it to the user was still quite successful. Both of these approaches
illustrate ways that online tools can help automate or distribute basic analytical tasks amongst many
users, allowing for more complex analysis of their interaction in a shorter period of time.
However, this approach was different than that used in the three comparative examples.
While the IFTF example distributed the generation of drivers amongst a crowd of participants, it
had no mechanisms for auto-aggregating or clustering these drivers; neither did OpenForesight's
"Future of Facebook" project, a fact which its creators noted in an interview when they said, "none
of us had any idea it would take this long to complete." This combination of enhanced data
generation and lack of mechanisms for sorting and analyzing data creates a challenging paradox. In
these cases, adding more data and more participation actually increases the analytical burden on the
consulting team, thereby making it potentially more time consuming and more difficult to sort, analyze,
and cluster drivers into useful categories for scenario building. The provision of equally powerful
sorting and clustering tools is therefore an essential component if such platforms are to be useful to
the scenario creation process.
Figure 8.1 illustrates the main areas of influence of each system on the traditional eight-step
scenario planning process. It can be seen that Cases 1 and 2 have the greatest subjective utility at the
early stages of the process; notably in generating key themes, identifying drivers, ranking forces and
(to a larger extent in Case 2 than Case 1) helping develop draft scenario logics. A similar pattern of
utility was found in IFTF's Foresight Engine and the Future of Facebook examples. By
comparison, WikiStrat focused on engaging users primarily in the write-up of more traditional
"essay-like" contributions. While this was relevant and applicable in the early stages, it also had
more perceived utility in later stages traditionally more conducive to long-form narrative
composition.
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This focus on early stage driver identification and analysis has several advantages. It
increases the likelihood that a wide variety of forces and factors will be included. This is further
enhanced when combined with the increased geographic, professional, and numerical participation
explored above. Diversity is a critical component of the scenario planning process, and such a wide
approach to collecting input from diverse sources appears to meet this goal. Expanding the scope
of participation beyond those familiar to the client or consultant helps increase the probability that
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diverse viewpoints will be heard, as well as suggests that a more robust set of drivers will be
captured.
This increased participation and diversity also implies that individual and group biases may
be less dominant at the early drivers exploration stage. One of the phenomena observed in the Base
Case (and in many other studies of group interaction) is that a few dominant personalities often have
disproportionate influence on the direction and tone of the discussion, potentially biasing scenario
outcomes. While using the "open outcry" method to generate a list of drivers helps offset these
biases, this challenge reemerges and becomes more pronounced in the driver clustering and
synthesis phase. The Base Case spent less than two hours in total exploring the connections
between factors and clustering them into meaningful categories. The initial round of clustering,
highly influential in steering the overall process, was done entirely by the facilitators in private while
participants were at lunch. Although this clustering was done based on the number of votes
received for similar drivers, there was nonetheless very little time nor inclination to modify them
after participants had returned and substantive debate had begun. Furthermore, the debate was
characterized by quite detailed argument over specific phrases and their meaning, perhaps
converging too rapidly on "local minima or maxima" and thereby missing important other
discussions or possibilities.
The use of computer-aided or semi-automated clustering techniques in Case 1, and the more
robust discussion and commenting mechanisms in the IFTF, Future of Facebook and WikiStrat
examples, suggest that these platforms offer both more sophisticated tools for analysing drivers and
their interactions, as well as more transparent mechanisms for discussing and deciding on which
ones to include in later scenario-building stages. Case 1 allowed for the exploration of second- and
third-order effects quite easily, while the other examples allowed for robust discussion of variables
and their implications through interactive reflection or transparent debate and dialogue. The second
area where these systems seem to be of value is therefore in adding transpareng and depth to the
driver clustering and analysis process.
8.1.3 More Structure, Easier Analysis; Less Structure, Easier Submission
The use of such systems illuminates a tension between the level of structure involved in the
submission and analysis process, and the ability for participants to submit and interact with material
as they like. On the one hand, this expressed itself in a tension between the user interface of Cases 1
and 2. Case 1 was designed to facilitate subsequent analysis and therefore used a highly structured
user interface with little room for deviation. This aided later phases as explained below, but was also
somewhat ungainly and counter-intuitive. It is likely that few participants would have chosen to
spend time using the system if they had not been paid to do so as part of their project
responsibilities. Case 2, on the other hand, was designed to allow for more open-ended data entry
and free-form contribution. The open-ended narrative structure in this case allowed for a range of
user contributions as each participant saw fit. Input ranged from observations that, "there are more
potholes on my street" to more reflective, in-depth, and reference-heavy analysis of the trends and
issues concerning them. This open-endedness is likely to have facilitated easier participation and
also allowed for a range of response types to be captured.
One challenge to this approach, however, was that it required a much more constrained
sorting mechanism to be used in the analysis phase. The three narrative archetypes that were used
as a forcing mechanism successfully allowed for the rapid distillation of diverse content into
representative examples, but were essentially predetermined axes. This highlights the crucial
influence of design on what these archetypes were and how they were expressed. It also suggests
that forcing data into pre-determined buckets could miss important, idiosyncratic, non-archetypical
scenario structures that might later become "Black Swan"-like events. As a result, Case 1's input
was more structured but its analysis more open, while Case 2's input was more open, but its analysis
more restricted.
This relationship also appeared as a trade off between ease of use and degree of
participation. The IFTF's Foresight Engine offered perhaps the best example of a fun, intuitive,
easy to use process, with a shallow learning curve and fairly open-ended possibilities for interaction.
But this very same ease of use comes at the expense of analytical tools that help synthesize, cluster
and rank important themes and issues. WikiStat, on the other hand, used a more complex format of
administrator-led challenges and responses, whereby participant teams were required to submit
essay-length analyses of complex geopolitical forces. This set a higher bar for user submission that
potentially reduced total participation, but increased quality of submission and analysis.
On balance, a mix of task structure and open-endedness is probably desirable, depending on
the nature of the data collected and the stakeholder community engaged. "Open mics are useless,"
argued one public engagement facilitator, for example. "You need to give people semi-structured
activities that help guide them into making a useful contribution." "People enter these activities with
little background experience, usually. Part ofyourjob is to help model the thinking process that they should
undergo," observed another. Striking a balance between levels of structure and levels of use is a key
consideration for such systems if they are to avoid either overly constrained processes that produce
generic outcomes or under constrained processes that produce analytical challenges and data
overload.
8.1.4 The Role of Visuals and Multimedia
A related theme is the way that thematic relationships and interactions were visualized and
presented. Several participants and experts interviewed felt that the visualization abilities of Case 1
in particular were of notable value. These visualizations, particularly the automated causal-loop
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diagramming, allowed for rapid exploration of second- and third-order relationships in a way which
enabled analysts to quickly identify potential pivot points within a storyline. This also appeared to
capture more of the real-world complexity in participants' understanding of the system dynamics,
thereby facilitating the kinds of "strategic surprise" most sought after in scenario workshops.
"Having a common diagram like that can be tremendously useful to help synchronize
people's understanding of what they are talking about," commented one Australian scenario expert.
"One of the key dynamics of these systems going forward is that it changes our ability to have great
visibility of these trends and conversations, of what people are thinking. This will become a critical
tool in the future." "It is also important to use visualization to see what are the most interesting and
important stories," suggested another scenarios expert. "Part of the unique value of a central
database is that diverse users can see what everyone else is thinking and build a common language
for dialogue. This fits perfectly with the goals of scenario planning and may be one of online
[platforms'] greatest strengths." Another respondent argued that scenario engagement techniques
are "ultimately about stretching people's minds. A futurist [process] helps people think."
Respondents emphasized that visualization techniques and common reference points (often through
shared images, videos or lists) may be one way to achieve this goal.
Although the Base Case did not explicitly engage in a systems mapping exercise, such an
approach is not uncommon in other face-to-face scenario processes. The use of visualization tools
like those employed in Case 1 may therefore be one of the more unique contributions to the process
of scenario planning. By reducing the time and effort involved in creating such maps, and by
allowing users to interact and explore them in more detail, they may help to synchronize opinions
and attitudes about how a complex system works and how it might change over time. More
interactive and dynamic functions would only serve to enhance this potential.
Although no other cases or examples used visualization in this particular way, the IFTF and
Future of Facebook examples used extensive video and multi-media enhancements to facilitate their
process. The IFTF example in particular presented a range of complex ideas and issues in a short,
easily accessible video at the beginning of the user experience. The video presented a summary of
the major themes and issues influencing the topic of the smart grid, in the form of a narrative news
broadcast from the future. This was derived from research conducted by the IFTF team in advance
and served to add content, excitement and focus to the game itself. The video was viewed over
2,500 times, helping to achieve the pedagogical goals of educating a user community, as well as the
practical one of synchronizing a group of participants in the scenario planning process. The Future
of Facebook project used a similar technique, producing curated clips of key themes and issues from
the interview process online on a custom YouTube channel, which received over 18,000 views. This
was a particularly effective way of presenting both raw concepts as well as more synthetic, analysed
themes and higher-level issues. It served to differentiate the process from other, more traditional
means and engage a range of users in creative ways that helped make often abstract ideas come alive.
The combination of enhanced participation, various clustering mechanisms, and more robust
visualization tools suggests that online approaches such as these may offer enhanced transparency in
the scenario building process for urban planning. One of the core critiques of scenario planning is
its lack of standards, professional guidelines, and objective evaluation metrics. The Base Case clearly
demonstrated areas where time, process, or facilitator constraints introduced bias and influence on
the process; particularly in the clustering and analysis of drivers and the creation of draft scenario
frameworks. Although none of these systems set out to address these core concerns directly, their
explicit focus on enhanced participation and decision transparency was identified by several experts
as a highly desirable potential impact. "No one will ever do it the same way (thankfully)",
commented one expert informant, "but the more clarity and transparency you add to the way you
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do, and the why decisions are made, the better." This helps further reduce individual, group, and
facilitator bias in the process and, it is hoped, enhances the quality of both process and outcomes.
The addition of more user-focused features such as voting and commenting (explored below) can
only increase this advantage. Taken together, data visualization, multi-media, and enhanced user
activity is another clear area of value for the scenario process.
8.1.5 The Social Experience of Online Scenario Building
One of the most marked differences between the Base Case and the online cases and examples was
the role and qpe ofsocialization involved. Although several of the Cases and examples may offer
improvements or augmentation to the core functions of the scenario planning process, the Base
Case provided clear advantages in the social dimension of the scenario process. One of the implicit
goals of scenario planning is to build relationships between organizational and stakeholder "silos",
thereby helping to build trust and social capital along the way. Another goal, to help influence
decision-makers through visceral, emotional, and creative means, is partly achieved through the
social experience itself. One UK-based academic noted that, "scenario workshops are most
effective when they help people play through their emotional experiences of uncomfortable ideas
and new issues. If you can tap into this process online, you will be more likely to achieve your
goals."
This insight illustrates the emotional and psychological dimensions of scenario workshops.
One South African scenario expert observed that, "Scenarios themselves are often just transitional
objects - they let people try out different conditions in which their plans must live. This helps them
get comfortable with conditions they may have to face that they would otherwise prefer to ignore."
Providing opportunities, or even requiring participants to interact with each other and with novel
ideas is one of the ways that face-to-face scenario workshops help 'stretch' participants' thinking and
comfort levels.
Although more people participated in the online cases, that participation was almost entirely
one-to-many, meaning that individuals sat alone at their computers, interacting with the system or
with other users remotely. The WikiStrat example alone was the sole example in which participants
came together as teams. While both the IFTF and the Future of Facebook allowed users to interact
with each other during the scenario process, only the Future of Facebook did so in an explicitly
social context, i.e., using participant's real names, real roles and real social contacts (or at least those
shared on social networking sights such as Facebook). This is not to say that the experience of
participation in these systems was not emotional, particularly the IFTF's game-like platform and
WikiStrat's collaborative competitive platform, but simply that the amount of social engagement was
far less than that in the Base Case and other similar scenario exercises.
This may be particularly true with Case 1 and Case 2, which provided little in the way of
either user feedback or social interaction. It was observed in both cases that participants felt that the
"one way nature" of the experience was both unfulfilling and "mysterious". Although the use of
user generated content was clearly spelled out at the beginning of the process, there was no readily
available way for participants to see the results of their efforts, nor those of others, nor interact with
them in any way.
This posed a major disadvantage when compared to the Base Case. One researcher
suggested that, "people need feedback in order to stay involved. You can provide automated
feedback, but other people are the best kind of feedback you can possibly ask for." Several
practitioners cited this phenomena as one of the main reasons that face-to-face scenario workshops
were so popular; they gave the participants a chance to contribute to a group process and
immediately get feedback from others on their contributions. Greater user involvement may go a
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long way towards addressing these concerns, particularly through more evocative use of multimedia
and game-like interactions such as those used by the IFTF, WikiStrat and the Future of Facebook
project. But one thing is clear from these findings: the online systems explored here fall short of
engaging many of the "softer aspects" that make scenario planning workshops at their best so
socially engaging.
However, a secondary aspect of socialization which bears discussion is the potential for
different stakeholders to play different roles in the management and curation of online scenario
platforms. Both the IFTF and WikiStrat examples suggest how greater participant involvement can
both enhance socialization and the process of data generation and analysis. Each used variations of
moderators, super-users or reputation systems to create incentives for participation and mechanisms
of enhanced involvement. The IFTF's SmartGrid 2025 game, for example, had several IFTF staff
and volunteers monitoring the flow of data generation and discussion. They facilitated particular
lines of inquiry through system-wide prompt questions, which both helped keep the pace of
participation flowing and also guided conversation towards under-explored areas. These
administrators also awarded various "power-ups" and status markers in the form of reputational
prizes and awards to highly involved users. Of the 4,700 submissions made, for example, 174 were
marked "super interesting" by system moderators, which provided both a boost in that author's
score as well as focusing attention on interesting discussions and debate. Various other awards were
given that helped to differentiate very active or particularly high-quality participants. WikiStrat took
this principle several levels further, giving participants explicit "ranks" based on their past
performance, years of experience, level of education and other criteria. This both recognizes varying
levels of expertise, but also provides additional roles and responsibilities for higher-ranking
participants. High-ranking participants were also entitled to greater financial returns on their
analysis, should it be deemed useful by paying clients or expert judges.
The segmentation of users into various roles suggests one mechanism for dealing with the
increased amount of data generated by such systems. By effectively "deputizing" users who have
demonstrated high levels of insight, such users can help to filter and moderate the process of data
generation and analysis, as well as facilitate the ongoing community of invested stakeholders. This
may only be relevant in the context of long-term, on-going engagements such as WikiStrat, but
offers interesting potential for increasing levels of social engagement in shorter exercises as well.
8.2 Larger Implications and Considerations
Evidence from the Case Studies and comparative examples also raised intriguing questions for
which data was unavailable, ambiguous, or only suggestive. This section identifies some of these
issues and begins to outline the contours of their discussion. It focuses on the impact of such
systems on core scenario outcomes (i.e., quality), their impact on professional standards and
tradecraft, their implication for the academic use and study of such systems, and a discussion of how
such platforms may evolve in the future.
8.2.1 Impact on the Process; Better Scenarios, Better Workshops?
Given the lack of objective metrics for evaluating scenario quality or outcomes, it is challenging to
speculate on the impact that these platforms may have on the outcome of scenario process itself.
Chermack's theory of scenario planning (2003) posits that scenarios can help organizations learn
about environmental change by increasing their awareness of external forces and factors. This in
turn is meant to produce more accurate "mental models", which lead to better decision making and
better performance, and addresses the notion that the process of identifying environmental
unknowns and critical uncertainties helps overcome individual and group decision-biases.
This definition fits well with the corporate and military roots of mainstream scenario
planning, whereby a small, centralized group of leaders with decision-making authority can directly
influence the actions of a large body of others (a firm, an army, etc.). It may be less appropriate for
multi-stakeholder public policy issues, however, where decision-making ability is split amongst many
different parties, and goals are often contested and open to review.
The multi-polar nature of public policy debate, therefore, suggests that scenarios may have
to "work harder" in the public planning context. More parties need to be consulted, more data and
perspectives need to be considered, and more differences need to be bridged in order to reach
consensus on key forces and factors affecting a community's future. It is therefore likely that the
emphasis of public scenario planning work may fall more heavily on the first and second steps of
Chermarck's model, notably "learning" and "influencing mental models". If this is true, how might
such platforms impact the public participation process in urban planning and decision-making?
Based on the findings of this research, it is logical that these platforms' ability to integrate
significantly larger number of participants in the process, combined with their ability to integrate
significantly different opinions and attitudes at relatively low cost and effort, makes them particularly
well suited to public engagement with urban planning issues. This suggests that public authorities,
non-profits and their consultants may successfully employ them at a fraction of the cost of full-scale
consultation efforts, thereby helping bridge the gap between the learning process and mental models
of more diverse stakeholder groups.
But to what end? Do these systems produce the kind of strategic insight and emotional
urgency that, "makes the ordinary seem strange and the strange, ordinary", as quoted by Schwartz
(1997)? Are they effective tools for not only bridging people's understanding of uncertainty but also
bringing these issues to life and motivating them to take action? Based on the findings of this
research alone, it is impossible to tell. It is also questionable as to whether or not the Base Case
produced this impact as claimed. Said another way, in the words of one UK-based academic and
experienced scenario practitioner, "Is more participation better?"
Not all experts interviewed were convinced of the value of broader and more diverse
participation. One experienced practitioner and academic from the UK asked the question, "why do
you need large groups to do futures research? Do you need them? I think not." When this
question was posed to a French consultant and futures researcher specializing in urban policy, he
replied, "Do you need large groups? No, definitely not. But do they add something? Definitely-
especially in the public policy context. If you can figure out a way to involve more people in the
process, it might not help the actual process but will certainly improve the acceptance of its results."
This sentiment was echoed by another respondent who observed that, "sometimes all you need is
five bright people spending a week together to change the world. Compare this to a year of 20,000
people all contributing banal and useless ideas. Which is better? You tell me."
Others were more optimistic about the value of increased participation as a way to add
content value, not just contextual acceptance. A South African academic and well-respected
practitioner observed that, "these workshops often involve the great and the good, but no one even
knows the marginal or fringe perspectives that could still be important in the future. Providing a
means to involve these players and ideas should only improve the output, if done well." Others
explicitly acknowledged that environmental complexity was so challenging and dynamic that the only
way to effectively understand the world was through as many diverse perspectives as possible.
Experts were therefore divided about the value of increased participation, usually
acknowledging that more engagement was often necessary as a consensus-building process in multi-
stakeholder environments but that more participants may lead to diminishing returns in quality.
The evidence from this dissertation suggests that use of such systems on their own will not
produce the desired outcomes of the scenario process. Case 1 effectively leveraged diverse expert
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opinions to produce a common systems map, but this alone was merely one part of the larger
process. Case 2 effectively produced compelling scenario logics that in retrospect have surprising
emotional resonance and accuracy. But the unidirectional, "black box" nature of both cases suggests
that they did not produce the kinds of emotional and social experiences sought in the most effective
scenario exercises. The same may be true of the WikiStrat case, although the more prolonged
engagement of its participants and the promise of financial reward and public recognition may have
increased its effectiveness. In contrast, the IFTF and OpenForesight examples used more active and
visceral methods of social engagement (particularly the game-like dynamics of the IFTF's Foresight
Engine) that, when combined with the creative use of video and multi-media, may offer a potentially
viable alternative. On the whole, however, it must be acknowledged that these systems did not on
their own produce sufficient emotional or analytical impact to replace the best examples of face-to-
face scenario planning.
That said, each system did effectively demonstrate the ability to significantly enhance the face-
to-face process in various ways. The use of Case 1's automated systems visualization tools and
clustering approach, as well as Case 2's qualitative and emotional narrative capture techniques,
clearly demonstrate ways that early stage scenario processes can be enhanced and improved. Both
demonstrate the prospect for enhanced transparency, speed and efficiency in the driver
identification, ranking, clustering, and draft scenario creation phases. The comparative examples
also demonstrate different methods of engaging larger groups in dialogue and debate around key
issues, such as exploring key implications and developing scenario content and ideas. This suggests
that with proper design and attention, a hybrid form of online and face-to-face engagement could
leverage the benefits of both virtual and in-person collaboration. Future systems are likely to
explore this combination, developing various approaches to rapid-prototyping futures online, then
testing and exploring them in more depth in person. This suggests both new avenues for future
research as well as new innovations in scenario practice and delivery.
8.2.2 Impacts on Professional Standards
Another important implication of the development of such systems is their potential impact on the
field's future, as well as on the larger topic of public participation in general. Pang (2010) suggests
that, "the futures profession is decentralized, eclectic and intellectually varied: there are no schools
that train its elite, few barriers to entry, no certification or regulatory body."
Just as Amazon, eBay, and other online sites have reputation mechanisms that differentiate
experienced, trust-worthy participants from others, so too could professional futurists and scenario
planners gain evidence-based reputations based on their performance in public scenario processes.
Several experts interviewed suggest that the large-scale deployment of such systems would have a
fundamental levelling effect on the industry, which is currently characterized by a wide variety of
speciality practitioners employing various methodologies. Should such systems enable more
transparent reputation tracking, both amateur and professional participants could be evaluated more
effectively by their scores over time. This would help prevent the "hedgehog effect" (Tetlock,
2006), by which loud, overly confident forecasters and pundits attract short-term media attention,
regardless of their past record of performance.
Indeed, "The Good Judgement Project" at the University of Pennsylvania and University of
California, Berkeley is seeking to do just that. Led by Phil Tetlock and others, sponsored by
DARPA, this project is attempting to create a national database of forecasters who would be tested
against various metrics of predictive accuracy and correctness. It is conceived that apart from
straight accuracy, other measures related to the "softer" aspects of scenario planning could also be
developed. These include those related to imaginative stretch, emotional engagement, effective
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reframing of issues and dilemmas, and the effective translation of future possibilities into present
day strategic options. Such a common set of transparent standards could significantly improve the
professional quality of the scenarios and foresight industry, which is heavily influenced by attention-
seeking media impresarios who operate without verification, accountability, or professional
validation.
In contrast, however, the use of widely available and economically affordable participatory
futures systems could significantly polarize the professional scenario planning market. To date, the
practice of qualitative scenario planning relies partially on the mystique of past glories (vis-a-vis
Pierre Wack, the success of Shell, and the early days of scenario planning consultancy GBN) and
partly on the lack of general understanding as to how it is performed. This allows practitioners to
command very high fees for the practice of scenario planning, with very little accountability or
standards for follow-up. If such online platforms become competitive alternatives, producing
robustly similar results at a fraction of the price, it is conceivable that much of the basic scenario
planning market could be commoditized in a way now common to basic accountancy, project
management, or HR functions. This could have the paradoxical effect of levelling the playing field
of most practitioners (thereby lowering their fees and prestige), but also creating a smaller, more
exclusive niche market for the true scenario "stars" (who may even reject the use of such tools on
principle and trade on their reputation alone).
On the other hand, larger management consultancies such as those which offer scenario
planning as an integrated part of their professional services may be likely to use such systems to
lower their cost of scenario planning operations, but without lowering fees. Thus the cost savings
associated with the automation of many of these tasks could provide a valuable competitive
advantage in the near- to medium-term, when such systems improve their effectiveness and
sophistication, but before they become widespread.
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It is likely that in either case, the continued development of these tools will produce a
significant impact on the scenario planning profession and market, especially when they achieve
greater operational sophistication and after the various issues and uncertainties presented in this
research are more fully understood. As they develop and are tested in different policy environments,
as well, they will likely further differentiate themselves from the standard business consulting model
used by many scenario planning consultancies. In particular, their use as dialogic and influence tools
in multi-stakeholder environments will likely make them more useful in urban planning and
advocacy cases, although with possible unintended consequences. This difference between business
and planning contexts is discussion in more detail below, where these findings are linked back to the
planning literature discussed in Chapter Two.
8.2.3 Connection to Urban Planning Theory
Chapter Two introduced four main traditions in the urban planning literature; social reform, policy
analysis, social learning and social mobilization. How do the themes and findings of this dissertation
relate back to these schools?
One of the main findings of this research is that although these systems are far from robust,
they do suggest that certain aspects of them could be more easily automated or done more cost
effectively. This has different implications if read through different lenses of planning theory. From
a policy analysis tradition, the technical potential of these systems could be seen as a positive
development towards more comprehensive understanding of diverse stake holder goals and values,
as well as a mechanism for more comprehensive monitoring and sampling of diverse inputs for
analysis. This, combined with the potential speed and efficiency gains resulting from the parallel
processing of this data via distributed, crowd-sourced analysis, suggests that such large scale
participatory systems could help address one of the main challenges of the policy analysis school, as
highlighted by Scott (1998) and others. Namely, that such formal rational approaches often fail
because they lack adequate measures of stake holder values and goals, a model for relating these
values to an objective set of choices, mechanisms for evaluating these choices, and means of
coordinating decision to enact these choices. While collective intelligence-based scenario systems
cannot address all of these concerns, they can assist with the solicitation of values and objectives in a
more rapid way, as well as the processing and synthesis of them in policy-relevant ways.
But the real potential of these systems relates more to the goals of the social learning and
social mobilization traditions than the policy analysis tradition. The stated purpose of qualitative
scenario planning is not to produce better predictions of the future, or even to minimize uncertainty
in the operating environment. Instead, the purpose is to facilitate collective learning in a way which
relates explicitly from the main traditions of the social learning school (Argys and Schon, 1974; Rein
and Schon, 1993). The purpose of scenario planning is to facilitate enhanced learning and
awareness, a need which translates well to the public policy sphere. Quoting Mintzenberg (1994),
Healey (2007) observes that, "strategic thinking involves a way of thought, in which events, episodes
and possibilities are continuously interpreted in terms of their significance for an enterprise as it
evolves over time in a specific and dynamic context" (p.30). The fragmented nature of urban public
politics suggests that different actors will perceive different parts of reality unfolding differently, and
that their interpretation of these events may vary significantly as well. The utility of large scale
platforms for helping stakeholders articulate these interpretations, discuss them and make them
visible to each other should not be underestimated.
While the traditional public engagement process is often episodic and theme- or event-
specific, online platforms offer the potential for continuous, rolling exploration of these issues
which has never before been possible. This relates powerfully to another strand of work within the
social learning school, that of the political power of frames and framing. A frame provides
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"conceptual coherence, a direction for action, a basis for persuasion, and a framework for the
collection and analysis of data" (Rein and Schon 1993, p. 153). Frames are thus social sensemaking
devices which can have powerful influence over the data collected, interpretations offered and
decisions taken around complex, uncertain events. Healey notes that, "in the context of collective
action for the development of urban areas, strategic thinking involves selecting and focusing on key
interventions in these relations that could make a difference through time" (p. 30). The narrative
aspect of scenarios, with their explicit focus on framing mental models of change in the world, offer
a particularly applicable compliment to the traditional framing work done by urban public decision-
makers. de Roo notes that, "imagining cities is about articulating the linkages of policy frameworks,
developing a shared awareness of the space-time dynamics of the relationships weaving through and
across an area" (p. 37). Scenarios do just this, acting as an exercise to focus attention, to articulating
and modifying frames for events that may not yet have occurred. Quoting Healey again, she
observes:
Strategic mobilisation involves a process of coalescence of intellectual and political forces
through which strategies are 'recognised', given names and positioned in specific institutional
contexts. Such mobilisations exploits moments of opportunity, where having a strategy responds to
some felt need among key actors. Skilled strategic work involves understanding the nature of such
moments and the opportunities to 'capture' them in particular directions (p. 195).
Scenarios, particularly in the public context, offer a mechanism for helping stakeholders
recognize these moments of opportunity and change, thereby offering the potential to help
synchronize perceptions in a way which can, in theory, help "coalesce" understanding into shared
frames for action. This could help generate new frames for the response to surprises, perhaps even
exploring how such events might occur beforehand and generating strategies that could help avoid
negative aspects of political gamesmanship and stakeholder fragmentation that often occurs during
times of crisis. They also offer the potential to help envision positive futures and frames, around
which stakeholder groups could coalesce for mutual benefit.
This possibility suggests an important unintended consequence of such systems, however,
which relates more to the social mobilization tradition of planning thought. If such systems
"democratize" the process of scenario creation to a sufficient degree, they could actually increase
fragmentation and political discord in urban environments, as opposed to decreasing it in the way
explored above. Given that the social mobilization tradition places planning in the context of
contested resources and decisions, it is far closer to the zero-sum competitive environments of
scenario planning's origins in business and warfare. If scenarios can be used as effective political
framing devices, this implies that they could also be used as "weapons" to further disrupt the
planning process. If each advocacy group or citizen committee is able to contest planning decisions
with a range of plausible alternative scenarios, then such tools exhibit a disruptive potential
unintended by their original creators. In these situations, the rhetorical power of scenarios as an
influence tool would situate them within the wide range of other advocacy methods employed by
political campaigners in the modern political system.
Scenarios, and the large-scale systems which could be used to create them, appear to have
the contradictory power to both enhance the formal analytical approaches of the policy analysis
school, augment the collective learning goals of social learning tradition and, paradoxically, serve as
disruptive political devices within the social mobilization tradition. This suggests that the emergence
of large-scale collective intelligence platforms for scenario generation is a far more complex
undertaking than one of simple technical feasibility. While involving larger numbers of people
should help improve the speed, transparency and diversity of scenarios themselves (all explicit goals
of the scenario planning literature), as well as furthering the democratic goals of public participation
in the planning process, their widespread application in public policy may paradoxically create a new
class of problems that they themselves are unlikely to be able to deal with. It is likely then, as these
systems continue to develop, far more attention will need to be devoted to the social and political
use of these systems if these issues are to be better understood. This, along with the technical and
operational aspects explored in more depth in this dissertation, will likely be fertile ground for
scholarly research in future versions of this research
8.2.4 Differences Between Business and Public Sector Scenario Planning
Although not the main focus of this dissertation, the findings of this work shed light on some of the
important differences between the way scenario planning is used in a business context, which has
relatively few stakeholders and relatively clear lines of command, and the public context, which has
many conflicting stakeholders, ambiguous power structures and multiple competing values and
objectives.
In fact, a variety of public decisions involve very similar conditions to private, corporate or
military conditions, and vice-versa. Decision-making which involves a small number of experts to
which the general public has delegated a reasonable degree of authority and expertise are often not
reviewed in the context of full public meetings, citizen engagement exercises and the like. In this
way they operate somewhat similarly to small group decision-making in the corporate board room.
On the other hand, many large, multinational corporate decisions involve dozens if not hundreds of
distributed division heads, regional directors, vice presidents and the like. While explicit command
and control may exist on paper for these organizations, the process of decision-making and
implementation is much closer to that of a public, multi-stakeholder process. The same is true for
military exercises involving significant degrees of diplomacy or coalition building.
This implies that a binary distinction between business and public sectors may be less
productive than thinking about them as a spectrum of decision contexts. Viewed in this light, we
may consider three dimensions of scenario building and application that could vary across each
example. These dimensions are:
e Openness of decision context (i.e., degree of effective command and control and multi-party
engagement)
* Openness of the scenario scoping process (i.e., what variables are deemed important to
consider before the scenario exercise begins)
e Openness of the scenario selection process (i.e., who decides how many and which scenarios
get integrated into a final set for decision-making).
Considering these three variables, we can see how several of the case studies and examples from this
dissertation map across this space. Case 1, for example, involved a closed group of experts making
decisions, but an open context of scenario scoping. Participants could, in theory, enter any data they
felt like into the system and it would contribute towards scenario generation. The results of this,
however, were taken into a closed scenario selection process in the end. Case 2 involved an open
decision context, but a closed scoping context and a closed scenario selection process. In contrast,
the Future of Facebook example involved an open decision context, an open scoping context and an
open scenario selection context.
The key point is that the purpose and function of scenarios, and therefore the utility of the
online systems explored here-in, will vary between these contexts. Where the stated purpose of
business scenario planning is often to both sensitive a small group of decision-makers to external
conditions they may not be aware of, as well as synchronize their mental models to how the world
may work and what scenario sets may unfold, the purpose may be quite different in a more open
decision-context involving open scoping or scenario selection. In these contexts, the point may not
be to generate consensus, but instead to provide a safe political vessel within which stakeholders can
"agree to disagree". Said another way, scenarios can be used in the public environment to actually
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surface and preserve disagreement in a politically productive way; one that enables political planning
to continue without any of the more extreme positions represented in any given scenario from
dominating or sabotaging the entire process. Thus while it is not strictly consensus building, it
serves more as disagreement containment in a way which preserves political freedom to make future
choices.
8.2.5 Methodological Considerations
The use of such systems as data generation platforms also poses a variety of issues for their use and
deployment as research instruments by urban planning academics. First, such platforms offer the
potential for participants to become directly involved in aspects of the research process itself. This
poses unique methodological challenges for study design and execution. Where most traditional
research design follows a hypothesis testing, research-question driven framework wherein both are
determined in advance, several unique features of user-driven collective intelligence platforms may
challenge this.
First, the evolution of such systems is ongoing, self-reflective and emergent. Users in mature
online communities are continually updating, refining and modifying system content through their
interaction. This makes the challenge of "bounding" a research study quite difficult. Participants
can influence and in some cases decide upon the framing of research questions to be asked; for
example, the selection or definition of constructs and even the variables selected for measurement.
This effect is more pronounced when users become involved in both data analysis and
generation. This suggests that their ability to structure and control the research process may be
limited in critical ways when using these tools. Participants may spend time exploring only those
issues and concerns which interest them most, thereby shifting cognitive resources away from the
concerns of the researcher and towards their own agendas. As a result, although such systems can
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be powerful analytical engines for processing the data the generate, they may also pose challenges to
their guidance and could become less explicitly directive and reliable when compared to traditional
data-generation exercises. A former practitioner suggested that, "moderators of an online process
sometimes have the feeling that they're barely holding on for dear life, because sometimes the
carriage tries to run away without them." This can be "tremendously frustrating" for researchers
used to "well behaved conditions", observed another practitioner, who suggested that the use of
such tools could require more flexibility in research design and study administration than a less
participatory, open approach. This raises important questions about how to curate a participant
community in the context of an ongoing research project and how to interpret results that are
emergent and self-reflective. One expert interviewed summarised this observation when she said,
'What you put in is not what you get out of these systems. They tend to have a mind of their own."
All of this suggests that it may be challenging, if not impossible, to predetermine which
outcomes should be observed in advance when conducting prototypical experiments with such
systems. If the research questions, constructs, and measurement devices are themselves subject to
influence by the user, and the process of engagement can require participation by the researcher
than, "there is often the necessity to reflect upon outcomes post-hoc in order to make sense of what
was created and learned in the process." Such post-hoc "sense-making", as one expert researcher
called it, suggests a novel form of data generation that is more "design oriented" and less
"hypothesis testing" in the traditional sense. "You're entering new territory," observed one
academic and expert in stakeholder engagement and scenario creation, "and the only way to figure
out what matters most in such a case is to generate the data first, then reflect on what is important
after."
204
8.2.6 How Such Platforms May Evolve
As the nature and sophistication of these platforms develop, it is likely that they could evolve rapidly
in different directions. Two directions in particular bear discussion here: their role as "personal
futures systems", and their use as real-time horizon-scanning, monitoring, and rapid-futures
prototyping systems.
Personal futures is, at present, a niche sub-topic within the larger literature on qualitative
scenario planning. Wheelwright (2009) defines personal futures as a process of using scenario
planning methods at the scale of individual life decisions and pathways. This involves a
combination of methods similar to those presented in this dissertation, adapted to various life stages
and life events. The result is a series of short- to medium-term qualitative scenarios exploring
different branching points facing an important life decision.
The combination of web-based, social-network driven mechanisms for generating future
scenarios with a widespread desire to understand and comment on your and others' lives could
become a powerful planning tool, taking many forms, from the most banal to the most profound.
On the trivial side, automated or semi-automated services could easily be imaged which provided
real-time micro-scenario forecasts for your day, week, or month depending on information culled
from your network and those of your friends. A more profound implementation could involve a
combination of online scenario mechanisms (greatly simplified and popularized, of course) with
face-to-face workshops with those you care about to produce a hybrid, "life-futures" workshop with
great effect. Designer and artist Jessica Charlesworth has begun to explore this territory with her
research into personal futures "Delphi Parties" and "microtrend diaries". These speculative design
fictions offer a compelling enactment of how such system might bridge qualitative scenario planning
with the booming industry of self-help and life-coaching.
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The second, perhaps more serious pathway of development could be through the
combination of such systems with other forms of predictive trend monitoring, data mining, and
algorithmic processing. Platforms such as Google Trends and sentiment analysis of Twitter have
found that search term volume and positive/negative sentiment correlates quite well with near-term
predictions of things such as movie sales, election standings, or flu outbreaks. Various defence and
industry-related projects already attempt to combine human expertise at pattern matching with
machine-aided clustering approaches. Software suites such as Palantir are in widespread use
throughout the intelligence communities of the US and other governments, and data-mining is
routine in nearly all large-scale corporate activities. It is therefore likely that, over time, a more
sophisticated and large-scale version of the platforms explored in this dissertation may merge with
such approaches to create extreme-scale, real-time monitoring and trend tracking systems.
This combination could offer three advantages. First, the massive sample size of hundreds
of thousands, if not millions of participants would provide a much greater source of data and
material for scenario building. Second, it would enable real-time monitoring of changes and trends,
such that a common base of opinions and perspectives could be compared against rapid movements
and surprising outcomes. Third, it would allow for more rapid (potentially real time) testing of
solutions and scenario spaces.
Access to the mental processing power of millions of participants, combined with suitably
sophisticated mechanisms for tracking and synthesizing the data they created, would enable a
fundamentally different kind of foresight practice, based on "rolling, constantly updated images of
the future" to quote Dave Snowden, a UK-based academic and practitioner. Such an ongoing
process would go even further to overcome the limitations of individual, group and facilitator bias,
helping to identify surprising events "as they emerged from the future" to quote Otto Scharmer
(2009). This makes possible a new approach to corporate strategic planning and public sector
policy-making, one based on sensing and interacting with emerging trends, as opposed to trying to
forecast and predict them over time. In such a scenario, government departments and actors would
have access to shared databases of public opinion, emerging events, collective analysis, and mental
simulations that could be brought to bear on both long- and short-term policy challenges. Parts of
these databases would be publicly available as well, allowing individuals, groups, and corporations to
both add to and take advantage of the social collective intelligence platform. While the social and
competitive effects of such a vast, potentially powerful information resource are unknown, it is clear
such systems are possible as the individual components, including those explored in this dissertation,
continue to develop over time.
8.3 Conclusion
This chapter discussed how the data generated in this dissertation might impact the core research
questions of this work. It did so in two ways: first by asserting points which could be reasonably
defended based on the evidence generated during this research and, second, by discussing more
speculative themes and issues beyond the empirical claims of this study.
With regards to evidence-based claims associated with the research, this chapter suggested
that online participatory futures systems can be highly effective at involving greater numbers of
more diverse participants from different locations. It was also clear that this participation may be
most influential at the early stages of the scenario process. It reflected on how the modest
interaction of many users at the early stages helped build understanding of diverse drivers and
inputs, but failed to produce the kinds of softer, "social" impacts sought after in scenario planning.
It also discussed how task structure might influence the relationship between participation, data
generation, and analysis.
207
The second section of this chapter discussed more speculative issues related to the work. It
suggested that these tools help enable the desired outcomes of scenario planning, but are unlikely to
provide the requisite value on their own. It also explored the potential impacts of widespread
deployment of such platforms in a mature scenario planning industry, suggesting that they might be
able to provide enhanced transparency and reputation mechanisms, as well as potentially
commoditizing basic aspects of the scenario planning process. Finally, it discussed various
methodological challenges involved in using and studying such systems for scholarly research, as
well as the potential evolution of such systems in the near- to mid-term future.
The following chapter, Conclusions, presents a summary of the work, discusses its
limitations, its contributions to the field, and areas for future research.
Chapter 9 Conclusion
9.1 Chapter Introduction
Previous chapters introduced the research, explored the study design, presented its findings and
discussed their implications. This, the last chapter, presents a summary of the research effort,
outlines its contribution to the field, discusses the limitations and suggests possible areas for future
research.
9.2 Summary of the Work
This dissertation explored the role that participatory, online scenario planning systems might play in
urban planning research. Chapter One introduced the research topic and provided a brief summary
of the problem statement and research goals. It argued that the concept of the future was an
integral part of the urban planning discipline, but that the role of the future had shifted over time.
Early optimism about the value of forecasting and prediction gave way to increasing frustration with
the limits of foresight, which coincided with the political movement away from scientific rationality
and towards greater community involvement and social deliberation. At the same time, however,
globalization and continued technological process has increased the level of complexity,
interconnectivity and volatility that planning and public policy-makers must contend with.
Qualitative scenario planning is often considered a means of helping to deal with these increased
uncertainties and rapid pace of change.
To date, the role of qualitative scenario research in urban planning research has been limited.
I argued that this was partially due to specific methodological, logistical and financial constraints,
particularly in the context of public, multi-stakeholder engagements. These constraints included
logistical, financial and methodological ones, primarily related to the need for extensive face-to-face
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involvement and expensive consultation. I then proposed that developments in online technologies
may enable similar savings in time and scale for qualitative scenario planning that they have for other
disciplines.
Chapter Two presented a detailed review of the literature. It began with a review of the role
of the future in urban planning and public policy, tracing four key schools of thought over time; the
social reform, policy analysis, social learning and social mobilization approaches. I suggested that
the combination of these forces, in particular those of social learning and social mobilization, came
together in the 1970's and 1980's to produce a demand for public participation in the planning
process. This segued into a discussion of the role of public participation in urban planning,
exploring how it met and fell short of its goals and aspirations in various ways. The role of Planning
Support Systems (PSS), public participation GIS (PPGIS) and participatory agent-based models was
also discussed, where I presented several different approaches from the literature that attempted to
combine the desire for public participation in a more rigorous analytical frame. I explored how
recent parallel developments in web-based platforms for user engagement have been used
experimentally for public participation in urban planning, before providing a detailed review of the
origins and history of qualitative scenario planning, as most often used in the business context.
I then discussed how qualitative scenario planning differed from simulation and modelling,
in that it sought to make explicit areas of uncertainty through creative, narrative or visual means.
The benefits of scenario planning were presented, notably increased appreciation for uncertainty,
greater environmental awareness and stronger shared mental models. This was grounded in the
theoretical literature on group learning, notably the constructivist and sensemaking traditions. The
many disadvantages to how scenario planning is currently conducted were also discussed. Finally,
the question as to the role that new web technologies could play in the adaptation of qualitative
scenario methods to the needs of urban planning research was posed.
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Chapter Three introduced the study design, research questions and methods. It presented
two main research questions, namely: "Do web-based participatory approaches add value to the
traditional scenario planning process, and if so, where and in what ways?" and; "If not, where do
they fall short, in what ways, and why?" It also presented a number of secondary questions designed
to explore various aspects of these larger ones in more depth. For the research design, a mixed-
method qualitative approach was chosen. Two novel data generation platforms were created in
order to generate data for these research questions. These platforms were applied on two different
projects, which became the core, in-depth case studies for this research. These were then compared
to a base case, representative of a popular form of face-to-face qualitative scenario planning. Key
measurement dimensions were discussed, including the type and amount of participation, the
demographics of who participated, the tasks they were asked to do, and what the analytical
outcomes were. In addition to this primary data generation and analysis, three secondary examples
were analysed and an extensive process of stakeholder interviews was conducted. These were
analyzed in the context of the measurement constructs created to compare the main cases.
Chapters Four, Five and Six presented the results from the primary cases. Chapter Four
presented and analyzed the base case; which was a face-to-face scenario project in Spain. It
illustrated how a typical deductive scenario planning project is conducted, including the use of
extensive in-depth interviews to collect perspectives on drivers and forces of future change, how
such data was clustered and analyzed and its presentation and use in the workshop setting. It also
explored how the scenario narratives were created. Finally, it discussed several of the major
strengths and weaknesses of such an approach, emphasizing the value of face-to-face interaction as a
mechanism to build social capital and connections across organizational or political boundaries.
Chapters Five and Six presented each data generation platform in sequence, beginning with
the "Futurescaper" system followed by the "SenseMaker Suite" experimental platform. Each
chapter discussed what the research intention behind each system was, how it functioned and how it
compared to the base case. Chapter Five, "Futurescaper", discussed the first online platform
created to generate data. It focused primarily on expert input in a simple web-form, which was then
combined with network graph analytics to create dynamic systems maps of variables and their
interaction. The strength of such a visual approach was discussed, as well as various user interface
design considerations related to the simplicity (but relatively abstract) means of engagement.
Chapter Six built on the lessons from the first platform to present the "Sensemaker Suite" approach,
which focused on allowing users to submit narratives, stories and opinions in a more natural way. It
also explored new ways of allowing users to code and signify the meaning of their contribution
along key dimensions, which were later used to auto-aggregate into representative themes and
stories. The benefits and disadvantages of this approach were discussed, primarily relating to the
ability for users to engage more intuitively and for the system to capture rich, ethnographic
descriptions in a way which could still be augmented by machine analysis for rapid summary. The
lack of social engagement was also discussed for both cases, either in the form of user-to-user
interaction or system-to-user interaction. This was clearly identified as a weakness of both primary
case studies.
Chapter Seven presented the three comparative examples, including the Institute for the
Future's online futures game, "The Foresight Engine", the collaboration geostrategy platform,
"WikiStrat" and an independent project using social media tools to explore the "Future of
Facebook". I discussed how all three examples invested significantly in the public engagement
mechanisms of their platform, which helped simplify and streamline the user experience. Unlike the
primary cases, each also focused explicitly on the social aspects of the process; a fact already noted
as absent in the primary cases. The Foresight Engine's ability to attract, recruit and engage a large
number of people in an enjoyable, targeted exercise was noted, and WikiStrat's ability to convert this
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into rich, analytically-robust data was also observed. The Future of Facebook was notably rich on
the user of multi-media and mixed platforms for engagement, although all three suffered from a lack
of automated or semi-automated content filtration, aggregation or clustering mechanisms.
Chapter Eight formed the bulk of the intellectual reflection on the findings from the
previous chapters. The main insight discussed was the role that such tools might play in augmenting
the traditional face-to-face process, where in the process they might fit and who might participate in
what ways. In particular, I discussed how the current generation of tools appeared to be most useful
at the early stages of the scenario process, and perhaps less so at the end. They were excellent at
engaging diverse professional and geographic users in the process of scenario thinking, primarily in
the form of early-stage driver creation, discussion and exploration. This ability allowed for greater
transparency, the ability to argue more persuasively for or against a given scenario based on the data
presented, and greatly expanded the number of people who may be involved in the process. They
were unable, however, to match the base case's social experience, which involved in-depth
discussion of sensitive topics amongst a group of participants who rarely, if ever, meet. I also
discussed how at present, they were unable to make the leap to crowdsourced scenario "writing", as
opposed to just analysis. While WikiStrat may the sole example different from the others, it was
nonetheless clear that at present, such online collaboration tools are most useful in the scenario
process at the early stage.
9.2 Contribution to the Field
The original research in this dissertation addressed several modest issues for urban planning
research. First, it connects previously underexplored linkages between the urban planning, public
participation and qualitative scenario planning literatures. It showed how the political and
theoretical concerns of urban planning gave rise to the need for enhanced public involvement, and
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how many of the current tools for large-scale public engagement around complex, uncertain issues
only addressed partial solutions. In parallel, it traced the history and techniques of qualitative
scenario planning, illustrating how it related and was distinct from various future-oriented
techniques from urban simulation (most notably, Planning Support Systems and related approaches).
This original contribution addressed the overlaps in these related, but previously underexplored
literatures.
The primary contribution of this dissertation, however, was two-fold. First, in the creation
and application of two unique online platforms for participatory scenario planning in urban planning
and public policy, and second, in the creation of an intellectual framework for measuring and
evaluating their role in the qualitative scenario planning process. While the former created original
research instruments to generate data relative to the core research questions, the latter also broke
new scholarly ground in proposing a framework for future evaluation and understanding.
These contributions represent several small steps towards greater understanding of how such
systems work, the role they play in urban planning research and how they could be used to evaluate
more detailed research questions in the future. As first generation prototypes, they intentionally
varied key design and process parameters relative to the research questions. Because no other such
systems existed at the beginning of this research, they represent an iterative, purposeful exploration
of the design space of such data collection platforms. They focused primarily on data collection and
analysis at the early stages of the qualitative scenario process, convincingly demonstrating their
ability to successfully engage a large number of diverse professional experts, distributed in time and
space, in analytically useful ways.
They explored two different methods of soliciting user input, first using more formal,
abstract mechanisms (Case 1) and the using more open, unstructured mechanisms (Case 2). They
also demonstrated two unique approaches to clustering and analyzing data generated from these
processes, producing rapid and subjectively useful systems maps of driver interaction and rapid,
sketch-scenarios based on pre-defined archetypes.. This combination served to generate substantially
useful data that helped shed light on the participatory and analytic value of these prototypes, but also
to illustrate their shortcomings and areas for future investigation. These insights were supplemented
by original documentation of three comparative examples that, to date, had not been properly
documented or reviewed in any scholarly fashion.
Aside from the direct contribution of these systems, and the reflection they enabled, the
process of defining an intellectual and methodological framework for further evaluation was also a
small contribution towards future efforts. While a variety of knowledge taxonomies exist for the
classification of online collaborative systems, for scenario planning approaches and for public
engagement techniques within urban planning, none of these were directly relevant to the question
of how online scenario creation systems may impact the public participation process in urban
planning. The methodological framework outlined here, and the data constructs used to generate
and evaluate the data, may serve as a useful contribution to other scholars seeking to understand
such systems moving forward.
In conclusion, this dissertation contributed original research to the field of urban planning,
vis-a-vis the purposeful creation of novel online data generation and stakeholder engagement
platforms for scenario planning in urban public policy. It helped outline the dimensions of this
rapidly emerging research area, contributing original scholarship on key methodological issues
related to its measurement and evaluation. It also generated original data that helped draw attention
to the strengths and weaknesses of such prototype systems to date, thereby laying out clear
opportunities for researchers to build on these modest findings in the future.
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9.3 Limitations
The research had several limitations, related primarily to the emerging nature of the subject and the
lack of standard methodological criteria for evaluation. This section explores those weaknesses in
the research design overall, as well as of the particular approach to data collection and analysis taken
here-in. While these weaknesses are significant, caution was taken in the presentation and discussion
of the results, so that the tentative conclusions that were drawn would be robust to criticism within
their limited domain of relevance. Despite these efforts, it is worth noting the limits of this research
in more detail, as well as drawing attention to key areas that could be addressed in future work.
The primary limitation of this dissertation was the lack of experimental design and peer-
reviewed framework for evaluation. Chapter Three, discussed how, in an ideal experimental design,
I would have been able to isolate key outcome variables in advance, manipulate them relative to
specific independent variables in a controlled process of randomized or semi-random testing. This
would then allow standardized measurement of the relationship between key variables and their
outcomes. Such an approach was infeasible for this research for three reasons, however: 1) the
relevant categories and variables for measurement were unknown in advance; 2) there was little
empirical evidence for, or agreement on, the key outcome variables of scenario planning and; 3)
there whereas no standard measurement instruments or protocols that could be applied in their
testing. As a result, both the dependent and independent variables were unknown and no standard
method for comparison could be established.
As a result, a mixed-method, exploratory case study approach that was chosen, in which the
two main cases were compared in serial against a common base case. This is open to several
weaknesses. First, it is possible that the base case was not representative of a typical face-to-face
scenario planning project. If this was true, using it as a benchmark for the two online cases would
produce false comparisons. Any number of exogenous factors could account for unmeasured
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variability in the base case that could suggest it was not typical. This includes the nature of those
available to attend, the specific social and economic make-up of the participants, the political
sensitivity around issues discussed, the unmeasured biases of the facilitators or any number of other
factors.
Although it is impossible to empirically verify the representativity of the base case, several
point suggest that it was a robust example to chose. First, it was completed by a large, well-known
and well-respected scenario planning consultancy who has been historically influential in the creation
and definition of Shell-style scenario planning method. Second, the client was an experienced
consumer of scenario planning activities and had run similar workshops before in the region. Third,
detailed debriefing of the experience from both the client and facilitator end uncovered specific
strengths and weaknesses, but deemed the process a successful and generally representative example
of the approach. Finally, as an experienced scenario practitioner familiar with dozens of different
engagements of this type, it was my experience that the process and results were typical of a
representative scenario planning process. This combination of factors suggests that the base case
was indeed a reliable instance for comparison.
Another major weakness was the lack of a common evaluation framework that had been
vetted by other scholars on a range of other projects. The validity and reliability of measurement
constructs was therefore not fully established. A more reliable measurement approach would have
used instrumentation that had been validated by others in a wide range of examples, subject to
extensive peer-review. Two factors which prevented this. First, the lack of empirical agreement on
what output variables mattered in the scenario planning process prevented any agreement on what
variables could (or should) be reliably measured. Second, the relative novelty of the research area
and lack of prior knowledge of what was important to measure further prevented the use of a pre-
existing measurement framework. As a result, an exploratory approach was taken which
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purposefully varied a range of variables along several dimensions simultaneously, thereby seeking to
maximize difference between the cases. This was intended to help sketch the boundaries of the
research design space, thereby laying the foundation for more rigorous research in the future. The
proposition of basic, generic set of data constructs was intended to help explore the terrain of these
issues, thereby seeking to capture a broad but not overly-wide sample of key variables.
This limitation, however, prevented the use of a more robust experimental design. Instead,
an exploratory, descriptive approach was taken which relied on triangulation from multiple sources
of varying scope and quality. This had several implications. First, the prototype systems were not
designed in a way which eased cross-case comparison, even if a common evaluative framework was
had. Second, the cases were explicitly dependent on each other, in that Case 2 learned from and
incorporated lessons and features from Case 1, where appropriate. Third, resource constraints
limited the ability to conduct more systematic variance of key system parameters, such as user
interface design features. While these limitations do not invalidate the conclusions reached, they
does place limits on the generalizability of the conclusions and confidence with which they can be
asserted. In particular, no causal claims can be made resulting from this data.
Several specific limitations bear mention with regards to the individual cases. Both Case 1
and Case 2 suffered from a lack of controlled recruitment process, meaning that the number of
perhaps even type of participants is likely to vary significantly if replicated in the future. The
inability to control marketing and recruitment suggests that the numerical aspects of participation in
particular should be taken with a degree of reserve. To partially address this, the comparative
examples were introduced, all of which enjoyed larger participation and promotion rates than the
detailed case studies. These provided another source of triangulation, although suffered from their
own set of constraints. In particular, I had limited access to data beyond what was available through
Skype and email interviews with their creators and active involvement as a participant. I also had no
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control over their system design or variables collected, so was unable to more precisely match their
process to the data constructs measured in the detailed case studies. Despite these limitations,
however, the comparative examples chosen were purposefully selected to further maximize variance
and cover gaps which the detailed case studies were unable to address. Although there is, to date,
still a very limited pool of examples to draw from, they were nonetheless judiciously applied in
Chapter Seven where they could offer reliable support.
Finally, there are general limitations to the use of in-depth expert interviews, which were
applied both at the beginning, middle and end of this research process. Although a mix of
respondents with scenario, public participation, planning and online skills were sought, the snowball
method used to discover candidates and solicit their contribution may have missed important
viewpoints and considerations. Several informants expressed notable criticisms of online
approaches, but it is possible that more severe critiques were not heard due to the nature of the
personal and professional networks employed. Although every effort was made to intentionally seek
out diverse and contradictory opinions, it is nonetheless possible that important view points were
missed.
9.4 Areas for Future Research
The project of designing online participatory scenario systems shed insight into the relevance of
such platforms as data generation instruments for urban planning research. In this way, my hope is
that this dissertation will help advance understanding about the diverse and emergent ways these
systems may benefit urban planning research. If large scale scenario collective intelligence systems
can grow to generate data in a manner that concretely illustrates issues and significant principles of
measurement instrument design, then this dissertation has the potential to provide insight into the
methods, contexts, fundamental issues and practices for such systems more broadly.
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I propose several areas for future research that could fruitfully build upon the efforts of this
dissertation. First, it will be important to continue to develop more rigorously empirical
measurements of the outcomes of the scenario planning process. Although concepts such as
"shared mental models" and "collective learning" are difficult, if not impossible to define, it may be
possible that proxy descriptive measures or even in-depth, ethnographic studies could help elucidate
the specific social and psychological mechanisms which occur.
One proposal towards this end could be the creation and refinement of a standard scenario
evaluation questionnaire. Given that the literature on scenarios suggest that collective exploration of
uncertainty helps minimize overconfidence and expand participants' appreciation for alternative
outcomes, it could be possible measure this effect through simple pre-test and post-test surveys.
Questions could be developed that would ask participants to evaluate the subjective probability of
various events occurring and rank their confidence in their answers. The same test could be
administered after participation in a scenario process. If theories of cognitive bias and
overconfidence hold true (Tetlock, 2006), participants would be expected to be overconfident in a
narrow range of outcomes before, and less confident confidence across a greater range of outcomes
after. This should be possible to measure, thereby gauging the specific impact of the scenario
process on key metrics of probability assessment. Individual and intra-group scores could then be
correlated to determine if the range of opinions converged towards shared mental models, thereby
testing another aspect of scenario planning's role. Although such scores would clearly address only
a very narrow aspect of the scenario process, a study of this sort would be a significant contribution
to the understanding of the basic social learning process involved in public, multi-stakeholder
scenario planning engagements. Additional richness could be had through detailed ethnographic
observation and participant interviews before and after, as well.
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Once such baseline measures for the impact of scenario planning were achieved, it may then
be possible to evaluate specific design features associated with online and offline engagement
approaches. This would enable a wide range of design options to be tested. Several of the themes
and issues raised in this work could be explored further, and used to hypotheses for specific testing
exercises. Design variables could also be held constant, and various social factors could be explored,
such as the effects of recruitment on participant engagement, the impact of various design strategies
on attracting, engaging and retaining different demographics, and the role of various analytic or
visualization techniques in the social learning process.
The last area of research of note is the role of active and interactive socialization in such
systems. Each of the main case studies explored here had very little interactivity and almost no
socialization between users. They were analytical robust nonetheless, producing valuable
contributions to the scenario planning process in urban planning. Each of the comparative
examples pursued a different approach, but focused more on user interaction than analysis (per se).
This tension deserves more exploration, particularly how augmented analysis and augmented
socialization online can be brought more actively into the face-to-face workshop process, where
possible.
In addition to efforts to better isolate and understand specific scenario planning impacts, a
series of additional methodological tests could be conducted that would help researchers understand
and evaluate different aspects of the process in more detail. Once a more basic understanding of the
core design and interaction issues of online scenario planning systems was understood, more
attention could be paid to the fine scale interaction effects. Three ways of doing so are proposed: a)
apply different systems across the same analytical topic to better understand the differences in output
which different system tpes engendered; b) employ multiple versions of the same system type,
applied to a single topic, but intentionally vary the design. By randomly assigning participants to
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different versions of the implementation it would be possible to measure the impact of said design
decisions on both participation and output; c) hold both system jpe and design constant, but vary
recruitment techniques to evaluate the impact of recruitment strategy on participation and interaction; d)
administer both an online and face-to-face process on the same subject to better understand their
variance and differences; e) apply a uniform survey instrument across different system designs and
types to evaluate the scenario output itself, focusing on either self-reported or expert evaluated factors
such as plausibility, completeness, believability, strategic relevance, etc. While each of these would
require a significant amount of testing and refinement to achieve robust research designs, it is hoped
that the contribution of this dissertation can lay the basic groundwork for more rigorous exploration
of different aspects of the scenario process in the future.
Finally, it is likely that new streams of research will open up as large scale data mining and
real time trend monitoring become more widespread. These are largely divorced from the scenario
planning and public engagement process at the moment, although research initiations such as the
Good Judgment Project are taking tentative steps towards combining them. Significant synthetic
work will likely be required to explore what such real-time systems offer the public scenario process,
and vice-versa. While it may be that they remain separate and unrelated in practice, I believe that
this intersection will bear exciting fruit in the next five to ten years.
9.5 Conclusion
This chapter opened with a summary of the entire dissertation. It presented the key goals and
objectives, an overview of the research problem, the research questions and study design. It briefly
summarized the case studies, the comparative studies and discussed how they were used to generate
findings. Highlights of the discussion of these results were noted, and then an extensive discussion
of the limitations of this work was presented. Finally, the chapter closed with a forward-looking
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discussion on the future opportunities which this topic suggests, making several specific
recommendations for study designs that would continue to advance our understanding of this area
of emerging research.
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